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A b s t r a c t
This thesis, Böhme and Hegel: A Study o f their Intellectual Development and Shared 
Readings o f  Two Christian Theologoumena, explores the connections which exist 
between both the intellectual development of Jakob Böhme and Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, and in their readings of two Christian theologoumena. As such, this 
thesis is divided into three chapters.
Chapter One consists of a comparative study between the intellectual 
development of Böhme and Hegel. The course of this development is divided into three 
phases, periods in which Böhme and Hegel will be shown to share. The examination 
begins with their reaction against Christian orthodoxy, their subsequent interest in the 
heterodox, and their eventual return to the Reformation. Through the course of this 
chapter it will be realised that the progression of Böhme and Hegel from one period to 
another constitutes development in language, but not in content. Both seek to find a 
mode of expression which adequately represents eternal truths which they consider to be 
perennial.
Chapter Two analyses an occasion in which Böhme and Hegel attempt to render 
this perennial content. Through their examination of the Christian concept of God, both 
are endeavouring to represent a kernel of religious truth, beyond its representational 
trappings. As such, both Böhme and Hegel will examine, in detail, Christian notions 
such as the nature of the unrevealed God, the Trinity and its supposed personhood, and 
the doctrine of the Incarnation.
Chapter Three continues Böhme and Hegel’s line of investigation, in attempting 
to unveil the speculative meaning between the Christian theologoumena of the creation
of the world, the psychology of the first created being, and the fall from his 
original nature. Through the course of this chapter, Bohme and Hegel’s shared 
thoughts on notions of the conflicting accounts of creation, the primordial unity 
with the divine, and the necessity of the Fall of Man will be examined.
Throughout the course of this comparative study, it is hoped that a clear 
and direct influence on Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophy of religion 
by Jakob Bohme will be shown.
ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS
Jakob Böhme
I  Apol. Tilke = The fir s t  apologie to Balthazar Tylcken: being an answ er o f  the authour
concerning his book the Aurora, opposed by an enem icitious p a sq u il or opprobrious libel, 
trans. by John Sparrow (London: Printed by M. S[immons] for Giles Calvert, 1661)
I I  Apol. Tilke = The Second  A pologie to Balthazar Tylcken: Treating o f  the E ternal Predestination
and  E lection o f  God, and  o f  the Incarnation, or Becom ing M an a n d  Person, o f  Christ, and  
C oncerning the Virgin M ary, trans. by John Sparrow (London: Printed by M .S. for Giles 
Calvert, 1661)
Apol. Richt. =  A n  A pology in A nsw er to G regorius Richter, trans. by John Sparrow (London: 
Printed by M. Simmons, 1665)
A urora = The Aurora, trans. by John Sparrow (London: Printed by M. Simmons, 1656; John M. 
Watkins, 1960)
Clavis = The Clavis, trans. by John Sparrow (London: Printed by M. Simmons, 1647) 
C ontem plation = On D ivine Contem plation, trans. by John Sparrow (London: Printed for M. 
Simmons, 1661)
Epistles = ‘The Sixty-Two Theosophic Epistles’, in The Rem ainder o f  Books written by Jacob  
Behm e  [s;'c], trans. by John Sparrow (London: Printed by M. S[immons] for Giles Calvert, 
1662)
Forty Q uestions = ‘Answers to Forty Questions Concerning the Soul’, in F orty Q uestions and  the 
Supersensual Life, trans. John Sparrow (London: n. pub., 1647. Reprint, Kessinger Publishing, 
2005)
G race =  ‘D e Electione Gratiae’, in D e Electione G ratiae and  Q uestiones Theosophicae, trans. by 
John Rolleston Earle (London: Constable, 1930)
Incarnation  =  O f the Incarnation o f  the Christ, trans. by John Rolleston Earle (London: Constable, 
1934)
Letzte Z eit =  O f the Last Times: Two Epistles to P au l Keym  [herafter Letzte Zeit], trans. by John 
Sparrow (London: Printed for M. Simmons, 1649)
Myst. Mag. = M ysterium  M agnum , trans. by John Sparrow (London: 1654; John M. Watkins, 
1924)
Princ. =  Concerning the Three Principles o f  the D ivine Essence, trans. by John Sparrow (London: 
Printed by M. Simmons, 1648; John M. Watkins, 1909)
Schriften  =  Säm tliche Schriften, ed. by Will-Erich Peuckert and August Faust, 11 vols (Stuttgart: 
Fromann, 1955-1961)
Seel. Frag. =  ‘Vierzig Fragen von der Seelen [hereafter Seel. Frag]’, in Säm tliche Schriften, vol 3 
Sig. Rer. = Signatura Rerum: The Signature o f  A ll Things, in The Works o f  Jacob  Behmen, The 
Teutonic Philosopher, trans. by John Sparrow, vol. 4 (London: Printed for G. Robinson, 1810) 
Stiefel =  ‘The Considerations upon Esaiah Stiefel’s Booke [sic] Concerning the Threefold State o f  
Man and the N ew  Birth’, in The R em ainder o f  B ooks written by Jacob B ehm e  [sic], trans. by 
John Sparrow (London: Printed by M. S[immons] for Giles Calvert, 1662)
Tab. Princ. =  A  Table o f  the Three Principles, trans. by H. Blunden and John Sparrow (London: 
Printed by M. Simmons, 1654)
Theos. Frag. = ‘Questiones Theosophicae’, in De E lectione G ratiae a n d  Q uestiones 
Theosophicae, trans. by John Rolleston Earle (London: Constable, 1930)
Theos. Punkt. =  Six Theosophic Points a n d  O ther Writings, trans. by John Rolleston Earle 
(University o f  Michigan Press, 1958)
Threefold  =  The Threefold Life o f  M an, trans. by John Sparrow (London: n. pub, 1650; reprinted 
by Watkins, 1909)
Way =  The Way to Christ, trans. and introduction by Peter Erb (New  York: Paulist Press, 1978)
Briefe = Briefe von und an Hegel, ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister and R o lf Flechsig, 4 vols 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1952-1961)
EL = Encyclopedia Logic, trans. by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1991)
ETW  = Early Theological Writings, trans. by Thomas M alcolm Knox (Philadelphia: University o f  
Pennsylvania Press, 1979)
Geraets =  The Encyclopedia Logic, trans. by T. F. Geraets et al. (Albany: State University o f  N ew  
York Press, 1991)
Glöckner = Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. by Herman Glöckner, 
26 vols (Stuttgart: 1927-39), xv, 53. The first 20 vols, containing H egel’s writings, are a 
reprint o f  the 1832-1887 edition (19 vols). V ols 2 1 -2 2  contain Glockner’s Hegel and vols 2 3 -  
26 his Hegel-Lexikon
Hoffmeister =  Berliner Schriften, ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Published for Felix 
Meiner, 1956)
Letters =  Hegel: The Letters, trans. by Clark Butler and Christianne Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984)
LHP =  Lectures on the History o f  Philosophy, 3 vols., trans. by E. S. Haldane (London: Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Triibner, 1892)
LPH  =  The Philosophy o f  History, trans. by John Sibree, with an introduction by C. J. Friedrich 
(Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001 )
LPR = Lectures on the Philosophy o f  Religion, ed. by Peter C. Hodgson, trans. by R. F. Brown, P. 
C. Hodgson and others, 3 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University o f  California Press, 
1984, 1985, 1987; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). The reference LPR without 
accompanying volume numbers refers to Lectures on Philosophy o f  Religion: One-Volume 
Editions —  The Lectures o f  1827, ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley: University o f  California 
Press; One-Volume edition, 1988)
Nohl =  Hegels Theologische Jugendschriften, ed. by Hermann N ohl (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1907)
PhM  = Phenomenology o f  Mind, trans. by J. B. Baillie, 2nd edn. rev. (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1949)
PN = The Philosophy o f  Nature, ed. and trans. by M. J. Petry, 3 vols. (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1970)
Postivity = The Positivity o f  the Christian Religion, in Early Theological Writings, trans. by T. M.
Knox (Chicago: University o f  Chicago, 1948)
PhS = The Phenomenology o f  Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). 
Sämtliche Werke= Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Hermann Glöckner, 20 vols (Stuttgart: Fromann, 
1937-1957)
Spirit = Spirit = The Spirit o f  Christianity and its Fate, in Early Theological Writings, trans. by T.
M. Knox (Chicago: University o f  Chicago, 1948)
VPH = Philosophy o f  History: Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Welgeschichte, ed. by Georg 
Lasson, 4 vols (Hamburg: Meiner, 1934)
VPR = Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, ed. by Walter Jaeschke, 3 vols (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner, 1984-1987)
Werke = G.W.F. Hegel: Werke, 20 vols, ed. by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986)
WL = Wissenschaft der Logik, 3 vols, ed. by Hans-Jürgen Gawoll (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1986— 
1992)
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
In accordance with recent scholarship, Jakob Böhme (‘Jakob Bern’ according 
some Görlitz annals; ‘Jacob Behmen’ to his English early translators; and ‘Jacob
Boehme’ to the British Museum) will be referred to according to this spelling 
throughout the text. Due to the enormous variety of editions and re-printings of 
the Böhme corpus,1 references made to John Sparrow’s English translations of 
Böhme’s works will take the form of part (or volume or book), chapter, and 
paragraph. For example, a later reference to part two, chapter three, paragraph 
twenty-six of Sparrow’s translation of the Incarnation o f  Jesus Christ would take 
the form of Incarnation, n, 3. 26. If a text is not divided into parts, then the 
reference will be to chapter and paragraph, e.g. Aurora, 7. 10. If a text is divided 
into neither parts nor chapters, references will be made simply to paragraphs, e.g. 
Clavis, 20. References made to Hegel’s works, whether the original German 
manuscripts or to their English translations, are made either to page (indicated by 
p.) or to paragraph (where the p. shall be absent).
For the sake of clarity, the long, medial ‘s’ characters used in the 
typography of the prints of Sparrow’s English translations of the Böhme 
manuscripts have been replaced by their modem counterparts. Capitalization has 
been modernised. This thesis shall follow the convention of Hodgson’s English 
editions of Hegel’s works, and use the lower case for Hegel’s philosophical 
terminology. ‘Spirit’, therefore shall be written in lower case (including the 
philosophical name of God, ‘absolute spirit’), except when it is in reference to the 
(Holy) Spirit of the Trinity. Words of special technical meaning in Böhme and 
Hegel’s philosophical systems will also be provided with their German equivalent
1 Which, as o f  1957, total six hundred pages across two volumes o f  W emer Buddecke’s 
bibliography o f  Böhm e’s work, D ie Jakob  Böhm e-Ausgaben, 2 vols (Göttingen: Häntzschel, 1937— 
1957). See also Buddecke’s Verzeichnis von Jakob-Böhm e H andschriften  (Göttingen: Häntzschel, 
1934).
Quotations from scripture will come from the The Holy Bible: The New Revised 
Standard Version (Nashville, T.N.: Catholic Bible Press, 1993).
from the original editions of their works.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores the connections which exist between German mystic and 
‘Teutonic philosopher’ Jakob Böhme (1575-1624) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel (1770-1831), with specific reference to their intellectual development and 
shared interpretation of two theologoumena central to Christian thought, namely, the 
concept of God and the creation of the world and its fall.1
The relationship between the work of the Jakob Böhme, a sixteenth century 
Saxon mystic, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, an eighteenth century 
Enlightenment philosopher, is not as obscure as once may have been thought. In 
recent years works devoted to this subject have been produced, such as, for instance, 
David Walsh’s essay, ‘The Historical Dialectic of Spirit: Jacob Boehme’s Influence 
on Hegel’, which draws upon his Ph.D. dissertation, The Esoteric Origins o f Modern 
Ideological Thought: Boehme to Hegel.2 There is also Cyril O’Regan’s book, The 
Heterodox Hegel, in which it has been commented that there are, in fact, ‘massive 
structural correspondences’ between Böhme and Hegel’s work, particularly at ‘the 
level of central theologoumena such as the Trinity, creation, evil, etc., as well as the
1 In reference to these two Christian notions, the term theologoum ena  is used, instead of, perhaps, 
‘doctrines’ or ‘confessions’, as both have not, as w ill be shown, been satisfactorily or coherently 
posited by Christian orthodoxy. It is the argument o f  both Böhme and H egel that the concept o f  God 
and the creation o f  the world and its fall, as posited by the mainstream o f  the Christian religion, are, at 
their very core, deficient. See Chapters Two and Three o f  this thesis.2 David Walsh, ‘The Historical Dialectic o f  Spirit: Jacob Boehm e’s Influence on H egel’, in H istory  
and  System: H e g e l’s P hilosophy o f  H istory, ed. by Robert Perkins (Albany, N . Y.: State University o f  
N ew  York Press, 1984), pp. 15-35; ‘The Esoteric Origins o f  M odem  Ideological Thought: Boehme to 
H egel’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University o f  Virginia, 1978).
1
depth-narrative level’.3 O’Regan surmises that Jakob Böhme holds the position of ‘the 
singlemost important modem precedent of the type of religio-philosophical scheme 
articulated by Hegel’.4
This precedence of Böhme’s thought upon Hegel’s religio-philosophical 
scheme will be examined in three main chapters. Chapter One begins with a 
comparative study of the philosophical development of Böhme and Hegel’s thought. 
This study should not be considered a mere historical vignette on the intellectual 
climate of the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, rather this chapter focuses on the 
shared theological, philosophical, and cultural forces at work on Böhme and Hegel’s 
thought, in addition to the central problem with which they concern themselves. This 
problem is in how to express truths which, for both, are considered to be perennial. In 
this way, their periods of engagement and disengagement with the values posited by 
the factions, institutions, and currents of thought of their time are to be considered 
movements in modes of expression, in finding a language through which these eternal 
truths can be expressed. As will become apparent, it is only Hegel, and not Böhme, 
who escapes this wheel of representation and finds an adequate vehicle for the 
expression for these truths.
The second chapter deals with one of the central theologoumena o f Christian 
thought: the concept of God as Trinity. Throughout its history as an idea, the notion 
of the Trinity has been treated as something of an entirely mysterious nature by
3 Cyril O ’Regan, The H eterodox H egel (Albany, N.Y.: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 1994), pp. 
18-19. See especially pp. 150-155, 180-187, 223-232 , 279-285 .4 O ’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, p. 19.
2
Christian orthodoxy,5 but that is a treatment which neither Böhme nor Hegel are 
willing to countenance. Both desire to formulate the Trinity in such a way as is 
accessible to reason, and, as such, find themselves at odds with the tradition of 
Augustine and Luther at a central level. Both Böhme and Hegel argue for the 
importance of an account of the hidden nature of God, and urge for a departure from 
the traditional representation of the Trinity as one as composed of real persons.
The final chapter seeks to show the influence of Böhme’s account of the 
creation of the world and the Fall of man on Hegel’s speculation regarding the same. 
Both will be shown to have a shared reading of the dual analogues of creation 
common to Christian orthodoxy: the creatio ex Deo, or emanationist, and creatio ex 
nihilo, or creation from ‘nothing’, accounts. From there, the examination will then 
move to their psychological evaluation of the first created being, Adam, considered as 
the archetype for humanity. Finally, the chapter will conclude with Böhme and 
Hegel’s reading of the Fall of Man account present in Genesis 3, and the 
epistemology and moral consequences of that fall from primordial unity.
As Hegel shares an similar religious heritage, upbringing, and early education 
to Böhme, it will be worthwhile, throughout the course of this thesis, to contrast the 
thought of both against what was popularly held to be theologically true at the time. 
For both Hegel and Böhme, this theological anchor was Protestant orthodoxy or 
scholasticism. This will both allow for a clearer picture of Hegel’s and Böhme’s
5 Here, and elsewhere, the term ‘Christian orthodoxy’ refers to certain mainstream Christian traditions, 
the doctrines o f  which are based upon the N icene Creed. Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism are, in 
this instance, specifically thought of.
3
theological and speculative thought to be drawn, and will situate it in its proper 
historical milieu.
On a final note, this thesis will consider, as per Hegel’s own wishes, the 
language of Böhme’s more Hermetic and visionary works less according to their 
original theosophical nature, and more philosophically. The use of symbolism and 
mystical language which appears throughout Böhme’s work will be read as figurative, 
and, thus, as a cipher for what may be rationally expressed.
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CHAPTER I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BOHME AND HEGEL’S 
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
In order to examine the influence of Böhme on Hegel, it will be useful to compare in 
general the content of their respective philosophies of religion. Both Böhme and 
Hegel’s philosophies of religion can be shown to share in a three-fold development. 
The first stage of development begins with a rejection of their Protestant orthodox 
heritage, education, and early intellectual development. This is examined in Section 
One of this chapter. This rejection leads to a period of creative introspection and 
flirtation with the heterodox — from the broad mystical traditions of Hermeticism, to 
the language and symbolism of, what may be called, ‘speculative’ alchemy. This is 
addressed in Section Two. The third and final stage for both, however, differs 
somewhat. Böhme’s transition from an initial rejection of Luther to a subsequent 
interest in dissenting doctrine leads him ultimately back again to the Reformation. 
Hegel’s development, however, though too leading him back to the Reformation, also 
advances him far beyond it, to the liberation of religion from the language of 
representation altogether. Essentially, these three phases of intellectual development 
which both philosophers have in common constitute a development in form, so to 
speak, but not in substance. The transition between rejection of orthodoxy, dalliance 
with the heterodox, and return to the Reformation, are periods of creative curiosity
5
with modes of expression, of language. Each serves as a cipher which renders a 
content which is, for both, perennial. It will become apparent, in Section Three, 
however, that it is only Hegel, and not Böhme, who comes to find the ultimate 
medium for the representation of this perennial content.
S e c t i o n  O n e  
R e a c t i o n  A g a i n s t  C h r i s t i a n  O r t h o d o x y
The first period for both philosophers which is deserving of examination is their 
formative years. Both Böhme and Hegel were raised and educated as Lutherans, and 
both later came to reject this faith. Their rejection of the claims of Protestant 
orthodoxy was due, in no small part, to the intellectual and cultural climates in which 
both found themselves during their early development. For Böhme, it was the twin 
undercurrents of the works of the German mystics and the spirit of humanism which 
ran through his youth spent as a cobbler in Lusatian town of Görlitz. For Hegel, this 
reaction against prevailing theological attitudes can be seen as the product of his early 
academic career at the Tübingen seminary, from which an interest in the Pietist 
movement and an espousal of the critical methods of the German Enlightenment 
came as a result. This rejection would, for both, come to have a two-pronged effect: it 
would cause them, like Kanf s first reading of Hume, to be awoken from their 
‘dogmatic slumber’; and would act as a negative pole against which they could orient
6
both themselves and their philosophical outlooks.
§ 1. 1. The Development o f Böhme ’s Theological Vision in the Face o f  Protestant 
Orthodoxy
Böhme was both bom into and educated by what has been called ‘Protestant 
orthodoxy’ or ‘Protestant scholasticism’. Protestant orthodoxy describes the 
Reformation tradition of piety and biblical exegesis associated with Martin Luther 
and his disciple Philip Melancthon — the doctrinal works associated with this 
tradition being primarily the Augsburg Confession (1530) and the Formula o f  
Concord (1577). Böhme’s father, also Jakob Böhme, was Kirchenvater of their 
hometown, Alt Seidenburg, in addition to being vestryman of its church, and was 
alleged to have a penchant towards the evangelical or ‘enthusiastic’ mode of 
worship.1 The content of Böhme’s education, under Johann Leder von Schneidsburg 
at the Seidenberg school, was primarily of a religious nature, composed of instruction 
in both scripture and Luther’s Smaller Catechism.2 Böhme was sent for further 
catechises to the town church, which was recently reformed by the Prince Elector in 
order to purge remnants of pre-Reformation ‘superstition’, the preaching in which
1 Hermann A dolf Fechner, ‘Sketch o f  the Life o f  Jacob Boehm e’, in Jakob Böhm e’s On the Election o f  
Grace and Theosophic Questions, trans. by John Rolleston Earle (London: Constable, 1930; repr. 
Kessinger Publishing, 1998), pp. x iv , and ff.2 Ibid. See also Richard Jecht, Jakob Böhme, Gedenkgabe der Stadt Görlitz (Görlitz: Selbstverlag des 
Magistrats der Stadt Görlitz, 1924), pp. 20 -21 .
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was focused upon ‘the Prophets, Apostles, Symbolic documents, and the Augsburg 
Confession’.3 The church’s devotional aspect, too, was strictly Protestant —  the 
hymnal used was composed by Luther, a document which was the stock and trade of 
the German churches, and ‘thesaurus of the Lutheran faith’ during the period.4 This 
religious education, writes his earliest biographer, Abraham von Frankenberg, 
instilled in the young Böhme a sense of pious duty, from which he ‘kept constantly to 
his church, together with reading the Holy Bible, a regular attendance upon the Word 
preached, and participation in the Holy Sacraments’.5
Finishing school at fourteen, and serving as an apprentice cobbler for a 
number of years, in 1595 Böhme moved to a town two miles distant from Alt 
Seidenberg, to Görlitz in Upper Lusatia, becoming a fully-fledged citizen of which in 
1599.6 The town itself was to have a tremendous effect on Böhme’s intellectual 
development. During Böhme’s time there, Görlitz, an important trading post in 
eastern Germany, found itself at an age of great financial prosperity. Such prosperity 
brought Görlitz a measure of cultural independence, leading it to cast aside the bonds 
of Germanic medieval feudalism, leading it to become ‘a place where men and ideas 
met, a crossroads for the conflicting philosophies and religious impulses of the age’.7
3 John Joseph Stoudt, Sunrise to E ternity: A  S tudy in Jacob Boehm e ’s L ife and  Thought (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), p. 45.
4 Ibid., p. 148.
5 Abraham von Franckenberg, D e Vita et scriptis Jacob Boehmens, oder ausfürlich erläuterter 
historischer B erich t von den Leben und  Schrijften des...Jacob  Boehm e  (Amsterdam: [n.pub.] 1730), 
#10.6 Görlitzer Traubuch , 10 May 1599. See Jecht, p. 10.
7 Johann Gottlieb Müller, Versuch einer O berlautzischen Reform azionsgeschichte  (Görlitz: Anton, 
1801), p. 318; Stoudt, p. 48;
8
As such, Görlitz became home to many humanists, scholars, physicians, and 
travellers. On the whole, Böhme’s religious notions were, until now, of an 
unreflective nature. It was upon the appointment of a new pastor in Görlitz in 1600, 
however, that Böhme, according to Franckenberg, found his religious spirit 
awakened. Böhme became ‘enraptured with the astral spirit of the soul’, and gained a 
new, conscious appreciation for Christianity.8
What caused this ‘new awakening’ in Böhme was what, a hundred years 
earlier, had spurred on Luther’s Reformation. It was the humanist spirit which sought 
to dispense with the primitive theological dualisms of the medieval Church —  of the 
division between man and God, the temporal and the eternal, the secular and the 
sacred, the natural and the spiritual, the world and the Church, reason and faith, and 
of flesh and spirit —  and to remould the world according to a new, rational vision of 
totality. It was this same spirit which engendered Erasmus to wish that ‘there could be 
an end of scholastic subtleties, or, if not an end, that they could be thrust into a second 
place and Christ be taught plainly and simply’.9 This humanist spirit, which was 
partially responsible for instigating the Reformation, was not a spirit, however, 
present in Luther himself. His reforming instincts were curtailed by his 
conservativism and by his determination not to ‘go faster or farther than he could 
carry Germany’.10
8 Franckenberg, #11.9 Erasmus, E pistle CCVII.10 Rufus M. Jones, Spiritual Reform ers in the 16th and  17th Centuries (London: MacMillan and Co., 
1914), p. 9.
9
He could not comprehend [...] the bold spirits who were dedicated to the task of 
reinterpreting Christianity in terms of the new age; he loved the old, in so far as it 
seemed to him unspoiled by apostasy and corruption, and he naturally kept reverting to 
ancient dogma and the accepted theology of the old Church instead of leading the way 
into a fresh, vital, spiritual form of Christianity [...] his normal tendency was toward a 
non-mystical type of Christianity, toward a Christianity thoroughly based on scripture, 
logically constructed out of the concepts of the nature of God and man, so ancient, 
sacred, and orthodox, that they seemed to him axioms of theology and capable of 
being formulated into a saving system of truth, as universal and as unalterable as the 
multiplication table [...] [Luther] wanders far afield from experience, draws curious 
conclusions from unverified concepts, piles text on text as though heaven could be 
scaled by another Pelion on Ossa, and once more turns religion back to the cooled 
lava-beds of theology. He never could succeed in getting the God of his heart’s 
glowing faith into the theologies which he laboriously budded. As soon as he started 
constructing he invariably fell back upon the building-material which had already been 
quarried, and which lay at hand.11
As such, many during Böhme’s time felt that the Reformation had not gone far 
enough. One of such persons was the recently appointed pastor primarius of Görlitz, 
Martin Moller (1547-1606). Moller, who, like Böhme, had had some schooling but 
could not afford a university education. Christopher Rnauthe, a pastor of a 
neighbouring town, wrote many years later that after Moller’s appointment a great 
religious rival in Görlitz followed, into which Böhme was swept.12 Johann Otto 
Glusing, an eighteenth century editor of Böhme’s work, shares Knauthe’s sentiment, 
stating that Moller was instrumental to Böhme’s spiritual development.13 John Joseph 
Stoudt, a more recent commentator on Böhme’s work, remarks that Moller ‘was the 
first and perhaps the dominant influence’ on Böhme, both of whom shared a
11 Ibid., pp. 9-10.12 H istoria C ryptocalvinism i in Lausat., suc., in Görlitz Archives, Annales, 255ff; N eues Lausitzischen  
M agazin , 94 (1918), pp. 48ff.
13 S. G. Grösser, M ehrere M erkw ü rd ig ke iten  (Görtlitz: [n. pub.], 1714), #8.
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relationship similar to Thomas ä Kempis and Johann Arndt.14 Along with his position 
as pastor, Moller organized a spiritual group of sympathizers of the German mystical 
tradition, the ‘Conventicle of God’s Real Servants’, of which Böhme was a member.15 
Although Moller had no university education, he was, nevertheless, both a talented 
translator o f religious literature (including ‘Ignatius’s letters, of Theodoretus’ 
dialogues, and of other patristic literature’),16 and a prolific writer, particularly of 
devotional tracts, such as the Meditationes sanctorum patrum durch Martin 
Mollerum, the Manuale Mortis and the Schedia Regia, works which were much 
influenced by Augustine, Tauler, Bernard of Clairvaux, the Victorines, Ruysbroeck, 
Suso, and Thomas ä Kempis.17 Some sermonized material which he would have 
preached to Böhme from the pulpit was published as the Praxis Evangeliorum, 
passages from which, as one commentator notes, are of a very similar character to 
passages in Böhme’s Aurora,18 In this way, Moller held a strong influence over 
Böhme’s intellectual development. The criticism may been made, however, that direct 
reference to Moller is seldom mentioned in Böhme’s work; in fact, he is referred to
14 Stoudt, pp. 51—52. See Will-Erich Peuckert, Die Rosenkreutzer: Zur Geschichte einer Reformation 
(Jena: [n.pub.], 1928; new ed., Berlin: E. Schmidt, 1973), pp. 259-260 .15 Richard Jecht, Jakob Böhme, Gedenkgabe der Stadt Görlitz (Görlitz: Selbstverlag des Magistrats der 
Stadt Görlitz, 1924), p. 27. See Eduard Emjil Koch, Geschichte des Deutschen Kirchenlieds, 7 vols 
(Stuttgart: [n. pub.], 1852), I, pp. 178-180.16 Stoudt, p. 51. Cf. Mehrere Merckwürdigkeiten, #8.17 Albrecht Ritschl, Geschichte des Pietismus in der lutherische Kirche des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts, 
3 vols (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1880-1886), n, p. 57. Cf. Stoudt, p. 51.18 Will-Erich Peuckert, Das Leben Jakob Böhmes (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1924), p. 24. The most 
recent publication o f  M oller’s work is Elke Axmacher’s Praxis Evangeliorum: Theologie und 
Frömmigkeit bei Martin Moller (1547-1606) (Berlin: Kirchliche Hochschule, 1986; repr. Göttingen, 
1989).
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only once by name, in a letter to Moller’s son.19 While this incongruity is surprising, 
the likely explanation is that the time of Böhme’s greatest literary output was also, as 
shall be seen, a time of great personal persecution, and, as such, Böhme did not want 
Moller, to whom he was so much indebted, to be indicted on similar charges of 
heresy.20
It was under Moller’s influence that, from the spring of 1600, Böhme 
experienced a series of mystical visions which lead him to compose his first work, the 
Aurora, unabashedly subtitled as the ‘root or mother of [all] philosophy’ (die Würziel 
oder Mutter der Philosophie). Franckenberg claims that these visions which acted as 
a catalyst for the composition of the book were initiated ‘by means of an 
instantaneous glance [...] cast upon a bright pewter dish, [which] introduced into the 
innermost ground or centre of the [...] hidden nature’.21 Böhme’s own writings, 
however, contradict this fantastical account —  the content of the Aurora was not the 
consequence of a sudden, Gnostic experience, but the product of many years of 
thought and reflection. The stifling religious climate of Protestant orthodoxy had dealt 
Böhme, to his own mind, ‘many a hard blow’, causing him to fall ‘into deep
19 Jakob Bohme, The Epistles o f  Jacob Bohm e  [hereafter E pistles], trans. by John Sparrow (repr. 
Kessinger Publishing, 1997), 63. 12.20 The opinion o f  Stoudt, p. 52.21 Frackenberg, D e Vita..., #11. That is to say, Franckenberg argues that the composition o f  the A urora  
was brought about through a meditative experience similar to the yogic phenomenon o f  samadhi, in 
which the consciousness o f  the subject is merged with that o f  the contemplated subject, thereby 
transcending the subject-object relation. See Roland Fischer, ‘A  Cartography o f  the Ecstatic and 
Meditative States’, Leonardo, 6 (1973), 59-66; Michael Comans, ‘The Question o f  the Importance o f  
Samadhi in M odem  and Classical Advaita Vedanta’, Philosophy E ast and  West, 43 (1993), 19-38. See 
also Roger Walsh, ‘Phenomenological Mapping and Comparisons o f  Shamanic, Buddhist, Yogic, and 
Schizophrenic Experiences’, Journal o f  the A m erican  Academ y o f  Religion, 61 (1993), 739-769  (p. 
742).
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melancholy and sadness when [he] contemplated the great deep of the world’.22 
Böhme’s intellectual spirit, ‘in such sadness’,23 was provoked to try to reconcile his 
newly found spiritual values with those of the world around him. Böhme was 
‘wrestling in God’s presence’ with a world as now defined by Luther and 
Melancthon, a world in which the conflicting Renaissance values of mystical 
devotion and nature philosophy were crashing together.24 His orthodox Protestant 
upbringing as a boy, together with his schooling in Lutheran catechises afforded him 
little comfort intellectually. As Böhme puts it, he discovered no answers from the 
‘high masters’, finding only ‘nothing but a half dead spirit’;25 the high-minded and 
dry scholastic disputes over petty theological points failed to provide him any 
comfort. The Aurora, therefore, may be viewed as literary exposition of Böhme’s 
wrangling with these issues. As Böhme writes in a letter, the Aurora ‘unfolded itself 
within me from time to time [...] I went around pregnant with it for twelve years, and 
a hefty impulse arose in me before I could bring it to external form’.26
In th is ligh t m y  spirit d irectly  saw  through all th in gs, and k n ew  G od  in and b y  all 
creatures, even  in herbs and grass [ . . . ]  In th is light m y  w ill  grew  in great d esire to  
d escrib e the b ein g  o f  G od  [ . . . ]  N o w  from  th is ligh t I h ave m y  k n ow led ge , as w e ll as 
m y  w ill  and drive; and I w ill w rite th is k n ow led ge  accord in g  to  m y  g ifts  [ . . . ]  and let 
G od  w ork  h is w ill;  [ . . . ]  I w ill attend and w a it w hat the Lord in ten d s.27
22 Jakob B ohm e, The Aurora [hereafter Aurora], trans. by John Sparrow (London: 1656; John M. 
W atkins, 1960), 19. 1 -6 .
23 Ibid., 1 9 .7 -1 1 .
24 Ibid., preface, 2 2 -2 5 .
25 Ibid., 10. 27 .
26 Epistles, 12. 10.
21 Aurora, 19. 13—17.
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Böhme, nevertheless, cannot be considered completely hostile to the Reformation. An 
appeal to purely intuitional values, as per Luther’s aim, is not Böhme’s intention, and, 
as such, rational discourse for Böhme still has its place within the world of religion. 
This is clear from the Aurora itself, for, as Stoudt comments, here 4 was no ecstasy, no 
nirvana, no bridal chamber mishmash of subject and object, or creator and creature, 
[...] no merging with the Godhead, no unio mystica', but the product of many years 
of spiritual guidance from Moller.28 Such an evaluation of Böhme’s book, 
nevertheless, is not readily apparent because, superficially, the Aurora reads as if it 
were some medieval grimoire, replete with the usually litany of angel, devil, and spirit 
talk. Böhme’s way of expressing his thoughts is unclear and circuitous; the narrative 
of the text jumps from point to point, and the issues which are raised are seldom 
satisfactorily resolved. On closer inspection, however, the Aurora betrays of an in- 
depth knowledge of humanism, of Copemican theory, and of the dichotomies 
between values of the old world and new. Moller’s influence is also apparent 
throughout, for the thought of Eckhart, Tauler, Suso, Mechthild, the Ebners, Nicholas 
of Strasburg, and the Theologia Germanica are each represented.29 Böhme is only too 
aware of how the text appears to the superficial eye, accounting for the Aurora's 
clumsy prose and sometimes confused narrative as being due to its being a work of 
his 'spiritual childhood’.30 In a later text, Böhme elaborates further on the Aurora's 
difficult style:
28 Stoudt, p. 59.29 Ibid., p. 80.30 Epistles, 12. 56.
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I wrote only my own mind as I understood it in the deep; and I made no commentary 
on it as I did not intend that it should be read; I wanted to keep it for myself; had I 
known that it would be read I would have written more clearly [...] Also my spirit’s 
labour in it and with it was continuous [...] For the light’s spirit moved my soul very 
much [...] repeating many things very often, ever deeper and clearer, from one step to 
another — it was the real Jacob’s ladder.31
What most significantly distinguishes the Aurora from any other Christian mystical 
text or medieval grimoire is that it does not purport itself to be the product of classic 
mystical staple of union with the Godhead. As Stoudt comments, Böhme ‘did not 
climb a ladder into the Bosom; he did not follow to Dante’s Golden Rose there to be 
lost in temptation; he was not melted into an abyss of being’.32 Böhme himself 
admits, that he ‘did not climb up into the Godhead’, rather ‘the Godhead climbed up 
in me, and revealed such to me out of his Love, which otherwise I would have had to 
leave it quite alone in my half-dead fleshly birth’.33
It was through the composition of the Aurora that Böhme discovered a new 
found place for himself in the religious sphere, a locus in which he could define and 
represent his visionary content. Böhme thought of himself, not as a successor to 
Luther, but as ‘a new Luther to a profounder reformation’, chosen to reveal to 
mankind that which had previously been hidden, and which had been unable to be
31 Jakob B öhm e, The fir s t  apologie to B althazar Tylcken [electronic resource] : being an answ er o f  
the authour concerning his book the Aurora, opposed by an enem icitious p a sq u il or opprobrious libel 
[hereafter I  Apol. Tilke], trans. by John Sparrow (London: Printed by  M . Sfinim ons] for G iles Calvert, 
1661) preface, 3 1 -3 7 .
32 Stoudt, p. 61.3 Aurora, 8. 7.
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faithfully represented by rationally based creeds.34 This ‘profounder reformation’, or 
reformatio nova, was already occurring, for, as Böhme writes, ‘the time already 
appears, and soon will come; he who wakes sees it [...] First there must come a great 
tribulation before it be fully manifest. The cause is the great contention of the learned 
[...] Let no honest man defile himself with such contention’.35 While Böhme may 
have been prepared to instigate a new, second Reformation, the world, as will become 
apparent, was perhaps not.
§ 1. 2. Hegel, Tubingen, and Protestant Orthodoxy
Hegel began his studies in theology at the Tübingen theological seminary, or Stift, in 
1788. H. S. Harris comments that Hegel entered the Stift purely because he was not 
under the obligation to pay for his education.36 Wiedmann argues, however, that 
Hegel never had any other intention academically than studying theology.37 
Regardless, Hegel’s decision to study at the Stift is a significant one. As is commonly 
attested to, the language of German theology and philosophy began with Eckhart. As 
one commentator writes: ‘[T]he most important factor in the growth of philosophical 
German throughout the medieval period (when mainstream philosophy was, as
34 Stoudt, p. 65.
35 Epistles, 46.36 Henry Silton Harris, H egel’s Development: Towards the Sunlight (1770—1801) (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), p. 64.37 Franz Wiedmann, Hegel: An Illustrated Biography, trans. by Joachim Neugroschel (New York: 
Pegasus, 1983), p. 15.
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elsewhere, normally written in Latin) was German mysticism, which owed as much to 
Neo-Platonism and to Gnosticism as to Christianity. Its first major representative was 
the Dominican, Meister (Johann) Eckharf ,38 As such, the work of Eckhart, as of 
many of the Rhineland mystics, came to be appropriated by Luther and the 
Reformation. It then comes as no surprise that the history of German philosophy is 
inexorably linked with Protestantism. The reality of this is demonstrated in the 
curriculum of the Tübingen Stift, as per Nietzsche’s famous indictment that,
Among Germans one will understand immediately when I say that philosophy has 
been corrupted by theologian blood. The Protestant pastor is the grandfather of 
German philosophy, Protestantism itself its peccatum originale [...] One has only to 
say the words ‘Tiibinger Stiff to grasp what German philosophy is at bottom — a 
cunning theology [...] The Swabians are the best liars in Germany, they lie 
innocently.39
The intellectual atmosphere of the university which Hegel entered into at the time was 
an uneasy one —  the theological faculty having been polarised by Kant’s philosophy 
into two factions: the ‘old’, conservative, and orthodox Protestant; and the ‘new’, 
radical, Pietist faction. The curriculum of the ‘Old Tübingen’ Stift, at the time led by 
Professors Flatt and Storr, was focused upon preserving the orthodox view of biblical 
supematuralism by the use of sceptical Kantianism.40 The ‘New Tübingen’ radical 
faction, which promulgated the ideals of the German Enlightenment, had its inception
38 Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: W iley-Blackwell, 1992), p. 8f.39 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, trans. by Reginald John Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1990), p. 131.40 Lawrence Dickey, Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics o f  Spirit 1770-1807  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 6.
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a generation before Hegel. Reuchlin, A. A. Hochstetter, and J. W. Jaeger had been 
professors there, and Bengel, Johann Valentin Andreae, Oetinger, Johann Ludwig 
Fricker, and Philipp Matthäus Hahn had been students.41
What was Böhme’s period of instruction under Moller which led him to reject 
the strict orthodoxy of Lutheranism, were Hegel’s years in the Tübingen Stift. Hegel 
found himself more sympathetic to the forward-thinking Enlightenment ideals of his 
Pietist tutors than to the antique and reactionary theology of the Old Stift. The 
accounts of his time spent there come from his own journal (kept from 1785), his 
early publications, and letters to and from friends.
The essays composed during this period of Hegel’s intellectual development 
were originally published, along with an exposition, by Wilhelm Dilthey in 1906 as 
the Jugendgeschichte Hegels.42 The Hegel essays were later published and edited 
separately by Herman Nohl, with the unfortunate title of Hegels theologische 
Jugendschriften.43 This error was further compounded T. M. Knox’s 1949 English 
translation, Hegel’s Early Theological Writings.44 The title is unfortunate and 
erroneous for the content of this collection is not, by Hegel’s own admission, 
theological. These include the critical essays The Positivity o f the Christian Religion
41 Ibid. p. 86. See also Glenn Alexander M agee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition (Cornell University 
Press, 2001), p. 70.42 Wilhelm Dilthey and Herman Nohl, Die Judgendgeschichte Hegels und andere Abhandlungen zur 
Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus (Leipzing and Berlin: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990).43 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegels Theologische Jugendschriften [hereafter N ohl], ed. by 
Herman Nohl (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1907).4 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Early Theological Writings [hereafter ETW\, trans. by Thomas 
Malcolm Knox and introduction by Richard Kroner (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 
1971). This collection includes ‘The Positivity o f  the Christian Religion [herafter Positivity] ’ o f  1795, 
and ‘The Spirit o f  Christianity and its Fate [hereafter Spirit]' o f  circa 1798-1799.
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(1795) and The Spirit o f  Christianity and Its Fate (circa. 1798-1799). The Positivity 
contends that the supposed failure of Christianity is the result of a historical 
misinterpretation of the religion due to its Jewish heritage. Hegel examines biblical 
history, from the Genesis account through to the foundation of the Jewish state and 
Crucifixion of Jesus, in order to assess instances of irrationalism present in the 
foundation of the Christian religion. The Spirit o f  Christianity pursues a Kantian 
argument —  that Christianity fails as a moral religion, as it does not base its moral 
code on the pursuit of acts which are good in themselves, but are founded on 
authority.
The Hegel of this period, then, is adequately described by the oft-repeated 
appellation of a ‘theologian manque’. He is not Richard Kroner’s ‘Christian mystic’ 
who ‘discovered his own soul by discovering the soul of Jesus’,45 rather, as Georg 
Lukács argues, Hegel is the essential anti-theologian.46 Though, to be fair, Hegel at 
times encourages this conception, later stating in the Lectures in the History o f  
Philosophy that ‘philosophers are closer to the Lord than those who live by the 
crumbs of the Spirit; they read, or write, the cabinet orders of God in the original; it is 
their duty to write them down. The philosophers are the mystai who have been present 
at the decision in the innermost sanctuary’.47 Further, in the preface to the second
45 Richard Kroner, ‘Introduction’, in Early Theological Writings, pp. 8f.
4GO f course, Lukács goes too far in his summation o f  this anti-theological period as ‘eine 
Geschichtesiegende reaktionärer Apologeten des Imperialismus’. Der junge Hegel: Über die 
Beziehungen von Dialektik und Oekonomie (Zürich and Vienna: Europa, 1948), p. 45.47 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister, 3 vols 
(Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1940) m, p. 96. See also the following extract from a 16th o f  April, 1795, letter
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edition of the Encyclopedia, Hegel declares ‘what was revealed as a mystery in earlier 
times should now be revealed for thinking itself.48
Hegel’s early rejection of Protestant orthodoxy does not, as Bohme’s does, 
come by way of the German mystical tradition. Rather, it is a product of the German 
Enlightenment, the movement seeking to dispense with the foundationalist 
approaches of Locke, Descartes, and Hume and embrace a unified theory of being, of 
man seen as a totality. As such, the young Hegel’s treatment of Christian religion is 
indicative of the majority of Enlightenment writers —  based upon Mosheim, Gibbon, 
and Forster —49 full of reactionary and revisionist declarations such as, for instance, 
‘Pure reason, incapable of any limitation, is the deity itself, and that Jesus’ ‘parents 
were Joseph and Mary’ coming as standard.50 Where Hegel’s criticism differs, 
however, is that while other Enlightenment critics were hostile to both the central 
message of Christianity and its theological fabrication into a religion, Hegel was 
critical only of the latter. His primary objection is to the distinction made by the 
Enlightenment between positive and natural religion (religion legitimised by reason
sent to Schelling, in which Hegel further muses on m odem  role o f  the philosopher: ‘I think that there is 
no better sign o f  our time than the fact that mankind portrays itself as being so worthy o f  respect. It is a 
proof that the aura surrounding the oppressors and the gods o f  this earth is fading. The philosopher will 
demonstrate this dignity and the peoples will learn to feel and not merely demand the rights that have 
been so trampled under foot’. Cf. Karl Rosenkranz, G. W. F. Hegels Leben (Berlin: Dunker and 
Humblot, 1944), p. 70 (trans. in Lukács, The Young Hegel, p. 11)48 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Encyclopedia Logic [hereafter EL], trans. by T. F. Geraets, W. A. 
Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), p. 17; G.W.F. Hegel: Werke [hereafter 
Werke], 20 vols, ed. by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus M ichel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1986), vra,p. 31.49 Johann Lorenz von M osheim ’s Institutiones Historiae Ecclesiastica appeared in Latin in 1755 and in 
German translation from 1769 to 1778. Edward Gibbon’s The History o f  the Decline and Fall o f  the 
Roman Empire was pubished from 1776 to 1789, and Georg Forster wrote throughout the late 
eighteenth century.50 See Nohl, p. 75.
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and ordinary apprehension, and not revelation), that they are two distinct constructs. 
One would think, given what will become his general concern with rendering 
religious truths philosophically, that Hegel would support the idea of a natural 
religion. Nevertheless, as Hegel writes:
A positive religion is contrasted with natural religion, and this presupposes that there 
is only one natural religion, since human nature is one and single, while there may be 
many positive religions. It is clear from this very contrast that a positive religion is 
contranatural [sic] or a supernatural one, containing concepts and information 
transcending understanding and reason and requiring feelings and actions which would 
not come naturally to men; the feelings are forcibly and mechanically stimulated, the 
actions are done to order or from obedience without any spontaneous interest.51
The Enlightenment notion of many positive religions springing from one natural 
religion is rejected here by Hegel. While it will become acceptable for Hegel to read 
religious truths as philosophical, to reformat theological imagery and allegory into a 
more rational context, it simply will not do to whitewash the entire content of 
religion, to rework or remove any and all of its transcendental or supernatural notions. 
Hegel’s argument rests on an appeal to tradition, that ‘the convictions of many 
centuries, regarded as sacrosanct, true and obligatory by the millions who lived and 
died by them in those centuries, were not, at least on their subjective side, downright 
folly or plain immorality’.52 Hegel pleads that one should at least presume that ‘man 
has a natural sense or consciousness of a supersensible world and an obligation to the 
divine [...] that everything high, noble, and good in man is divine, that it comes from
51 Positivity, p. 167.52 Ibid., p. 172.
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God and is his spirit, issuing from him self.53
Christianity, as conceived by theologians from Augustine to Luther, is 
considered by Hegel to be ‘the religion of the “private individual’” , the ‘religion of 
the loss human liberty’, and responsible for the ‘millennia-long despotism and 
enslavement of mankind’.54 The spread of the Christian religion is seen as something 
‘accomplished by anything rather than reason and understanding’.55 Nevertheless, 
Hegel’s critique never descends, for instance, into the materialist atheism of Hume — 
Hegel is interested only in outlining the problems inherent to Christianity, and 
offering solutions, all within a religious framework.56 The core of Hegel’s Christian 
critique lies in what he argues is the notion of ‘positivity’ in the religion (positivity 
being defined in this case as ‘the suspension of the moral autonomy of the subject’).57 
‘The Christian religion,’ Hegel writes, ‘proclaims the moral law as something 
external to us, as something ‘given’ and must therefore strive to win respect for it on 
other grounds. We may therefore regard it as a defining feature of a positive religion 
that it posits the moral law as something given to mankind’.58 Historically, after 
Christ’s death the positivity of the Christian religion was solidified through a 
movement from virtue religion to sect.59 The primary cause of this positive construal 
was the interpretation of the religion by Jewish intellectuals not of the Alexandrian
53 Ib id , pp. 175-17654 Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between D ialectics and  Econom ics 
(London: Merlin Press, 1975), p. 9.5 Nohl, p. 221.56 Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel, p. 9.57 Ib id , p. 18.58 Nohl, p. 212 (Livingstone trans, p. 22).59 Positivity, p. 73.
22
school, who did not have the benefit of an education in philosophy. This caused the 
moral religion of Christ to be interpreted positively. Christ’s teachings, Hegel argues, 
became drained of any goodness inherent within them as moral laws qua moral laws. 
They became validated, not through reason, but through the authority of Christ as the 
supposed sensible manifestation of God.60 In this way, the faculty of reason was made 
‘a purely receptive faculty, instead of a legislative one’.61 The consequence of 
positivity, both in religion and politics, is the loss of moral freedom.
The capacity for this [positive faith] necessarily presupposes the loss of the freedom, 
the autonomy of one’s reason which henceforth stands helpless before a superior 
power. This is the point at which all belief or disbelief in a positive religion begins. At 
the same time, it is the centre around which all disputes revolve and even if it never 
rises to the surface of consciousness it is nevertheless the deciding factor between 
submissiveness and rebellion. The orthodox must stand fast at this point and make no 
concessions.62
Here, then, the young Hegel appears to subscribe to some Kantian ideals; the concept 
of man as the maker of his own morals being one of them. Hegel’s representation of 
Jesus is as a mouth-piece for Kant’s moral philosophy, and even, at one point, 
reinterprets the Golden Rule in Kantian language, as ‘What you can will to be a 
universal law among men, valid also against yourselves, according to that maxim 
act’.63 Further along this line, Hegel argues that Christ’s teachings ought not to be 
founded on the moral authority of Mosaic law, which has its ultimate value by virtue
60 Ibid. Further, moral doctrines have ‘lost the inner criterion whereby their necessity is established’, p. 
85.61 Ibid., p. 85.62 Nohl, p. 234 (trans. in Lukács, The Young H egel, p. 23).63 Ibid., p. 87.
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of being revelatory, but it should be ‘founded on reason and the heart’. What Hegel is 
propounding here is a union of both rational and romantic values:64 what is considered 
to be moral ought to be ‘authorised by the universal reason of man’, and yet must be 
‘so human that they correspond to that stage of morality which a people has 
attained’.65 The historical Christ, however, present in an age permeated by legalism 
and the rejection of reason, was obliged to express himself as a teacher of a purely 
moral and not at all positive religion, in a manner in keeping with the spirit of the 
age.66 The manner in which Christ was obliged to represent himself publicly was 
identical to that of previous prophetic figures —  being forced to rely on myth in order 
to point towards a higher, speculative truth. In the particular case of the historical 
Jesus, it was through the myth of the Messiah who, ‘girdled with might as Jehovah's 
plenipotentiary, was to rebuild the Jewish state from its foundations’.67 It thus follows, 
Hegel argues, that the foundation of Christianity became itself corrupt and degenerate, 
coming to rest on ‘the belief in Christ, not a recovery of God’s will in one’s own 
heart.’68 Its undertaking of the ascension of ‘religion and virtue to morality and [the 
restoration] to morality the freedom which is its essence’ failed entirely.69
Hegel’s ire is not restricted to the early Christian church, but extends also to 
the Reformation itself. It has strayed from its original mission as a return to primitive
64 Charles Taylor, H egel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 56.65 Nohl, p. 21.6 Taylor, p. 57.67 Positivity, p.77.68 Ibid.69 Ibid.
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Christianity, as a church ‘not bound [...] to certain unalterable standards o f faith’, 
purged of Roman corruption, and ‘which protests against all authority in matters of 
belief.70 Protestantism has failed to live up to this ‘negative determination’,71 and has 
become a mere ‘institution’ just as Roman church has become, steeped in positivity. 
Psychologically, Protestantism espouses ‘no real knowledge of the human heart’, 
rather, due to the ‘shame’ of its ‘theological compendia’, it has only ‘theological 
prejudices concerning an innate corruption of human nature’.72 Its incarnation of the 
Christian message is as doctrinaire as any other church that has gone before it, for
every church holds that nothing in the world is so easy to find as truth: the only thing 
necessary is to memorize one of its catechisms. For the churches it is false to say:
’Tis the earnestness that flinches from no toil
That alone can catch the gurgle o f  truth’s deep-hid spring.73
The church offers truth in the open market; the stream of ecclesiastical truth gurgles 
noisily in every street, and any wayfarer may drink his fill of it.74
Hegel echoes Böhme’s criticism of the Protestantism’s theologians, reproaching them 
for their ‘swaggering’ and ‘self-importance’, and whom, he surmises, even with all 
their ‘mysterious high-flown phrases’ impress ‘only the ignorant and the credulous’.75 
The successors of Luther have become ‘intolerable [...] publicly employed guardians
70 Nohl, p. 8.71 Ibid., p. 199. Trans in Walter A  Kaufrnann, ‘H egel’s Early Antitheological Phase’, The 
Philosophical Review, 63 (1954), 3—18 (p. 12).72 Ibid., pp. 4 3 f73 Schiller, D as Idea l und  das Leben.74 Positivity, p. 134.75 Nohl, pp. 33f.
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of morals’, and those, Hegel writes, ‘with a pure heart [are] the first to be 
misunderstood by the people with the moral and religious yardstick’.76 Luther and 
Melanchthon are considered to be the founders of
Christian police institutions [...] The establishment of church power as the champion 
of the freedom of conscience against the power of the princes never occurred to them; 
they subjected Christianity to worldly power [...] How far Luther, for example, was 
from any idea of the worship of God in spirit and truth, can be seen from his sorry 
quarrels with Zwingli, Oecolampadius, etc. He took from the clergy the power to rule 
by force and over men’s purses, but he himself still wanted to rule over their 
opinions.77
As has been seen, Hegel’s intellectual development during this period is marked by 
two distinct trends. Firstly, a rejection of the Christian message as incarnated in 
Protestant orthodoxy, and secondly a rejection of the typical criticism of the 
Enlightenment towards Christianity. Hegel, therefore, wishes to preserve what he 
regards as the essential element of the transcendent in religious content. This does not 
mean, however, that Hegel wishes to dispense entirely with an attempt to understand 
Christianity historically. The Positivity declares the Christian religion as the force 
behind the culture of the western Mediterranean; from the fall of the Roman empire,
76 Ibid., p. 45.7 Ibid., p. 42. A  prevalent theme throughout the early theological writings is the supposed financial 
responsibility o f  the clergy. The rule o f  the early church, that property was to be held in common, 
quickly ceased, H egel argues, ‘to be the condition for admission [ .. .]  all the greater is the emphasis on 
voluntary contributions to the communal treasury as a way o f  buying one’s way into heaven [ ...]  The 
clergy could only gain by this since it recommended generosity to the laymen while taking good care 
not to throw away its own possessions, and so in order to enrich the poor and needy, i. e. itself, it 
reduced the other half o f  mankind to beggary’. Nohl, p. 44 (trans in Lukács, The Young Hegel, p. 64). 
Communal living in the modem church Hegel also subjects to intense criticism: monasteries are 
compared to autocratic states in which ‘gluttonous prelates [ .. .]  get fat on the sweat o f  the poor’. Nohl, 
p. 365 (Lukács, p. 66).
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the rise of the Italian city-states and Swiss republics of the Renaissance, to the 
colonisation of the New World and India,78 —  ‘in all climates the tree of the Cross 
has grown, taken root, and fructified. Every joy in life has been linked with this faith, 
while the most miserable gloom has found in it its nourishment and its justification’.79 
Hegel’s objections to the Enlightenment, that it had failed in accomplishing the goals 
it set itself, ‘that happiness is the goal of both reason and life, [the Aufklärung had] 
failed because it interpreted happiness in secular terms only’,80 and that it was shallow 
caused ‘the beautiful subjectivity of Protestantism’ to be ‘transformed by 
Enlightenment into an empirical subjectivity, and the poetry of its grief [...] into the 
prose of a satisfaction with this finite world’.81 Like Böhme’s frustration with 
orthodoxy, Hegel’s dissatisfaction with both of these currents will lead him to another 
vehicle for the expression of the perennial content, that of the heterodox.
S e c t i o n  T w o  
H e t e r o d o x  L e a n i n g s
The second phase of Böhme and Hegel’s philosophical development comes as a 
consequence of the rejection of their shared Lutheran heritage. While both retained a 
genuine admiration for the content of the Christian religion, its mode of expression
78 Positivity, p. 168.79 Ibid., pp. 168-169.80 Richard Kroner, in ETW, p. 37.81 Werke, I, p. 10.
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was, they found, seriously deficient. The shortcomings found in the language of 
orthodoxy would lead them to a period of heterodox reflection, an interlude spent in 
an attempt to find a new grammar in which to render the eternal truths of Christianity. 
The variety of heterodoxy in particular which both would come to develop a 
passionate, if relatively short lived, curiosity was the broad spectrum of Hermeticism 
and the symbolic language of alchemy. Their acquaintance with this dissenting branch 
of learning can be seen as very much the product of their cultural climates. Böhme’s 
acquaintance with heterodoxy would come as an extension of his interest in the 
German mystics and the methods of the humanists, coming to his attention through 
his Silesian friends and disciples. Hegel’s familiarity with the heterodox lies in the 
cultural climate of Swabia, into which he was bom and educated, and its seemingly 
eternal interest in the philosophia perennis. In this way it may be said that what was 
Böhme’s Silesia was Hegel’s Swabia.
§ 2. 1. Böhme 's Period o f Silence and the Failure o f  Hermeticism
The Aurora was not a work intended for wholesale dissemination; Böhme ‘intended 
to keep [...] my writing by me all [...] my life’.82 Unfortunately for Böhme, however, 
‘it fell out [...] that I entrusted a certain person with [the Aurora]; by means whereof 
it was published without my knowledge or consent, and the first book was taken from
82 Epistles, 12. 12.
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me’.83 When the Aurora manuscript began to be circulated, a copy ended up in the 
hands of Moller’s replacement as pastor primarius of Görlitz, Gregorius Richter 
(1560-1624). Unlike his predecessor, Richter was a staunchly orthodox Lutheran, 
and, as such, thought the circulation of the Aurora would be of a destructive influence 
upon the minds of his parishioners. The town council was petitioned to have the 
work, and any future philosophical output Böhme might put to paper, suppressed. 
Richter’s wish was granted, and Böhme was forbidden from writing, and even briefly 
exiled from the town.84 Böhme’s acquiescence to this decree was, more than likely, a 
judicious move, taken in the light of his awareness of the age in which he found 
himself living. The early seventeenth century was the time of the burning of Bruno, 
the suppression of Kepler and Galileo, and the withdrawal from the public forum of 
Valentin Weigel and Johann Arndt. Even the reforming tendencies of the 
Rosenkreutzer necessitated that their work being published anonymously.
Naturally, this judgement and interdict by the Görlitzers had a deleterious 
effect on both Böhme’s creative output and his state of mind, and earned his fellow 
burghers a high degree of personal condemnation:
I bring in no complaints against them [...], condemn them for anything, except for 
their wickedness and abominations, as pride, covetous, envy, and wrath, against which 
the spirit of nature complains [...] and not I [...] They walk up and down in their 
drunkenness, seeking the key, when they have it about them and they know it not, [...] 
like the country man looking for his horse who all the while he was looking for him
83 Ibid.84 Franz Hartmann, L ife and  D octrines o f  Jacob  Boehm e (New  York: Macoy, 1929; Kessinger, 1992),
p. 11.
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Iwas riding on the back of that very horse [...] What could I [...] poor layman, write of 
their high art if it were not given me by the spirit of nature in whom I live and am?85
A seven year ‘period of silence’ ensued, which, though Böhme continued to write 
privately, he informed only his close friends of his literary activities. Prior to 1619, 
Böhme had used the language of Moller and Luther to express his visionary content. 
These sources now faded into the background as Böhme’s withdrawal led him to 
explore a burgeoning interest in other, heterodox modes of expression. It was during 
this period of creative seclusion that Böhme became obsessed by the language and 
symbolism of Hermeticism. It is important to mention here that, when discussing 
Böhme (and indeed later Hegel’s) Hermetic leanings, Antoine Faivre’s established 
convention of the use of the term ‘Hermeticism’, rather than ‘Hermetism’, shall be 
used. Where the latter designates the religion or philosophy proceeding from the 
Corpus Hermeticum and the like, the former signifies
the general attitude of mind underlying a variety of traditions and/or currents besides 
alchemy, such as Hermetism [the religion of the Corpus Hermeticum], Astrology, 
Kabbalah, Christian Theosophy, and philosophia occulta or magia (in the sense these 
two words acquired in the Renaissance, that is, of a magical vision of nature 
understood as a living being replete with signs and correspondences, which could be 
deciphered and interpreted).86
In Bohme’s time, a knowledge of these subjects that constitute the wide spectrum 
which is Hermeticism was not unusual: for those without the advantage of Hebrew,
85 Aurora, 12. 16, and ff.86 Antoine Faivre, ‘Renaissance Hermeticism and Western Esotericism’, in G nosis and  H erm eticism , 
ed. by R oelof van den Broek and Wouter J. Hanegraaf (Albany: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 
1998), pp. 109-124 (p. 110).
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Reuchlin’s cabbalistic works were available in Latin (the word ‘cabbala’ is even used 
directly by Böhme twice in his Theosophical Fragments)?1 while the alchemical 
writings of Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa and Paracelsus were widely read in 
intellectual circles.88 This new-found interest in Hermeticism came by way of 
Böhme’s rather large circle of (predominantly Silesian) friends, the careers and 
interests of whom were nothing but diffuse, but who were united, nevertheless, by a 
shared interest in Paracelsian alchemy.89 While interest in the Paracelsian was most 
common, in the sixteenth century, to Görlitz and Bohemia,90 this group extended 
beyond the bounds of Böhme’s Görlitz itself —  of the group’s leaders (if indeed they 
may be called so), Balthasar Flöter and Francis Kretschmeyer were from Sagan, 
Johann Huser and Paul Linck from Glogau, and Marcius Ambrosius from Neisse.91 
The Görlitz group, to whom Böhme was the most intellectually indebted, was 
composed of three individuals, each physicians by training and close personal friends 
of Böhme. From Johann Rothe (or Rother; described as being a sonderbare alchemist 
und adeptus), he learned of the German mystical tradition (characterised by the 
thought of Johannes Tauler, Valentin Weigel, and Johann Arndt in particular).92 From
87 Jakob Böhme, ‘Questiones Theosophicae [herafter Theos. Frag.]', in D e E lectione G ratiae and  
Questiones Theosophicae, trans. by John Rolleston Earle (London: Constable, 1930), 3. 34, 6. 11. For 
an in-depth study o f  the relationship o f  the Cabbala to Böhm e’s philosophical system, see Scholem, 
M ajor Trends in Jew ish M ysticism  (New York: Schocken Books, 1941), pp. 1-39, 190, 237.8 Stoudt, p. 89, n. 17.89 Ibid., p. 95.90 Andrew Weeks, Boehm e: A n  Intellectual B iography o f  the Seven teen th -C en tw y P hilosopher and  
M ystic  (Albany, N . Y.: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 1991), pp. 27 -31 .91 Stoudt, p. 95; Will-Erich Peuckert, Pansophie  (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1956), pp. 524-525; 
Peuckert, Böhme, pp. 50ff.92 Magee, p. 37. See Jecht, p. 58; Stoudt, p. 95.
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his own physician, and later disciple and executor of his will, Tobias Kober (author of 
the Observationes Castrenses), he became familiar with alchemy in general. The most 
important influence in this alchemical period in Böhme’s life came by way of 
Balthazar Walther, from whom Böhme learned of Christian Cabbalism, Paracelsian 
alchemy, and Orientalism. Stoudt describes him as Böhme’s ‘most learned friend, 
entirely typical of the times, dabbling in the [theosophic] arts and somewhat of a 
theologian’.93 Walther claimed, and was accorded with by subsequent biographers, a 
colourful, if somewhat dubious peripatetic career.94 Since 1587 Walther had used 
Görlitz as a base for his travels (to Poland, Wallachia, and Greece, and, allegedly, to 
Syria and Egypt), and long been associated with the Görlitz Paracelsians.95 Böhme’s 
relationship with him began in 1617, and Walther billeted with him for three months 
the following year.96 In 1620, Walther became the director of the chemical laboratory 
in Dresden, and in 1622 he travelled to northern Germany to learn from their 
‘philosophers’. Throughout this time, he published extensively, and shared what he 
wrote with Böhme.
It would not be worthwhile to examine here each and every contributing 
element from the spectrum of Böhme’s Hermetical leanings.97 It is, however, 
worthwhile to explore Böhme’s interest in alchemy, the symbolism of which, it has
93 Stoudt, p. 96.94 John Sparrow, ‘The Life o f  the Author’, in Aurora, p. XXI.95 Jecht, p. 63. Jecht’s account is based upon the monograph Balthazari W althari vera D escriptio  
Rerum  ab Dno. Jon  M ichaele Mold. Transalp. S. W alachiae D uce E t P latina  Gestarum.96 Alexander Koyré, L a Philosophie de Jacob Boehm e  (Paris: J. Vrin, 1929), p. 48, n. 1.97 This task has already been more than adequately accomplished in Cyril O ’Regan’s, Gnostic  
Apocalypse'. Jacob B o eh m e’s H aun ted  N arrative  (Albany, N. Y.: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 
2002)
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been argued, is ‘an indelible part of Böhme’s discursive inheritance’.98 It would be 
rather obtuse to merely state that Böhme had an interest in alchemy without being 
specific, for, historically, there were many schools of thought. Böhme’s interest, as 
was the general attraction during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, was 
not in the work of Lull, Ficino, and Mirandola, but of Paracelsus. It was Balthazar 
Walther who had induced into Böhme an appreciation of Paracelsian alchemy, which 
is evidenced by the many alchemical references throughout the Böhme corpus, and, 
indeed, the existence of passages in his own work which are parallel to passages in 
Paracelsus.99 Generally speaking, the entire Paracelsian corpus represents an attempt 
at a philosophical system or scientia wherein elements from the content of 
Naturphilosophie are expressed theologically, while elements from the content of 
theology are expressed naturally.100 The vision reached through this interdisciplinary 
synthesis is one in which the static, material world is taken as a ‘signature’ of the 
dynamic, invisible one. Hence, it is argued that through the examination of the 
material signatures, that a description of the invisible should then be possible. One 
may read Böhme’s new found interest in Paracelsian alchemy as an extension of his 
earlier humanist spirit. As was Luther’s intention to reveal the mysteries of God 
through the cipher of scripture, Paracelsus attempted to find these signatures or
98 Ib id , p. 69.
99 For example the similarity in passages from Huser’s edition o f  Paracelsus’s D e Secretis Creationis 
and Böhm e’s D e Signatur a Rerum: The Signature o f  A ll Things [hereafter Sig. Rer.\, in The Works o f  
Jacob Behmen, The Teutonic Philosopher, trans. by John Sparrow, vol. 4 (London: Printed for G. 
Robinson, 1810). See also Peuckert, Böhme, p. 56.
i°° o ’Regan, Gnostic Apocalypse, p. 59.
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universal laws of nature in a similar manner.
As such, the alchemy of Paracelsus which now fascinated Böhme was not that 
of the literal furnace, the bellows, and alchemist’s retort; rather, it was of a 
speculative, reflective, and spiritual variety, defined by the creed of aurum nostrum 
non est aurum vulgi (‘our gold is not the common gold’). The process of the 
transmutation of base metals into gold of earlier alchemical systems was taken as a 
cipher for a figurative, symbolic transformation of the imperfect soul into a godly 
one.101 To this end, Stoudt comments that Böhme’s use of alchemical language was 
like Jung’s, intended to describe merely the archetypes of the psyche.102 Having found 
that the dogmatic use of reason failed to reconcile the spiritual with the psychical, 
Böhme surmised that the language of alchemy could now bridge that gap. As Böhme 
himself pleads, ‘Do not take me for an alchemist [...] I write only in [...] the spirit 
[...] Though I could here show [...] in many days and hours these things might be 
prepared, for gold cannot be made in one day, but a whole month is needed for it [...] 
I know not how to manage the fire.’103 The ‘proper art of the spiritual alchemist [...] 
was the production of the spiritual and only valid tincture or philosopher’s stone, the 
mystic seed of transcendental life which should invade, tinge, and wholly transmute
101 See Evelyn Underhill, M ysticism: A S tudy in the N ature a n d  D evelopm ent o f  Spiritual 
Consciousness  (London: Methuen and Co., 1911; repr. 1930), p. 143. ‘the proper art o f  the spiritual 
alchemist [ .. .]  was the production o f  the spiritual and only valid tincture or philosopher’s stone, the 
mystic seed o f  transcendental life which should invade, tinge, and wholly transmute the imperfect se lf  
into spiritual gold’. See also Eduard Zeller, P hilosophie der Griechen, 3 parts in 6 vols (Leipzig: [n. 
pub.], 1903), ffl, ii, pp. 242-254; Richard Reitzenstein, Poim andres: Studien zur griechisch­
ägyptischen und frühchristlichen  L iteratur (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1904); John Martin Creed, ‘The 
Hermetic Writings’, The Journa l o f  Theological Studies, 15 (1914), 513—538.102 Stoudt, pp. 96 -98 . See Carl Gustav Jung, P sychologie und  A lchem ie (Zürich: Rascher, 1944).103 Aurora, 22. 104.
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the imperfect self into spiritual gold’.104 The goal was, through a knowledge of the 
signatures of nature, to unveil its first principle, closely identified with the Gnostic 
and Hermetic aipdppevri or the Platonic dvdyKri.105 The focus of Böhme’s 
speculative alchemy can be read as a pantheistic concern of God in nature. Questions 
asked, such as ‘if God is hidden within living substance then when matter bums does 
God bum?’, and ‘when a tree grows does the hidden God also grow?’, highlight 
Böhme’s preoccupation with this issue.106 A unity with this God-in-nature was what 
Böhme sought, echoing the past spiritual endeavours of such legendary figures as 
Hermes Trismegistus, Paracelsus, and the Pseudo-Albertus Magnus. The means by 
which this unity, this ‘regeneration’ of the man as the image of God, could be 
expressed conceptually also became a central concern for Böhme during this period. It 
was Böhme’s initial speculation that through the symbolism of alchemy this process 
of regeneration could be expressed. This attempt to reconcile Christian content with 
alchemical expression is present throughout Böhme’s signature work of the period, 
De Signatur a Rerum composed in 1621 (and described, by one commentator, as an 
‘unsurpassed recapitulation of what is articulated in Paracelsus’s De Rerum 
Naturae).107 The following passage illustrates this ‘chemical marriage’ of Christian 
and Paracelsian expression:
104 Underhill, p. 143.105 For an excellent elucidation upon the aipappevri as the first cosm ic principle, see Hans Leisegang, 
D ie G nosis (Leipzig: Kroner, 1924), pp. 363, 367.106 Stoudt, p. 99.107 O’Regan, G nostic Apocalypse, p. 59.
35
You must eat of God’s bread if you will transmute your body out of the earthly 
property into the heavenly. Christ said, ‘He that eateth not the flesh of the Son of Man 
hath no part in him’; and he says further, ‘He that shall drink of the water that I shall 
give, it shall spring up in him to a fountain of eternal life’. Here lies the pearl of the 
new birth. It is not enough to play the sophist; the grain of wheat brings forth no fruit 
unless it falls into the earth; whatever will bring forth fruit must enter into its mother 
from whence it first came to be.108
The end of this dalliance with the Paracelsian coincides with the final chapters of De 
Signatura. What Böhme found was that the concept of Christian-alchemical 
expressive reconciliation and integration was impossible. He discovered that the 
symbolism of ‘fire, transmutation, process, work, and all the quackery of Faust’s 
laboratory’ was incapable of fully expressing the heart of the Christian religion, of 
spiritual regeneration, exemplified by the question of ‘how can one being old enter his 
mother’s womb again?’109 Alchemy, with its focus on spiritual development of an 
inward and highly personal species could not be successfully applied to a revealed, 
community-based religion such as Christianity. The fire of the alchemist’s furnace 
could no longer be regarded as the apxh, the first category of being, rather the first 
principle of eveiything was now realised to be ‘the eternal will-spirit of God’, 
wherein ‘there is nothing prior’.110 Böhme, reflecting upon his period of alchemical 
speculation, realised that through alchemy he had become as a ‘rebellious, stubborn, 
and disobedient child’, his will having ‘entered into self-hood’, and he had made 
himself his own enemy, bringing upon himself a kind of intellectual ‘self-destructive
108 Sig. Rer., 1 0 ,49ff.109 Ibid., 10 ,51 .10 Ibid., 3. 3.
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death’.111 This movement away from the language of alchemy is clear through study 
of Böhme’s subsequent works of the period, such as the 1623 works the Mysterium 
Magnum and De Electione Gratiae for, while traces of the Paracelsian persist, they 
are of a far more ‘covert’ nature.112 Alchemy, and Hermeticism in general, Böhme 
now considered ‘the idolatry of the heathen’ which is constituted by ‘worship of the 
planetary system and the four elements’,113 and a ‘departure from the one and only 
God and turning to the magic generation of nature, selecting false gods from the 
powers of nature’.114 The movement away from alchemy and natural philosophy was 
paralleled, for Böhme, by a return not only to the values of Moller, but also of the 
main current of the Reformation itself. This rejection of Hermeticism and return to 
Protestanism is demonstrated in concluding chapters of De Signatura, through the a 
play on the Christian metaphor from Matthew’s Gospel. ‘Christ said,’
‘S eek  and you  sh a ll find; k n ock  and it sh a ll b e  op en ed  to  y o u ’: Y o u  k n ow  that C hrist 
s ig n ifies  in a parable con cern in g  the w ou n d ed  traveller, that h e  fe ll  am ong m urderers, 
w h o  beat him  and w ou n d ed  h im , and p u lled  o f f  h is  c lo th es , and w en t aw ay, and le ft  
him  h a lf  dead, till  th e Sam aritan cam e, and took  p ity  on h im , and poured o il in to  h is  
w ou n d s, and brought h im  to  an inn: T his is a m an ifest and liv e ly  representation  o f  the  
corruption o f  m an in Parad ise, and a lso  o f  the corruption o f  the earth in the cu rse o f  
G od, w h en  P aradise departed from  it. N o w , w ou ld  you  b e  a m agus? T hen  y o u  m ust 
b ecom e a Sam aritan, o th erw ise  y ou  can n ot h eal the w ou n d ed  and decayed; for the  
b ody you  m ust heal is h a lf  dead , and sore ly  w oun ded; a lso  its right garm ent is  to m  o ff, 
so  that it is very  hard for y o u  to  k n ow  th e m an w h o m  y o u  w ill heal, u n less  you  h ave  
the ey e s  and w ill o f  the Sam aritan.15
11 Ibid., 15. 8ff.12 O ’Regan, Gnostic Apocalpyse, p. 68.13 Jakob Böhme, M ysterium  M agnum  [hereafter Myst. M ag.], trans. by John Sparrow (London: 1654; 
JohnM . Watkins, 1924), 37. 10.14 Ibid., 11. 6.15 Sig. Rer., 7. 39 -40 .
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§ 2. 2. Hegel ’s Swabian Heritage
It ought to be stated from the outset that the tracing of heterodox and Hermetic 
elements of Hegel’s thought is not, in fact, some singular or peculiar enterprise which 
belongs on the fringes of philosophy. In his own time, Hegel’s work, particularly the 
Logic, was regarded by some of his contemporaries as an operation in ‘occultism’ 
{Geheimwissenschaft).116 Rosenkranz argues for a definite ‘mystical-theosophical’ 
period in Hegel’s intellectual development.117 Magee’s recent book, Hegel and the 
Hermetic Tradition, follows in the tradition of commentators, such as Eric Voegelin, 
Frances Yates, Antoine Favire, Richard Popkin, Allan Debus, Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, 
Paul Oskar Kristeller, D. P. Walker, Stephen McKnight, and Alison Coudert, who 
assign Hermetic leanings to rationalist thinkers. Ernst Benz comments that, ‘In a 
certain sense one can refer to the philosophy of German Idealism as a Böhme- 
Renaissance, when Böhme was discovered at the same time by Schelling, Hegel, 
Franz von Baader, Tieck, Novalis and many others’.118 Eric Voegelin remarks that ‘by
16 The view  o f Berlin theologian Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette (1780-1849), noted Wiedmann,, 
p. 53. Further, de Wette writes in an 1815 letter to Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) that, in the 
Logic , ‘Mysticism reigns here mightily, and how deep we have sunk is shown in the thought o f  H egel’. 
Noted in Gunther Nicolin, ed., H egel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen  (Hambrug: Felix Meiner, 1970), 
p, 117.17 Karl Rosenkranz, ‘H egels ursprüngliches System 1798-1806’, Literarhistorisches Taschenbuch, 2 
(1844), 157-164 (p. 157). Trans, in Henry Silton Harris, H eg el's  D evelopm ent: N igh t Thoughts (Jena  
1801-1806) (London: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 184. Jaeschke, however, citing an article by 
Heinz Kimmerle, argues against this view  o f  a definite theosophical period o f  H egel’s development. 
Cf. Walter Jaeschke, Reason in Religion: The Form ation o f  H eg e l's  P hilosophy o f  Religion, trans. by 
J. Michael Stewart and Peter Hodgson (Berkeley: University o f  California, 1990), p. 126.18 Ernst Benz, Adam  der M ythus vom  Urmenschen  (Munich: Barth, 1955), p. 23. Two o f  the most 
important tributaries for the flow  o f  Böhm e’s theosophy to Hegel are by way o f  Schelling and Novalis. 
Schelling, in particular, makes much use o f  Böhm e’s terminology, often using the adjectives 
‘unoriginated’ (unanfängliche) and ‘groundless’ (ungründliche) which are peculiar to Böhm e’s corpus
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his contemporaries Hegel was considered a gnostic thinker’, whose philosophy 
‘belongs to the continuous history of modem Hermeticism since the fifteenth 
century’.119 Voegelin further argues that the Phenomenology o f  Spirit ought to be read 
as a ‘grimoire’, which ‘must be recognised as a work of magic — indeed, it is one of 
the great magic performances’.120 A variety of Hermetic themes throughout Hegel’s 
corpus have been traced by Magee:
These include, in broad strokes, a Masonic subtext of ‘initiation mysticism’ in the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit', a Bohmean subtext to the Phenomenology's famous preface; 
a Kabbalistic-Bohmean-Lullian influence on the Logic; alchemical-Paracelsian 
elements in the Philosophy of Nature', an influence of Kabbalistic and Joachimite 
millennialism on Hegel’s doctrine of Objective Spirit and theory of world history; 
alchemical and Rosicrucian images in the Philosophy of Right', and influence of the 
Hermetic tradition of pansophia on the system as a whole; an endorsement of the 
Hermetic belief in philosophia perennis; and the use of perennial Hermetic symbolic
(see Chapter Two o f  this thesis). For a thorough investigation on the influence o f  Böhme on Schelling, 
see: Robert Brown, The Later Philosophy o f  Schelling: The Influence o f  Boehm e on the Works o f  
1809-1815  (Lewisburg, P. A.: Bucknell University Press, 1977); Kurt Leese, Von Jakob Böhm e zu  
Schelling: E ine U ntersuchung zu  M etaphysik des G ottesproblem  (Erfurt: Kurt Stenger, 1927); and 
Frederick Kile, D ie theologische G rundlagen von Schellings P hilosophy der F reiheit (Leiden: Brill, 
1965). For the influence o f  Böhme on Novalis, see: Carl Pascheck, ‘Der Einfluss Jakob Böhmes auf 
das Werk Friedrich von Hardenbergs (Novalis)’ (Inaugural diss., University o f  Bonn, 1967); and Walt 
Feilchenfeld, D er E influss Jakob  Böhm es a u f  N ovalis (Berlin: Ebering, 1992).19 Eric Voegelin, ‘Response to Professor Altizer’s “A  N ew  History and a N ew  but Ancient God’” , in 
The C ollected Works o f  Eric Voegelin: P ublished  Essays, 1966-1985, ed. by Ellis Sandoz, 34 vols 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), xn, pp. 292-303  (p. 297).120 Eric Voegelin, ‘On Hegel: A  Study in Sorcery’, in The C ollected  Works o f  Eric Voegelin: P ublished  
Essays, 1966—1985, ed. by Ellis Sandoz, 34 vols, pp. 213—255 (p. 222). Cf. V oegelin’s Science, 
Politics, and  Gnosticism: Two Essays, trans. by W illiam J. Fitzpatrick (Washington, D. C.: Regnery, 
1968), pp. 68 -69 , and his ‘In Search o f  Order’, in Order and  H istory, 5 vols (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1987), v , pp. 54-70 . Although this view  is an intriguing one, H egel him self has 
little good to say about readings o f  this kind. Quasi-visionary views o f  the Phenom enology  are 
dismissed by Hegel, who reads them as declaring that ‘the absolute is not supposed to be 
comprehended, it is to be felt and intuited; not the concept o f  the absolute, but the feeling and the 
intuition o f  it, must govern what is said, and must be expressed by it’. The P henom enology o f  Spirit 
[hereafter PhS], trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 4. Further, in the 
‘Introduction’ to the Encyclopaedia, Hegel wryly surmises that, to this end, ‘[The] comfortable view  o f  
what constitutes a philosopher has recently received a fresh corroboration from the theory o f  immediate 
or intuitive knowledge (die Lehre vom unmittelbaren Wissen, durch A nschauen )'.
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forms (such as the triangle, the circle, and the square) as structural, architectonic 
devices.121
The instantiation of Hegel’s Hermetic leanings can be attributed, in part, to his 
involvement in the German Enlightenment. As Magee comments, the Enlightenment 
quest ‘for universal knowledge and power over nature led to a revival of mysticism 
and occultism, for these had always promised to deliver just those boons’.122 Walsh 
adds that this particular tendency of the Enlightenment was most keenly felt in 
Hegel’s Württemberg, that ‘the influence of the Enlightenment, to the extent it had 
made itself felt in Württemberg, was integrated with a theosophic philosophy of 
nature and a speculative Pietism which was concerned with the progressive revelation 
of the divine structure of history’.123 Heinrich Schneider writes that the cells and 
lodges of ‘secret societies’ active in Württemberg at the time, such as the Masons, 
Weishaupt’s Bavarian Illuminati, and the Rosicrucians, were ‘teeming with magical, 
theosophical, mystical notions’.124 As such, they had swept up many of Hegel’s peers 
into their ranks. Gerald Hanratty notes that Hegel, early in his youth, ‘assimilated 
Masonic ideas and aspirations which were propagated in German by the supporters of 
the French revolution. Throughout his life he interested himself in the Masonic 
movement so that its ideas and aspirations were important elements of the matrix
121 Magee, p. 2.12 Ibid, p. 56.123 Walsh, Boehm e and  H egel, p. 296.124 Heinrich Schneider, Q uest fo r  M ysteries: The M ystical Background fo r  L iterature in Eighteenth  
Century German  (Ithaca, N . Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947), p. 22.
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from which Hegel’s Gnostic system emerged’.125 In sum,
Long before Kant’s important answers to the great problems of human life, the mystics 
in the secret societies had transformed these societies into anti-Enlightenment 
organisations and, in thus keeping alive the mystical traditions, had made possible the 
later merging of German idealism and mysticism [...] This mystical movement was 
the conservative revolution of the eighteenth century, and if in its beginnings its 
character was not exactly Christian, it was undoubtedly religious.126
An ancestor, Johannes Hegel, had come to Swabia from Carinthia to escape Catholic 
persecution.127 It was in Swabia, in the Duchy of Württemberg, in 1770 that Hegel 
was bom. Hegel’s Old Württemberg was a breeding ground for radical and 
transgressive ideas, particularly those stemming from the Hermetic tradition (such as 
the work of Jakob Böhme), and those which went against the spirit of religious 
orthodoxy at the time, such as radical Pietism. The Swabians were considered to be 
‘the mystical people of Germany’, known for their interest in the esoteric and the 
Hermetic,128 and, in thought, a marked proclivity towards the holistic and 
systematising, towards the ‘both-and’ or ev K o a  rcav, rather than the ‘either-or’.129 
The comment that ‘Swabia is accustomed to reconciling opposites’,130 is aptly 
illustrated by the fact that the great systematising philosophers, Reuchlin, Andreae, 
Oetinger, Hahn, Mesmer, Schiller, Schelling, Hegel, and Hölderin, had all been
125 Gerald Hanratty, ‘Hegel and the Gnostic Tradition: IT, Philosophical Studies  (Ireland) 31 (1 9 8 6 -
1987), 301-325  (pp. 312-313).126 Heinrich Schneider, pp. 76 -77 .127 Rudolf Haym, H egel und  seine Z eit (Leipzig and Berlin: Heims, 1857), p. 16.128 Magee, p. 62.129 Dickey, p. 11.130 Pierre Deghaye, ‘Jacob Böhme and His Followers’, in M odern E soteric Spirituality, ed. by Antoine 
Faivre and Jacob Needleman (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1992), pp. 210-248  (p. 236).
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Swabians. An affinity for the Hermetic, however, was seen as very much the preserve 
of the ‘lower classes’ or ‘grass roots’ movements. As such, they were subject to much 
mockery by the better educated, which led to the ‘embarrassing situation’ of, until 
recently in academia, an ignorance on the subject.131 One of Hegel’s earliest 
biographers, Karl Rosenkranz comments that, ‘In Berlin it was the case that much that 
was attributed to Hegel as a person was typical of all Swabians, and was not regarded 
as being in any way peculiar to him so long as he lived in southern Germany’,132 
while O. H. Gruppe pasquinises those same Swabian roots in his play The Wind, or 
an Entirely Absolute Construction o f World History Through Ober’s Horn.133
Paracelscian and Böhmean manuscripts were widely available and read in 
Württemberg, and Hegel’s intellectual world has been described as being obsessed 
with ‘ancient categories of chemical (i.e. alchemicalj-biological Naturphilosophie.134 
Hegel’s diaries from the period, however, betray little interest in the Hermetic or 
Böhmean. Why this was so, two possible answers have been suggested. Firstly, as has 
been stated, there was the social stigma which Hermeticism bore, being long 
considered the preserve of the lower classes and therefore not worthy of scholarly 
endeavour. Hence, Hegel’s silence on his allegiance to these traditions was perhaps
131 Robert Schneider, Schellings und  H egels sw abische G eistesahnen  (Würzburg-Aumühle: Konrad 
Triltsch Verlag, 1938), p. 146. Translations provided by Magee.132 Rosenkrantz, H egels Leben, p. 22.13 Cf. Magee, p. 62.134 ‘D ie uralten K ategorien der chem isch (alchim istisch)-biologischen N aturphilosophie '. Robert 
Schneider, p. 20.
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judicious, for such an interest could potentially damage his academic career.135 
Secondly, as Robert Schneider argues, this notable absence may be accounted for 
simply, as that ‘about which one talks about constantly, one does not write in one’s 
diary’.136 That is to say, the cultural climate of Swabia into which Hegel was bom 
and educated was so brimming with Hermetic ideas, which had so permeated Hegel’s 
consciousness, that he did not feel the need to comment upon them.
As a student, Hegel was known as a Collecteenmacher (an ‘anthologist’) who 
gathered together concepts and ideas from other philosophers and theologians, rather 
than as a creative genius in his own right. His particular areas of interest are listed by 
Schneider as drawing from the works of ‘Oetinger, Böhme, von Helmont, Boyle, 
Fludd, Paracelsus, Agrippa von Nettesheim, Telesio, and others [...] This philosophy 
of nature was still alive in Württemberg during Hegel’s [...] youth’.137 Hegel’s 
personal library included
Hermetic writings by Agrippa, Bohme, Bruno, and Paracelsus. He read widely on 
Mesmerism, psychic phenomenal dowsing, precognition, and sorcery. He publicly 
associated himself with known [theosophers], like Franz von Baader. He structured his 
philosophy in a manner identical to the Hermetic use of ‘Correspondences’. He relied 
on histories of thought that discussed Hermes Trismegitus, Pico della Mirandola, 
Robert Fludd, and Knorr von Rosenroth, alongside Plato, Galileo, Descartes, and 
Newton. He stated in more than one of his lectures that ‘speculative’ means the same 
thing as ‘mystical’. He believed in an ‘earth spirit’ and corresponded with colleagues 
about the nature of magic. He aligned himself, informally, with ‘Hermetic’ societies 
such as the Freemasons and the Rosicrucians. Even Hegel’s doodles were Hermetic.138
Magee, p. 71.136 ‘ Worüber man ständig  spricht, schreib t man nichts in sein T agebuch '. Robert Schneider, p. 17,137 Ibid., p. 20.138 Magee, p. 2.
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This penchant for Hermetic anthology cannot be disregarded as a simple 
propaedeutical stage in Hegel’s career; a developmental phase in which he grounds 
himself in the philosophy of his predecessors prior to forming his own system. 
Rather, as he would later go on to admit, an intact, fully justifiable philosophical 
science already exists in the world, and has existed since the dawn of history. To this 
end, Hegel declares that,
From the true knowledge of [the principle of all philosophy], there will arise the 
conviction that at all times there has been only one and the same philosophy. So not 
only am I promising nothing new here, but rather am I devoting my philosophical 
efforts precisely to the restoration of the oldest of things, and on liberating it from the 
misunderstanding in which the recent times of unphilosophy [s/c] have buried it.139
It would not be truthful to state that Hegel accepts everything propounded by the wide 
spectrum of ideas and concepts which compose Hermeticism. In fact, only three 
Hermetic strands are worthy of examination, for they constitute the bulk of Hegel’s 
familiarity with the system. They are the cabbalistic, the Paracelsian, and the 
distinctly Bohmean.
O’Regan notes in an article that the ‘historical fact that the linkage of the 
Cabbala with Bohme was available to Hegel [...] leads one to emphasise its value for 
characterising Hegelian ontotheological narrative’.140 Though Hegel never read any of 
the seminal Hebrew texts, he did study their various Hermetic commentaries.141
139 Rosenkranz, H egels L eben , p. 192 (Magee trans., p. 86).140 See Cyril O ’Regan, ‘H egel and Anti-Judaism: Narrative and the Inner Circulation o f  the Kabbalah’,
The O w l o f  M inerva, 28 (1997), 141-182.141 Magee, p. 166.
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Among them was Knorr von Rosenroth’s Kabbalah Denudata, and the Latin volumes 
of John Jacob Bucker’s Historia Critica Philosophiae, of which Hegel read 
carefully.142 According to one commentator, Brucker’s Historia constituted ‘the first 
really systematic description of the Western esoteric currents, [whose] importance 
should not be underestimated’.143 It includes accounts of the work of cabbalists and 
hermeticists such as Bruno, Lull, Campanella, Fludd, van Helmont, and Böhme 
himself. Hegel, however, writes of Brucker’s work that it constitutes ‘so much 
useless ballast’, and he found that there was little of what could be considered 
philosophical in it. Magee argues that this is because Brucker’s accounts are 
‘inaccurate and deformed by his commitment to Wolffian metaphysics’.144 
Nevertheless, it can be said, in general, that Hegel finds the writings of the cabbalists 
and hermeticists as prone to ‘sink into the fantastic’, and as having little real 
contribution to philosophy.145 Böhme’s own work is regarded in the same way, as 
Hermetic, and is, as Magee adds, taken very seriously, however, by Hegel.
Hegel’s opinion of alchemy, however, is constituted by more than a simple, 
outright rejection. Hegel’s knowledge of alchemical symbolism was advanced 
enough, in keeping with the general interest in such of the period. In an 1808 letter 
decrying the spirit of the age, Hegel employs his own vivid, Hesiodic alchemical
142 Ibid., pp. 166-167.143 Antoine Faivre, Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition: Studies in Western Esotericism , trans. by 
Christine Rhone (Albany: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 2000), p. xvm ; 18-19. Cf. Jacob 
Brucker, H istoria critica Philosophiae , 6 vols (Leipzig: [n. pub.], 1742—1744).14 Georg W ilhelm Friedrich H egel, Lectures on the H istory o f  P hilosophy  [hereafter LHP], trans. by 
E. S. Haldane and F. M. Simson, 3 vols (London: G. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), I, p. 112; 
Werke, XIX, p. 134 (Magee, p. 166)145 Ibid., n, p. 395; Werke, XIX, p. 426 (See Magee, p. 167).
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symbolism: ‘If this age is on the whole an age of iron, here it is still mixed with lead, 
nickel, and other base metals. Things are indeed always being reorganised to produce 
a nugget of gold as well. It is characteristic of gold, however, to grow all too slowly, 
and with all our sprinkling and greenhouse exertions no steady growth ensues’.146 
Hegel’s understanding of alchemy comes almost exclusively by way of Paracelsus 
and Böhme. The particulars of the Paracelsus’ elemental quatemity of mercury or 
fluidity, sulphur or oil, salt, and a vitalistic principle and Böhme’s similar vision of an 
elemental triad was not unknown to Hegel, writing that ‘according to an ancient and 
general opinion, each body consists of four elements. In more recent times, Paracelsus 
has regarded them as being composed of [the elements stated above] which Jakob 
Böhme called the great triad’.147 When Hegel writes upon this subject, Paracelsus and 
Böhme are seldom mentioned by name, rather, as Harris comments, ‘Paracelsus and 
Böhme together are [called] “the elders’” .148 Even when Hegel is commenting upon 
the alchemical symbolism of his contemporaries, he is insistent on ‘finding an earlier 
pedigree’ in these elders, ‘in Paracelsus and Böhme’.149
It is a matter of history that Paracelsus said that all terrestrial bodies are composed of 
the four elements of mercury, sulphur, salt, and virgin earth (jungfräulichen Erde), and
146 Georg W ilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel: The Letters  [hereafter Letters], trans. by Clark Butler and 
Christianne Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984) p. 147; Berliner Schriften  [hereafter 
Hoffineister], ed. by Johannes Hoffineister (Hamburg: Published for Felix Meiner, 1956), #131.147 Georg W ilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy o f  N ature  [hereafter P N \, ed. and trans. by M. J. 
Petry, 3 vols. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), § 136. For an elaboration on Bohm e’s triad, 
see Chapter Two o f  this thesis.148 Henry Silton Harris, H egel's  Development: N igh t Thoughts (Jena 1801—1806) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983, p. 274, note.149 Ibid., p. 278.
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that these correspond to the four cardinal virtues. Mercury is metalline, and as metal is 
abstract matter; it is self-identical in its fluid corporeality, and corresponds to light. 
Sulphur is rigidity, the possibility of combustion; fire is not alien to it, but constitutes 
its self-consuming actuality. Salt corresponds to water, which is the cometary 
principle, and its dissolution constitutes indifferent reality, or the subsidence of fire 
into independence. Finally, virgin earth is the simple innoxiousness of this movement, 
the subject which constitutes the extinction of these movements; this was the accepted 
expression for the abstract earthiness of pure silica.150
It is interesting to note here that Hegel’s use of the term ‘virgin earth’, which, in the 
above paragraph, he attributes to Paracelsus. In point of fact, this term never appears 
in the Paracelsian corpus, but it appears continually (and in fact originates) in 
Böhme’s work.151
Hegel finds a great deal of fault in the use of alchemical imagery in the work 
of his contemporaries. Why this is so is that, while the Paracelsian and Böhmean 
symbolism of the elemental and metalline is employed (which Hegel approves of), 
there is also the use of astrological symbolism, for which neither Hegel nor Böhme 
have much patience. As Hegel writes in the Philosophy o f  Nature,
Schelling and Steffens have drawn a parallel between the planetary series and that of 
metals. This is an ingenious and pregnant comparison, but it is not a new idea, for the 
representation of Venus by copper, Mercury by quicksilver, earth by iron, Jupiter by 
tin, and Saturn by lead, is commonplace, just as it is to call the sun golden and the 
moon silver. There is something completely natural about this, for metals are the most 
compact and independent bodies to be found on earth. The planets do not belong to the 
same field as the metals and the chemical process, however. Cross-references
150 PN, introductory chapters. Paracelsus wrote: ‘A ll things (man included) are composed o f  three 
substances [ .. .]  These three [ .. .]  are [ .. .]  sulphur, mercury, and salt, and they are acted upon by a 
fourth principle which is life. These [ .. .]  are not seen with the physical eye [ .. .]  [but] are held together 
in forms by the power o f  life. If you take these three invisible substances and add [ ...]  the power o f  
life, you will have invisible substances in visible form’. Quoted in Franz Hartmann, The Life o f  
Paracelsus (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1887), p. 165.151 Harris, N igh t Thoughts, 274n.
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[,Anspielungen] of this kind are external comparisons and decide nothing. They merely 
sparkle before the imagination without furthering the scope of knowledge.152
The more involved rationale for this rejection of planetary symbolism in favour of the 
elemental and the chemical is that the goal of alchemy, as Magee points out, is at the 
same time Hegel’s ‘philosophical object’.153 Hegel’s reading of the Paracelsian is 
identical to Böhme’s, in that both considered alchemy to be a speculative, rather than 
practical, discipline. In Hegelian terms, the process of the transmutation of base 
metals into gold is representative of the journey of spirit from a finite to an absolute 
nature.154 In the ‘phenomenological crucible’, spirit is to be ‘separated from its 
impurities and, literally, perfected’.155 In short, Hegel finds Böhme’s use of alchemical 
imagery significant because, though it ought not to be taken literally, as Böhme 
himself admits, it ‘should not be overlooked [...] that in essence it contains and 
expresses the determinations of the concept’.156
To move now to Hegel’s familiarity with Böhme directly, it becomes clear, 
not only through historical speculation but also through the content of his own 
writings, that Hegel was familiar with both the work and the theosophical ideas of 
Jakob Böhme directly. Hegel’s affinity with the work of Böhme is demonstrated by 
his ‘abortive courtship’ of the philosopher known as the Böhmius redivivus of his day,
152 PN, § 280153 Magee, p. 211.154 See Chapter Two o f  this thesis.15 Ibid.156 PN, § 316.
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Franz von Baader (1765-1841). Baader thought that much of his remit as a 
philosopher was to revive an interest in Böhme, and came to be considered Böhme’s 
‘principal interpreter’ of the period.157 Hegel had read much of Baader’s work,158 and, 
‘despite their apparent differences, Hegel sought to persuade both the public and von 
Baader himself that their positions were reconcilable’.159 In the preface to the 
Encyclopedia, Hegel makes particular reference to Baader’s Fermenta Cognitionis 
(1824), declaring that
What is most sublime, most profound, and most inward has been called forth into the 
light of day in the religions, philosophies, and works of art, in more or less pure, in 
clearer or more obscure shapes, often in very repulsive ones. We can count it as a 
particular merit of Franz von Baader that he not only goes on bringing such forms to 
our recollection, but also with a profoundly speculative spirit he brings their basic 
import expressly into scientific honour because on that basis he expounds and 
confirms the philosophical idea.160
I am certainly delighted to learn that Herr von Baader agrees with many of my 
propositions — as is evident both from the content of several of his more recent 
writings and from his references to me by name. About most of what he contests — 
and even quite easily about everything — it would not be difficult for me to come to 
an understanding with him, that is to say, to show that there is, in fact, no departure
157 Magee, p. 47. See von Baader’s comment to this effect, that: ‘I f I here call our “Philosophus 
Teutonicus” the former o f  religious philosophy I do it in anticipation o f  a not too distant future, and I 
wish to emphasise that the writings and principles o f  Jakob Böhme will be o f  excellent service in that 
purely philosophical reform. I would like to convince at least a few competent minds that, from what is 
becoming more precise in the contemporary idealist movement o f  German philosophy, it w ill no longer 
be possible for any but the ignorant to ignore his writings’. Franz von Baader, Säm tliche Werke, ed. by 
Franz Hoffman et al, 16 vols (Leipzig: Bethmann, 1851-1855), n, p. 199. Quoted in Ernst Benz, Les 
sources m ystiques du rom antism e allem and  (Paris: Vrin, 1968), p. 29. See also Antoine Faivre, ‘La 
critique boehmienne de Franz von Baader’, [paper present at] Colloque Boehme, Paris, 1978, in Jacob  
Boehme: ou, L ’obscure lum ière de la  connaissance mystique: hom m age a Jacob  B oehm e dans le 
cadre du Centre d ’études et de recherches interdisciplinaires de C hantilly  (Paris: Vrin, 1979), pp. 
135-154.158 Letters, p. 572; Hoffmeister, #699.159 Letters, editorial comment, p. 570.160 EL, p. 15.
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from his views in it [the Encyclopediar].161
Despite being on the margins of the philosophical scene, Baader, who could have 
made good use professionally of a friendship with Hegel, did not agree with this 
assessment of the similarities between their work. Writing in an 1824 letter, Baader, 
on the contrary, considered Hegel’s ontological system to be a ‘philosophy of dust’.162
It would not be appropriate here to enter into too much detail regarding 
Hegel’s response to Böhme’s philosophy, for that will be explored in the succeeding 
chapters of this thesis. What will suffice here is to give a general outline of Hegel’s 
attitude towards Böhme’s speculative thought. It is largely in his later works that 
Hegel indicates his inspiration and full debt to Böhme directly, devoting an entire 
section to him (taking up twenty-eight pages) in the Lectures on the History o f  
Philosophy — far more space than is devoted to Locke, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, 
and Jacobi.163 For Hegel, Böhme was not a ‘long-forgotten [...] pious visionary’, 
deserving of the ‘disdain accorded to him’, but the philosophus teutonicus who 
possessed a ‘deep, concrete heart’ and a notable ‘profundity of mind’.164 In a letter 
addressed to a friend, Hegel writes,
B ö h m e ’s th eosop h y  a lw ays seem s to  m e  on e o f  th e m ost n otab le attem pts, on  th e part 
o f  a profound y e t  uncultivated  m an, to grasp the in m ost nature o f  ab so lu te ex isten ce . 
For G erm any h e p o ssesses  th e p ecu liar  in terest o f  b e in g  the first really  G erm an  
p hilosoph er. C onsiderin g  the ca p ab ilities o f  h is  t im e and th e sm all d egree o f  training
161 Ibid.; Werke, vm, p. 29.162 Quoted in Letters, p. 571.163 Magee, p. 49.
1M LHP, I, B.
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he possessed in abstract thought, he makes the supremest effort to bring the deep 
speculative element which rested in his imagination into the form of the conception, 
and so to work upon the ordinary conception as to allow the speculative element to be
therein expressed.165
Hegel judges, nevertheless, some elements of Böhme’s philosophy to be inadequate 
for his own uses, in particular the lack of order in his work, his odd cabbalistic system 
of biblical hermeneutics,166 and his use of imagistic modes of expression. Hegel 
complains that Böhme never attains complete ‘clearness or order’ in his work, there 
being ‘no systematic connection but the greatest confusions in his divisions’. 
Böhme’s ‘great mind is confined in the hard knotty oak of the senses — in the gnarled 
concretion of ordinary conception —  and is not able to arrive at a free presentation of 
the idea’.167 Where Böhme’s revelatory visions are concerned, Hegel is also highly 
critical. In trademark fashion, Hegel condemns the seemingly arbitrary kind of 
knowledge provided by mystical experience, and questions why God should choose to 
manifest himself in one way to one person, and another way to ¿mother.168 It is of 
importance, nevertheless, to note the division Hegel makes between two kinds of 
mysticism. The first, taking the premise that mysticism provides a form of knowledge 
beyond general human understanding, Hegel concludes as false, tantamount to 
superstition, and ‘transient’.169 The second division, that mysticism points towards
165 The letter was to his friend Van Ghert o f  Amsterdam, thanking him for an edition o f  Bohm e’s 
works. Quoted in Elizabeth S. Haldane, ‘Jakob Bohme and his Relation to H egel’, in The 
Philosophical Review , 6 (1897), 146-161 (p. 146).16 See Chapter Three o f  this thesis.167 LH P , m, p. 195; Werke, x x , p. 98.168 Haldane, p. 148.169 Ib id , p. 149.
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something beyond the understanding, indicating a higher, speculative truth beyond, 
Hegel is far more sympathetic. If Böhme is taken to be a mystic of the second variety, 
then perhaps the content of his visions are closer to Hegel’s own speculative 
philosophy than to base ‘superstition’. Where his ‘rude method of presentation’ is 
concerned, Hegel characterises Böhme as ‘a complete barbarian’. Hegel’s criticism of 
Böhme’s use of alchemical argot, and his talk of ‘qualities, spirits, and angels’ which 
makes ‘one’s head swim’,170 might be considered somewhat rich as Hegel may be 
judged just as guilty of similar offences. It has been often commented that Böhme’s 
theosophical writings appeal primarily to those who wish to escape the philosophical 
contradictions and cul-de-sacs they cannot appear to overcome. What is, perhaps, 
more true is that Böhme most appeals to those who ‘possess a strong, firm grasp of 
life’ and ‘accord to reason the place of paramount importance’.171 As such, Hegel is 
able to move beyond the representative manner in which Böhme expresses himself, 
and notes that the content of his philosophy is quite insightful. Concepts such as ‘the 
generating of light as the Son of God from qualities, through the most living dialectic’ 
and ‘God’s diremption of Himself are singled out by Hegel as the most profound.172 
In short, this dissonance that Hegel finds between the way Böhme portrays his work’s 
philosophical content and the content itself is best described in his parting words to 
Böhme’s chapter in his philosophy of history lectures. Here, Hegel remarks,
170 LHP, I, B.171 Haldane, pp. 147-148.172 LHP, I, B. See Chapter Two o f  this thesis.
52
Barbarianism in the working out of his [Böhme’s] system can no more fail to be 
recognized than can the great depths into which he has plunged by the union of the 
most absolute opposites. Böhme grasps the opposites in the crudest, harshest way, but 
he does not allow himself through their unworkableness [sic] to be prevented from 
asserting the unity. This rude and barbarous depth which is devoid of notion, is always 
a present, something which speaks from itself, which has and knows everything in 
itself. [To mention] Böhme’s piety, the element of edification, the way in which the 
soul is guided in his writings. This is in the highest degree deep and inward, and if one 
is familiar with his form these depths and this inwardness will be found. But it is a 
form with which we cannot reconcile ourselves, and which permits no definite 
conception of the details, although we cannot fail to see the profound craving for 
speculation which existed within this man.173
S e c t i o n  T h r e e  
T h e  R e t u r n  t o  t h e  R e f o r m a t i o n
The third and final stage of Böhme and Hegel’s shared philosophical development 
consists of a return, of sorts, to the Reformation. For both, the content of their period 
of dalliance with the language of heterodoxy was found to be critically lacking in any 
real substance. The eternal truths of Christianity which they sought to express still had 
not, they surmised, found their proper medium. In this way, both found themselves 
returning to the values first promoted by the Reformation. The return for both, 
nevertheless, is by no means wholesale. Böhme remains, and is perhaps even more, 
disparaging of the kind of renovation of the Christian religion as inaugurated by 
Luther. Therefore, the momentum of Böhme’s final period of intellectual 
development finds itself aligning with another side of the Protestant Reformation; 
towards the ‘spiritual reformers’ of the so-called ‘middle-way’, the language of whom
173 Ibid.
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lay far beyond the pale of Luther’s unpleasant mixture of dry scholasticism and bitter 
invective. In this way Hegel’s mature period mirrors Böhme’s, for he too wishes to 
return to the Reformation, but not, indeed, to Luther. Hegel’s developmental 
homecoming is not, however, a perfect imitation of Böhme’s: it does not constitute a 
return to the old, rather, rendered in Hegelian terms, a ‘return to the more’. This new 
departure consists in a radical reassessment o f the expression of the truths of the 
Christian religion, the result of which, Hegel will come to find, ends in the liberation 
of the content of religion from representation altogether.
§ 3. 1. Böhme ’s Return to the Reformation
In March of 1624, Böhme ran foul of Richter once again when Franckenberg had 
some of Böhme’s works surreptitiously printed. The reaction provoked from Richter 
was of a stronger variety than before: Böhme was cursed and damned from the pulpit, 
and a mob was incited to break the windows of Böhme’s home. A three-part 
pasquinade was published against him, the Judicium Gregorii Richteri, and, once 
again, Böhme was dragged before the Görlitz town council. This time, however, 
Böhme did not immediately cavil to council’s wishes, but presented a detailed written 
defence against the criticisms he had received. Böhme’s efforts were in vain, 
however, and he was asked to leave the town. Böhme did so, leaving for Dresden on 
the ninth of May of the year.
The text which led to Böhme’s expulsion was The Way to Christ, a 1624
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compilation of devotional tracts, and which represents the summit of Bohme’s 
resurgence of the values of the Reformation.174 This selection of tracts, written in the 
tradition of the German mystics, proclaimed a new kind of focus for the philosophy of 
religion. No longer should the annihilation of the self, as in the tradition of the 
Dionysians and the Neo-Platonists, be sought after; nor the atonement for sin and the 
focus on the hereafter, as in the tradition of the Medieval mystics; rather the end 
philosophical pursuit was to be the perfect harmony of the individual to the divine 
order, of the soul to God-in-nature.175
Two impulses dominated this period: on the one hand, the rejection of the 
language of alchemy and its Gnostic approach to epistemology, and, on the other 
hand, a renewed interest in the language of the Reformation. This interest in Christian 
expression, which earlier, through Moller, had been merely an unconsciousness and 
almost passing acquaintance, was informed by a now serious and committed fluency 
with the work of the mainstays of German mysticism: the Fourth Book o f Ezra;176 
Siebmacher’s Der Wasserstein der Weisen;177 (the pseudo) Weigel’s Gnothi 
Seautorr,ll& and the works of Caspar Schwenkfeld,179 Johann Sebastian Franck, Hans
174 The Way to  Christ is composed o f  six tracts or monographs, viz.: ‘O f Illumination’; ‘O f True 
Repentance’; ‘O f True Resignation’; ‘O f Regeneration’; ‘A Short Compendium o f  Repentance’, and; 
‘The Supersensual L ife’.175 Isaak August Domer, H istory o f  Protestant Theology , trans. by George Robson and Sophia Taylor, 
2 vols (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1871), n, p. 178; Stoudt, p. 150.176 Jakob Böhme, O f the Last Times: Two Epistles to P aul Keym  [herafter Letzte Zeit], trans. by John 
Sparrow (London: Printed for M. Simmons, 1649) I, 27.17 Epistles, 18. 14.178 Ibid., 9. 14.179 Cf. Peuckert, Böhme, p. 69.
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Weyrauch, Weigel,180 and Tauler.181 It is, perhaps, interesting to note that Böhme’s 
movement from the alchemical to the Protestant-mystical mimics the movement of 
the birth of Protestant mysticism itself, a delta into which the rivers of Hermeticism 
and Paracelsian alchemy, on the one hand, and the Theologica Germanica, Luther, 
and the Swabian Spiritual Reformers, on the other, flow.182 Böhme’s writings of this 
period are so similar to those of the Protestant mystics that even some instances of 
outright plagiarism have been suggested.183 What is most interesting about Böhme’s 
creative output of this period, however, is that it demonstrates an unconscious, 
schizoid element in Böhme’s psyche towards the Reformation. On the one hand, 
Böhme now has nothing but praise for Luther, regarding him as the hero, if not the 
saviour, of Germany. Böhme’s writing during this period are stocked with borrowings 
from Luther. His childhood catechesis is recalled; Luther’s ‘wir sollen Gott lieben 
und fürchten’ from the Smaller Catechism is recurrent. In Busse and Gebet, the 
formula of ‘Ich armer unwürdiger, sündiger Mensch’ is repeated; baptism is referred 
to as a Bund; and, in the Apology to Gregor Richter, Lutheran hymns are quoted.184
180Epistles, 12. 5 Iff.181 Stoudt, p. 157, n. 1.182 Ibid., p. 147. See. Jones, passim. See also Carl. G. Jung, Paracelsica: Zw ei Vorlesungen über den 
A rzt und  Philosophen Theophrastus (Zürich: Rascher, 1942).183 For instance, the parallel between Schwenkfeld’s Von dem dreyerley Leben des M enschen  and 
Böhm e’s Von dem D reyfachen Leben des M enschen. There are also other striking parallels o f  Böhm e’s 
work during this period with Schwenkfeld’s corpus, namely: Caspar Schw enkfeld ’s Schriften, D er 
Erste Theil der Christlichen O rthodoxischen B ücher und  Schriften  ([n.p.]: 1564); Epistolar I  (1566); 
Epistolar, A nder Theil (1570); and Das 2. Buch des ändern Theils des Epistola  (1570).184 See Jakob Böhme, ‘O f H oly Baptism [hereafter Taufte], in O f C hrist's Testaments (London: Printed 
by M. Simmons, 1652), 1. 4, 4. 15; A n  A po logy in A nsw er to G regorius R ich ter  [hereafter Apol. 
Richt.], trans. by John Sparrow (London: Printed by M. Simmons, 1665), 57; Aurora, 14. 133. Cf. 
Stoudt, p. 148.
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Luther’s fundamental dialectical distinctions (love and wrath, law and Gospel) are 
recalled, as are the familiar Lutheran themes of man as the master of the natural 
world, freedom of the will, and voluntarism.185 Luther is now thought of as a great 
hero; a bulwark against the corruption of the material world, typified by the Roman 
Church. Luther is ‘the great prince Michael’ who ‘came and fought for the holy 
people, and overcame [...] But the Prince of darkness, perceiving that his merchant 
[the Pope] had a fall, and that his deceit was discovered, raised a tempest from the 
north [...] and the merchant of the south made assault upon him.’186
On the other hand, beyond such servile fawning over the Wittemberg 
Reformer, there is a distinctly un-Lutheran current which pervades the work of 
Böhme throughout this period. Böhme’s philosophy continued to differ strikingly 
from that of sixteenth century Protestant orthodoxy. Primarily, while Luther was ‘a 
purer homo religiosus tied to the piety of the old church and the Middle ages’, 
Böhme’s work captured the spirit of the prevailing Zeitgeist, ‘belonging to a new time 
in which the church had been pushed to the background’.187 Böhme began to see 
Luther as part of a more and more antique crypto-mystical tradition, one in which a 
resounding ‘no’ is roared against any and all visionary content, except that if it comes 
by way of Tauler, the mystical content from whom much of Luther’s own work was
185 Stoudt, p. 149. See Erich Seeberg, Christus W irklichkeit und  U rbild  (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1937), 
passim.186 Aurora, preface.187 Arlene A. Miller, ‘The Theologies o f  Luther and Boehme in the Light o f  their Genesis 
Commentaries’, The H arvard Theological Review , 63 (1970), 261-303  (p. 261, n. 1). Cf. Felix Voight, 
‘Das Böhmebild des Gegenwart. Ein kritischer Überblick über die neueste Böhmeliteratur’, N eues  
Lausitzisches M agazin, 102 (1926), 252 -312 .
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based.188 It is exactly over the question of mysticism where Luther and Böhme 
diverge. Where there was undoubtedly a place for spiritual experience within 
Protestant scholasticism, Luther’s treatment of such is almost entirely a reaction 
against the mediaeval Catholic mystics. His criticism was not as much against the 
content of mystical experience, but its mode of expression, its language.189 Although 
Luther might have employed certain mediaeval terms such as exstasis and excessus, 
finding them useful in of his own conception of the unio mystica, he was always 
careful to distinguish ‘his meaning from that of his predecessors’.190 Böhme too 
denounced classical mysticism’s ‘ascending gothic’, wanting nothing to with a 
representation of gnosis, of ‘ladders, pilgrimages, levels, stages, degrees, [and] 
hierarchies’, which implied that knowledge of God was something to which had to be 
ascended.191 The Socratic, Platonic, and Pseudo-Dionysian idea of mystical 
experience as the transcending of temporal and evil, that ecstasy is obtained ‘by 
denying or removing all things that are [...] impediments to the latent image’,192 did 
not gel with the message Protestant Orthodoxy. For both Luther and Böhme, the unio 
mystica is conceived of as being brought about through the personal merit of the man, 
and not the imputation of grace from God.193 Mystical union is insisted upon as a 
right, as a possibility occurring from the genesis of mankind, revealed both through
18 Ibid. Cf. Walter N igg’s H eim liche W eisheit (Zürich and Stuttgart: [n. pub.], 1959), passim.189 Peter Erb, ‘Introduction’, in The Way to Christ, trans. and introduction by Peter Erb (New  York: 
Paulist Press, 1978), p. 13.190 Ibid.191 Stoudt, p. 300.192 Dionysius the Areopagite, The M ystical Theology a n d  the D ivine N am es , trans. by C. E. Rolt 
(London: Dover Publications, 2004), pp. 194-195193 Erb, p. 14.
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Another instance in which Böhme and Luther’s views begin to diverge is on 
the matter of scriptural interpretation. Following the tradition of the Alexandrian 
Fathers, Böhme endorses an almost entirely allegorical reading of the mystical content 
of scripture. For Böhme, scripture is ‘a secret to be revealed, a hieroglyph to be 
decoded, just as lying behind the visible surface of reality is an invisible depth’.195 
This comes in stark contrast to Luther’s quasi-Augustinian view of the use of 
allegory, which promotes a complete rejection of its use in the exegesis of any biblical 
text.196 Luther’s rationale is that if one finds oneself obliged to interpret scripture in 
any way other than literally, the implication is that God’s Word is unclear. The 
Alexandrian mode of exegesis Böhme came to promote is explicitly denounced by 
Luther, as ‘the bare allegories, which stand in no relation to the account and do not 
illuminate it, should simply be disapproved of as empty dreams. This is the kind 
which Origen and those which follow him employ’.197 After a fashion, Flegel will 
come to recollect Böhme’s criticism of the accepted method of scriptural 
interpretation: where Böhme sees the literal meaning as something which should be
scripture and in the hearts o f the created.194
194 Ibid., p. 16.195 O ’Regan, G nostic Apocalypse, p. 87.196 It was Augustine’s view that allegory should be used only when the content o f  scripture was itself 
obscure. Augustine: D e D octrina Christiana, ed. and trans. by R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), m, 1. 1. Luther goes one step further, castigating Augustine’s view  on this matter, and 
rejecting outright the use o f  allegorical as mode o f  interpretation. See Martin Luther, L u th er’s Works, 
ed. by Jaroslav Pelikan and H. Lehman, 55 vols (St. Louis: Fortress and Concordia, 1957-1975) I, pp. 
4, 7, 69. See also Luther the Expositor: Introduction to the R efo rm er’s E xegetical Writings (St Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1959), pp. 28, 89. For an account o f  Augustine’s influence on Luther’s 
treatment o f  scriptural allegory see James Samuel Preus, From Shadow  to Promise: O ld  Testament 
Interpretation fro m  A ugustine to the Young L uther  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
197, L uther's Works, I, p. 233.
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read as allegorical, pointing towards a higher meaning beyond the text, Hegel sees 
allegory as something to be transcended, indicative of a greater, speculative truth 
which could not be encapsulated by the biblical authors. Both philosophers follow 
Paul’s injunction that he ‘who has made us competent to be ministers of a new 
covenant, not of letter, but of Spirit; for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life’.198 For 
Böhme, the most striking theological concept which runs pervasively throughout his 
work is that of ‘eternal generation’. Whereas Protestant orthodoxy would characterise 
God as a transcendent being distinct from creation, Böhme states that he is a constant 
divine process manifestation, revealing and being revealed throughout history.199 This 
characterisation of God proceeds from the divine desire for self-manifestation —  
God’s will to ‘reveal himself to himself — which would be ‘psychologically 
impossible unless an other stands opposite to him’.200 As Böhme himself writes, ‘No 
thing can be revealed to itself without opposition [ Wiederwärtigkeit]: For if there is 
nothing that opposes it, then it always goes out of itself and never returns into itself, 
as into that from which it originated, then it knows nothing of its origin’.201
A third kind of divergence from the Lutheran current takes the form of a 
closeted appreciation of the work of another current, or the ‘middle way’, of the 
Reformation, with the work of Caspar Schwenkfeld. One cannot suggest, it has been 
argued, that this renewed interest in Schwenkfeld was purely a renewed appreciation
198 n Corinthians 3. 6.19 Magee, p. 38. See Chapter Two o f  this thesis.20 Ibid.201 Jakob Böhme, ‘Vom Götter Beschaulichkeit’, in Säm tliche Schriften  [hereafter Schriften ], ed. by 
Will-Erich Peuckert, 11 vols (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1955-61), IV, 1. 8.
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stemming from Böhme’s period of spiritual of direction under Moller, for any 
mention of Schwenkfeld in the Aurora was only unconscious or implicit, rather it 
must be the result of some new, direct acquaintance with the theologian’s work. It is 
of some importance to be able to trace where the Schwenkfeldian influence came 
from, as it was, for a large part, from the Schwenkfeldians that, after Böhme’s death, 
his intellectual legacy was passed down, eventually reaching Hegel.202 It has been 
suggested that Böhme came to Schwenkfeld by way of his patron, Carl von Ender,203 
or perhaps through his own disciple and biographer von Frankenberg.204 Stoudt 
suggests that it was perhaps through men such as Abraham von Sommerfeld, Hans 
Sigmund von Schweinichen, David von Schweidnitz, and Hans Dietrich von 
Tschesch, all crypto-Schwenkfeldians with whom Böhme had had some contact.
Caspar (or Kaspar) Schwen(c)kfeld von Ossig (1489 or 1490-1561) represents 
an entirely different current of the Reformation, a ‘gentle Reformer’ after the fashion 
of the Catholic Francis of Assisi, opposed to vituperative and irascible Luther. A 
Silesian noble who heard the clarion call of the Wittemberg Reformer, Schwenkfeld 
was inspired to leave his life in the imperial court, and join in Luther’s fight against 
the established Church. Schwenkfeld, however, soon fell out of Luther’s good graces, 
as he felt that the kind of Christianity Luther espoused was becoming too dry and
202 See Johann Gichtei, Theoscopia P ractica  (Amsterdam: [n. pub.], 1722).203 Peuckert, Bohme, p. 73. For the details o f  the relationship between Böhme and von Ender, see 
Erasmus Francisci, G egenstrahl der M orgenröthe, Christlicher u n d  Schriftm ässiger Wahrheit, w ider 
dass sterngleissende Irrlicht der A bsonderung von den K irchen  (Nuremberg: [n. pub.], 1685).204 Peuckert, Rosenkreutzer, pp. 244— 255.
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scholastic —  ‘too dependent on externals’.205 The break was an acrimonious one: 
Luther, throughout his table-talk, refers to Schwenkfeld by the uninspired pun of 
‘Stenkfeld’, and frequently has cause to make vitriolic comments about his character 
and work, such as, for instance, ‘The stupid fool, possessed by the devil understands 
nothing. He does not know what he is babbling. But if he won’t stop his drivel, let 
him at least not bother me with the booklets which the devil spews out of him’ .206 
Luther’s tirades against Schwenkfeld even reached ears beyond the Continent —  in a 
1551 tract, described as a ‘preservative or treacle against the poison of Pelagius’, by 
the English writer William Turner, the ‘Swengfeldianes’ are referred to as one of the 
heads of ‘this monster in many points like unto the water-snake with seven heads’.207 
The causes of the split between Luther and Schwenkfeld are, on the whole, of a too 
manifold and theological nature to treat here, but one point arises in the doctrinal split 
which Bohme developed a high degree of sympathy with, that of ecumenism. For 
Schwenkfeld, the ‘inward grasp’ of Christ must be recovered in the hearts of the 
believers, the ‘inward, living kernel of Christ’s Gospel’.208 Christianity, as a religion, 
must move beyond ‘the alphabetical promises of salvation‘, and towards a ‘radical 
transformation of personal and social life’, so that the church ‘may be reformed in
205 Jones, p. 77. Detailed accounts o f  Schwenkfeld’s theology can be found in Paul L. Maier, Caspar 
Schw enkfeld  on the P erson and  W ork o f  Christ (Assen, the Netherlands: Royal van Gorcum, 1959); 
and Richard H. Griitzmacher, W ort und  Geist: eine historische u n d  dogm atische U ntersuchung zum  
G nadenm ittel des Wortes (Leibzig: A. Deichert, 1902), pp. 158-173.206 Gottfried Arnold, U npartheiische Kirchen-und-Ketzer-H istorien, vom A nfang  des Neuen  
Testaments biss a u f  das Jahr C hristi 1688  (Frankfurt: [n. pub.], 1699-1700; repr. Schafhausen, 1740 -  
1742), n, p. 251.207 William Turner, A P reservative or Treacle against the Poyson o f  Pelagius, etc. ([n.p]: [n. pub.], 
1551), A, m.208 Jones, pp. 66-67 .
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Christ, edified in the Holy Ghost, and unified into one’.209 For Schwenkfeld,
the true Church community [should] be identified with no temporal, empirical 
organisation — whether established or separatist. It is a spiritual invisible community 
as wide as the world, including all persons in all regions of the earth and in all 
religious communions who are joined in life and spirit to the divine head. It expands 
and is enlarged by a process of organic growth under the organising direction of the 
Holy Spirit.210
This universalising spirit of ecumenism found fertile ground in Böhme’s psyche. A 
subject of persecution by the established Church throughout his career, Böhme 
betrayed the little love he had for it in many of his later texts. ‘The mere belief in the 
historical Christ’, Böhme writes, no longer sufficiently ‘constitutes a Christian’.211 In 
his opinion, the modem Church is but ‘a building of stone’, a ‘bazaar’ wherein the 
‘goddess of vanity’ is served and ‘the Israelites dance about the golden calf, one of 
the many ‘constructed fetishes whom they call God’.212 Christianity has ‘turned into 
mere sects and orders, where one sect despises and brands another as unrighteous’. Its 
theologians ‘wrangle and contend about the church, yet none will take care of the 
poor, forsaken mother of Christ’ —  they are ‘mad wolves and lions [...] foxes and 
hares,’ who continually ‘contend, wrangle, grin, and bite one another for the letter’.213 
In short, the Christian religion has become ‘a mere murdering den’: self-seeking,
209 Caspar Schwenkfeld, Schriften von K aspar Schw enckfeld, 4  vols ([n. p.]: [n. pub.], 1564-1570), n., 
p. 785.210 Jones, pp. 78-79 .21 Quoted in Hartmann, Boehm e, p. 5.212 Ibid., pp. 7 - 9 .213 Sig. Rer., 11. 6Iff.
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corrupt, and ‘full o f  blasphemies about Christ’s person’.214
In the stone-houses of the churches, cathedrals, and cloisters [...] they do counterfeit 
somewhat of Christ, seeing that they there read the writings which the Apostles left 
behind in them; but afterwards in their preaching [...] they foist in the kingdom of 
nature, with brawling and disputing; and spend their time with disputing, confuting, 
and contending about sects (and different mental idols and opinions), is so much that 
one party is brought wholly to condemn the other, and the ears (and hearts) of the 
hearers are so infected with gall and bitterness that one sect wilfully opposes another, 
and cries it down for devilish; whence nothing but wars and disdainful provocations 
do arise, to the desolation of countries and cities.215
Böhme acknowledges the Reformation’s own attempts at revivifying the spirit of 
Christianity, but likens the attempt to trying to ‘transform a whore into a virgin’. The 
only thing Luther and the Reformation accomplished was a ‘whoredom [which] has 
only been ornamented and increased’.216 ‘If this whore is to perish,’ Böhme writes, 
the Schwenkfeldian ‘inward grasp’ or ‘inner spirit’ has to be recovered. Then, and 
only then, will ‘the sects [...] perish, together with the animal whereupon she rides, 
for they are all only images of the whore’.217 For the Christian religion to end this 
‘fetish-worship’ and ‘re-enter the promised land’, it must embrace the spirit of 
universality and non-sectarianism. It must no longer be the external ‘church of Abel’, 
but embrace the spirit of the invisible ‘church of Cain’.218 This spirit of universality 
is, for Böhme, the enduring presence of God, post fall, for as ‘the true Christian does
214 Myst. M ag., 40. 94.215 Ibid., 40. 98.216 For some o f  Luther’s own thoughts on Reformation ecumenism, cf. M artin Luthers sam m tliche  
Werke, Erlangen edn, ed. by Johann Georg Plochmann, 67 vols (Erlangen: Heyder, 1826-1886), xxn,
p. 20.217 Myst. M ag., 36. 69.218 Ibid., 26. 25. See also chapters 27 and 28.
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not belong to any particular sect’, it is through this universal spirit that human beings 
should recognise that they have ‘a single order to which they belong’.219
It is very deplorable to see the world revile and storm, blaspheme and denounce, 
whenever the gifts of God manifest themselves in mankind in different ways, and if 
they have not all the same quality of knowledge, what can a man take if it is not 
generated within him? This [the quality of his understanding] is not a matter of his 
choice, but as his heaven [his mental constitution] is, so will God become revealed to 
him.220
We have all only one single order to which we belong, and the only rule of that order 
is to do the will of God, that is to say, to keep still and serve as instruments through 
which God may do his will. Whatever God sows and makes manifest in us, we give it 
back to him and his own fruit. The kingdom of heaven is not based upon our opinions 
and authorised beliefs, but roots in its own divine power. Our main object ought to be 
to have the divine power within ourselves. If we possess that, all scientific pursuit will 
be a mere play of the intellectual faculties with which to amuse ourselves; for the true 
science is the revelation of wisdom of God within our own mind. God manifests his 
wisdom through his children as the earth manifests her powers through the production 
of various flowers and fruits. Therefore let each one be glad of his own gifts and enjoy 
those of the others. Why should all be alike? Who condemns the birds of the forest 
because they do not all sing the same tune; but each praises its creator in its own way?
Nevertheless, the power which enables them to sing originates in all from only one
221source.
A belief, therefore, ‘merely in the historical Christ’, does not, for Böhme, sufficiently 
‘constitute a Christian'.222 The teachings of Christ are intended to
have no other object than to show us the way how we may re-ascend from a state of 
variety and differentiation to our original unity; and he who teaches otherwise teaches 
an error. All the doctrines which have been hung around this fundamental doctrine, 
and which do not conform with the latter, are merely the products of worldly 
foolishness, thinking itself wise; they are merely useless ornaments which will create
219 Quoted in Hartmann, Boehm e, p. 9.20 Epistles, 1. 14.21 Quoted in Hartmann, Boehm e, p. 9.22 Ibid., p. 5. Emphasis mine.
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This final period in Böhme’s intellectual development came to a close in November 
of 1624, when, due to the final stages of malarial infection, Böhme died under the 
ecclesiastical administrations of Richter’s successor. His parting words of ‘manibus 
complicatis, oculis elevatis’ reveal the heart of his philosophy, for, although he was 
led upon an expressive journey through the languages of the German mystics, the 
Hermeticists and Paracelsians, and return to the language of the Reformation, the 
kernel of his thought remained perennial. Although there was found to be a dialectical 
disharmony between the language and symbolism of mysticism, Hermeticism, and 
Protestant orthodoxy, the content which each sought to express was not so discordant 
at all. A final irony, however, here becomes apparent, for although Böhme had 
attempted to whittle away the husks of the seed of this perennial philosophy, and 
render it as clear and apparent, he had succeeded only in still shrouding it in the 
figurative, the symbolic, and, in Hegelian terms, the representational. What was once 
the mystical, the Hermetical, and the Reformational was now the Böhmean. In other 
words, as David Walsh succinctly notes, ‘the transmitter of the new symbolism to the 
modem world was [now] Jakob Böhme’.224
This new symbolism would find its way to Hegel through a lengthy and 
circuitous course, through a long line of the ‘Teutonic Philosopher’s’ students,
23 Ibid., pp. 7 -8 .24 David Walsh, ‘A Mythology o f  Reason: The Persistence o f  Pseudo-Science in the M odem  World’, 
in Science, Pseudo-Science a n d  U topianism  in Early M odern Thought, ed. by Stephen A. McKnight 
(Columbia: University o f  Missouri Press, 1992), pp. 141-166 (p. 151).
errors, and are calculated to throw dust in the eyes of the ignorant.223
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sympatherisers, and critics. Böhme’s philosophy never gained much appreciation in 
Germany before the Enlightenment, but his writings were preserved. Firstly, by his 
own disciples von Franckenberg (1593-1652) and Johnann Theodor von Tschech 
(1595-1649), eventually becoming a contributing influence on the Silesian poets of 
the seventeenth century, such as Quirinus Kuhlmann (1651-1689). Böhmeanism (or 
‘Behmenism’ as it came to be known) found more fertile ground in England, after his 
works were translated and published by John Sparrow (1615-1665). Böhme’s English 
disciples during the period were composed firstly of the Philadelphian Society of John 
Pordage (1607-1681) and Jane Leade (1623-1704), and secondly seventeenth century 
visionaries such as John Milton (1608-1674), Isaac Newton (1642-1727),225 and 
William Blake (1757-1827).226 Hegel’s introduction to Böhme’s writings was 
through, on the one hand, and as stated, Württemberg Hermeticism and, on the other, 
the Pietist movement. Böhme’s thought began to have an impact on German
25 Erb, p. 1. O ’Regan comments (G nostic A pocalypse, p. 227, n. 4) that there is some debate as to the 
extent o f  Böhm e’s influence on Newton. Karl R. Popp, in Jakob Böhm e u n d  Isaac N ew ton  (Leipzig: 
Hirzel, 1935) and Kurt Poppe, in ‘Uber den Ursprung der Gravitationslehre J. Bohm es, H. More, I. 
Newton’, D ie Drei, 23 (1964), 313-340 , argue the case for a strong Böhmean influence on Newton. 
Stephen Hobhouse, however, argues against this interpretation, in Selected  M ystica l Writings o f  
William Law: E d ited  w ith N otes and  Twenty F our Studies in the M ystical Theology o f  William Law  
and Jacob B oehm e and  an Inquiry into the In fluence o f  Jacob Boehm e on Isaac N ew ton, 2dn ed. (New  
York: Harper, 1948).26 For Böhm e’s influence both on Blake and on eighteenth-century mystical and romantic circles, see: 
Nils Thune, The Behm enists and  the Philadelphians: A Contribution to the S tudy o f  English M ysticism  
in the 17,h and  18th Centuries (Uppsala: Almquist and W iksells, 1948); Desiree Hirst, H idden Riches: 
Traditional Sym bolism  fro m  the Renaissance to B lake  (New York: Barnes and N oble, 1964); Jacques 
Roos, Les aspects littéraires du m ysticism e ph ilosophique et l ’influence de Bœ hm e e t de Sw edenborg  
au début du romantisme: William Blake, Novalis, B a ll anche (Strasbourg: Heitz, 1951); Biyan Aubrey, 
Watchmen fro m  Eternity: B la ke’s D ebt to Jacob  Boehm e  (Lanham: M. D.: University Press o f  
America, 1986); and Phillip Clayton Richards, ‘Visionary Mysticism: A Study o f  Visionary Mysticial 
Experience as it Informs the Work o f  Jacob Boehm e and William Blake and its Importance for the 
Philosophy o f  R eligion’ (Ph.D. diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1987).
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Hermeticism after being translated into French by Louis Claude de St. Martin (1743- 
1803), and gaining ground amongst German lodges, after which ‘in the German secret 
societies [Böhme’s ideas] had never been forgotten’.227 It was through such societies 
that Böhme’s thought exerted an influence on Hegel’s contemporaries, most notably 
Franz von Baader (1765-1841), Hölderlin (1770-1843), and Schelling (1775-1854). 
The Pietists, who felt Luther’s Reformation did not go far enough in terms of 
revivifying Christianity, looked to Böhme’s writings for inspiration. Among these 
were Phillip Jakob Spener (1635-1705), his student Johann Georg Gichtel (1638— 
1710), the Württemberg biblical scholar Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687-1752), and 
the radical Pietists Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714) and Friedrich Christoph Oetinger 
(1702-1782). The Pietist strain, as will be shown in the following section, constitutes 
one of the main currents of transmission of Böhme’s thought to Hegel’s philosophy.
§ 3. 2. Hegel the Reformer?
In his book on Protestant thought, Karl Barth asks the question: ‘Why did Hegel not 
become for the Protestant world something similar to what Thomas Aquinas was for 
Roman Catholicism?’228 Given what has been argued thus far, perhaps a better 
question would be to ask ‘Was Hegel even Protestant?’ The answer to this question is
27 Heinrich Schneider, p. 81. See also Arthur Waite, The Unknown Philosopher: The L ife o f  Louis 
Claude de Sa in t M artin and  the Substance o f  his Transcendental D octrine (New  York: Rudolph 
Steiner Publications, 1970).28 Karl Barth, P rotestant Thought: From  R ousseau to R itschl, trans. by Brian Cozens and Herbert 
Hartwell (New  York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 268.
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at best ambiguous. If ever Hegel were to be considered as such, it would be during his 
period in Heidelberg and Berlin, and not Tübingen. At the closing of his Jena period, 
Hegel finally affirms the Christian religion as the absolute manifest revealed 
religion,229 and the Hegel as the ultimate philosopher of religion is found in the 
Encyclopedia. But the question still remains, was Hegel a Lutheran? Charles Taylor 
answers, ‘when Hegel claims to be a Lutheran Christian, one can certainly question 
whether his position really deserves this description, but not that he truly thought so 
him self.230 Hegel writes in a July 3rd, 1826, letter to Friedrich August Gottreu 
Tholuck (1799-1877) that ‘I am a Lutheran, and through philosophy have been at 
once completely confirmed in Lutheranism’.231 In an 1829 review of K. F. Göschel’s, 
Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen 
Glaubenserkenntnis, Hegel is clearly pleased to have his work regarded as a 
‘Christian philosophy’.232 In the Lectures on the Philosophy o f  History, Hegel refers 
to both himself and the Wittemberg Reformer as ‘We Lutherans —  I am a Lutheran 
and will remain the same — have only this original faith’.233 In another of the Berlin 
writings, Hegel praises Luther and Melanchthon for the ‘immortal deed’ of the 
Reformation, and, through such ‘memorable work’, ‘they have obtained this priceless
29 Merold Westphal, ‘Hegel and the Reformation’, in H istory a n d  System : H e g e l’s P hilosophy o f  
H istory , ed. by Robert Perkins, pp. 73 -92  (p. 74).230 Taylor, p. 486. Some commentators, however, such as Walter Kaufmann, do question H egel’s 
description o f  him self as a Lutheran. Cf. Walter Kaufmann, H egel (New York: Double-day & Co., 
1965), section 65 and passim.231 Letters, p. 520; Briefe, # 5 14a.232 Cf. Berliner Schriften, 1818-1831, ed. by Eva Moldehauer and Karl Markus M ichel (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1986).23 LHP, I, p. 73.
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freedom for us all’.234 In the Lectures on the Philosophy o f  History, Hegel supposes 
that, historically, it was ‘in the Protestant church the reconciliation of religion with 
legal right has taken place’ —  there is no longer ‘no sacred, no religious conscience in 
a state of separation from, or perhaps even hostility to secular right’.235 While 
Hegel may praise the instigators of the Protestant churches (referred to as the 
‘teachers’ in the Positiviy), however, he has little positive to say regarding their 
present day stewards (the ‘officials’).236 In the Positivity, Hegel laments that,
A part from  the usual annual read ings o f  th e A ugsb u rg  C o n fessio n  in som e Protestant 
churches (readings u su a lly  w ear isom e to  every  hearer) and apart from  the dull serm on  
w h ich  fo llo w s  th ese , w hat is the festiv a l w h ich  ce lebrates th e m em ory o f  th is ev en t  
[the R eform ation]?  [ . . . ]  It lo o k s as i f  th e authorities in church and state w ere con ten t  
that th e m em ory o f  h o w  our forefathers had a sen se  o f  th is right [to m ake reform s to  
re lig ion ], h o w  thousands co u ld  stake their liv e s  to  v in d ica te  it, sh ou ld  slum ber in our 
hearts and n ot be retained in any liv in g  fash ion  237
Hegel argues that as long as the Protestant church remained faithful to the spirit of 
Christianity, its ‘pure ecclesiastical right’ then it would be legitimised.238. However, 
this is no longer the case, for, as Hegel writes in an argument strongly reminiscent of 
Bohme’s vituperative tirades against the ’wrangling theologians of his own day’, 
Protestantism’s
appointed  o ffic ia ls  [ . . . ]  h ave tried  to  look  on  th em se lv es  and to  act as m ore than m ere
234 Hoffineister, pp. 31, 33.235 LPH, p. 476.236 Positivity, p. 121.237 Ibid., pp. 146-147.238 Ibid., p. 121.
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representatives of their congregation [...] They have tried to regard their authority as 
more extensive and to hold that the congregations have left it to their judgment to 
decide among themselves what the church’s faith is [...] The Symbolic Books of the 
Protestant church are so framed and so packed with subtleties that they cannot be 
regarded as opinions validated through the consent of the whole people but are solely 
the work of hair-splitting theologians.239
A further fault Hegel finds with Protestantism is its perpetuation of the idea of 
class.240 Whether it be temporal or spiritual, secular or religious, Hegel, in this stage of 
his development, finds the notion of a stratified social hierarchy as the result of 
positivity.
But when a class — either the ruling class or the priests, or both together — loses that 
spirit of simplicity which had brought into being and hitherto inspired their laws and 
ordinances, then not only is it irreparably lost but also the oppression and 
dishonouring of the people is certain (for this reason, the mere division into classes is 
already dangerous to freedom since it can foster an esprit de corps which can become 
a threat to the spirit of the whole).241
Religious and political class division, then, is something which is inimical to the 
notion of freedom. Equality was a principle, a ‘first law’, with the early Christians - 
‘the slave was the brother of his owner [ ...]’.242 However, this principle later became 
something which was not to be realised on earth, but in heaven. Religious rites meant 
to remind the congregation of equality and humility, such as the washing of the feet 
and hands on Holy Thursday, is now reduced to a ‘comedy’, a liturgical act drained of
239 Ibid., pp. 121-122.240 Lukacks, The Young H egel, p. 47.241 Ibid. p. 48.242 Positivity , p. 88.
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Pietism has been defined as ‘the public re-emergence of a more or less 
continuous effort in Germany to achieve a simpler, less dogmatic, and more 
moralistic Christianity than that to be found in any of the established churches’,244 a 
resurgence of the spirit of Schwenkfeld which influenced Böhme’s ecumenism. The 
sources of inspiration and religious concerns of the Pietists came from two quarters: 
from German mystical tradition of Eckhart, Hildegard, Susso, Tauler, and Joachim 
which influenced Schwenkfeld;245 and from Jakob Böhme.246 The remit of the 
movement has been described, in part, as attempting to create a ‘Böhmean “vitalistic 
philosophy of nature’” .247 The kind of language employed the texts of Pietism were 
said to be of a Paracelsian-Böhmean variety.248 Pietism, as a movement, was not well 
regarded by orthodox Protestantism: pastors Johann Jakob Zimmerman of Bietigheim 
and Ludwig Brunnwuell of Grossbotwar were dismissed from their positions for
the essential oil o f  sincerity.243
243 Ibid., p. 89.24 Lewis White Beck, Early German P hilosophy  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 
p. 157.245 Magee, p. 63, n. 70.246 For Böhm e’s influence on Pietism in general, see: Emanuel Hirch, ‘Jacob Böhme und seine 
Einwirkung auf die Seitenbewegung der pietischen Ziet’, in G eschichte der neuern evangelischen  
Theologie, 5 vols (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1951), n, pp. 208-255; Arlene R. Miller, ‘Jacob Boehme: 
From Orthodoxy to Enlightenment’ (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1971). For Böhm e’s influence on 
the prim us inter pares  o f  the Pietism movement, Oetinger, see: Sigrid Grossman, Friedrich Christoph  
Oetingers G ottesvorstellung: Versuch einer A na lyse seiner Theologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht, 1979), pp. 59-66; Wilhelm Albert Hauck, ‘Oetinger und Jakob Böhm e’, in D as G eheimnis 
des Lebens: N aturanschauung und  G ottesauffassung Friedrich Christoph O etingers (Heidelberg: 
Winter, 1947), pp. 159-179.247 Beck, p. 159; Magee, p. 63.248 August Langen, D er W orschatz des D eutschen P ietism us (Tubigen: Max Niem eyer Verlag, 1968), 
P- 71.
72
alleged ‘Böhmeanism’.249 This dislike o f Pietism was no doubt due to the Böhmean 
strain present in the movement, and, as such, perceived to be a threat to traditional 
orthodoxy. Both Protestant orthodoxy and its incarnation in the Tübingen Stift were 
intolerant of Pietism, especially the writings of Oetinger, and ‘for pastors hoping for a 
successful career within the Württemberg church, it was politically expedient to 
espouse conservation rather than speculative views’.250 Despite this, Pietism spread 
like a ‘patina [...] over almost all of German culture’,251 even infiltrating the Stift. As 
Schneider argues, ‘there can no longer be any doubt, that in the Stift, spurred on and 
enriched by the Enlightenment, the original spirit of the [Swabian] Heimat was at 
work, seeking the Truth only in the Whole’.252 The influence of Pietism on Hegel has 
been stated, by many commentators, to be one which endured throughout his life. As 
one commentator has it, ‘Hegel’s upbringing can only have been “Pietist”’.253 During 
his time at gymnasium in Stuttgart, Hegel became familiar with the thought of Johann 
Albrecht Bengel, one of the fathers of Pietism, though his study of J. W. Jaeger’s 
Catechism. Johannes Cocceius, whose thought was also represented in the Catechism, 
was a proponent of the Böhmean (a traditionally Ireneanen) theodicical account, that 
the Fall initiated a process of gradual movement towards perfection in fulfilment of
249 Magee, p. 63.250 Priscilla A. Hayden-Roy, A  F oretaste o f  H eaven ': Friedrich H ölderlin  in the C ontext o f  
W ürttemberg Pietism  (Am sterdam er Publikationen zur Sprache und Literatur) ([n. p.]: Rodopi, 1994), 
p. 69.251 Beck, p. 10.252 Robert Schneider, p. 56.253 Ibid., p. 16.
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the divine plan.254 The educators at the Tübingen Stift with whom Hegel was most 
sympathetic were markedly Pietistic in their outlook. His own instructor, Gottlob 
Christian Storr (1746-1805) was a Pietist and champion of Kantian metaphysics 
(which was popular with the movement).255
In addition to Bengel, J. W. Jaeger was another father of the Pietist movement. 
Jaeger had been a professor of theology at the Stift, and later its chancellor. Jaeger’s 
theology, however, did not fit easily into Protestant orthodoxy, and was considered to 
be the professor of Kontroverstheologie during Tübingen professorship.256 Jaeger’s 
primary theological concerns were with ‘practical piety’, or praxis pietatis, an attempt 
to reconcile Christian eschatology with ethical activism. Jaeger’s notion of practical 
piety greatly echoes the kind of Christological exemplarism that Böhme espoused in 
his final period, particularly in the Way to Christ. Practical piety became a focus point 
of Hegel’s moral philosophy throughout his career: indeed, in 1786, Hegel trawled 
through and excerpted much from Christian Wünsch’s book on the subject;257 in 1787 
he also wrote an essay on the subject;258 and, in his later work, the notions of 
Sittlichkeit and Volksreligion were essentially re-statements of Jaeger’s original 
notion.
The ecumenical spirit of Schwenkfeld and the ‘middle-way’ of the
254 Magee, p. 70. See Chapter Three25 See J. P. Mackey, ‘Making Room for Belief: The Gospel According to Kant’, The M aynooth  
Review, 3 (1977), 20-37 .256 Karl Hermann, Johann A lbrecht Bengel: D er K losterprästor von  D en ken d o rf (Stuttgart: Calwer 
Vereinsbuchhandlung, 1938), pp. 123ff.257 Harris, Towards the Sunlight, pp. 23-26 .258 Johannes Hoffmeister, ed., D okum ente zu  H egels Entw icklung  (Stuttgart: Fromann, 1936), pp. 4 3 -  
48
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Reformation lived on through Hegel in statements such as, ‘A man counts as a man in 
virtue of his manhood alone, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, 
Italian, etc.’,259 and that ‘many [...] who worshipped Zeus, or Brahma, or Wotan, will 
find grace before the judge of the world’.260 This kind of ecumenical, non-sectarian 
sentiment, reminiscent of Böhme’s mature period, is a common element throughout 
Hegel’s later work, and, as such, there is little value in going too much into it here. It 
is sufficient to summarise, as Peter Hodgson does, that Hegel makes very little of the 
‘supposed superiority of Lutheranism’, and, as such, his own ‘philosophical theology’ 
is ‘transconfessional’.261 What is significant is that an important issue here arises. 
Thus far it has been seen that Hegel’s intellectual development conforms, by and 
large, to Böhme’s. The transition through periods of rejection of orthodoxy, to the 
symbolism and imagery of Hermeticism, and return to a kind of heterodox 
Protestantism is a course of intellectual development which Böhme appear to share. 
Nevertheless, it becomes apparent that Hegel does also stop at Böhme’s final 
juncture, a return to a kind of orthodoxy, rather he moves beyond it. Böhme’s 
heterodox Protestantism still retains the element of the theological, the imagistic, the 
symbolic, or, in Hegelian terms, the representational. The question should here be 
raised, then, is it the case that Böhme and Hegel’s intellectual concerns seem to be 
primarily of a religious nature, and, therefore, their proper medium for exposition
259 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, P hilosophy o f  R ight, trans. by Thomas Malcolm Knox (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1952), remark to par. 209.260 Nohl, p. 107.261 Peter C. Hodgson, H egel a n d  Christian Theology: A R eading on the Lectures on the P hilosophy o f  
R eligion  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 192-193.
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should be through the discipline o f  theology, and not philosophy?
§ 3. 3. 1. Liberating Religion from Theology
In response to the question above, one might, as Lukács does, quote Lenin’s aphorism 
that ‘Idealism is clerical obscurantism’ —  that to remain true to the premises of 
philosophical idealism, one cannot ‘evade the claims of religion’.262 It is, in fact, the 
view of a considerable number of Hegel’s commentators that ‘religion and theology 
are the central axis around which the whole Hegelian system revolves’.263 Georg 
Lasson, Hegel’s modem editor, for instance, ‘attacks every critic, however 
reactionary, who omits to put religion in the very centre of his interpretation of 
Hegel’.264
To best provide an answer to this concern, one ought to turn to Hegel’s own 
thoughts on the matter. Hegel laments that ‘there was a time when all knowledge was 
knowledge of God’,265 and ‘our age [...] knows nothing of God [...] the belief that 
this knowledge is not even possible passes for the highest degree of insight’.266
262 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, V. I. Lenin: C ollected Works, trans. approved by CPSU, 45 vols (London and 
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963), xxxvin, p. 363.263 Noted in Georg Lukács, The Young H egel, p. 8.264 Ibid.265 Es hat eine Z eit gegeben, wo alles Wissen W issenschaft von G ott gew esen ist. Georg Wilhelm  
Friedrich Hegel, Werke [hereafter Glöckner], Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. by Herman Glöckner, 26 vols 
(Stuttgart: 1927-39), xv, 53. The first 20 vols, containing H egel’s writings, are a reprint o f  the 1832— 
1887 edition (19 vols). V ols 2 1 -2 2  contain Glockner’s H egel and vols 2 3 -2 6  his Hegel-Lexikon.
266 E s m acht unserm  Zeitalter keinen K um m er mehr, von  G ott nichts zu  erkennen, vielm ehr g ilt es fü r
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Proceeding from these laments, it was thought, in his own time and particularly 
during the deliverance of the lectures on the philosophy of religion, that Hegel’s 
motive was either to transpose the content of theology to ‘a purely immanent human 
phenomenon’, or to annul the classical theism of the Reformation by reinterpreting 
Christian doctrine according to his own philosophical system.267 It was not Hegel’s 
intention, however, to do either of these things, rather, as one commentator argues, 
his agenda was ‘to recover the conceptual foundations of religion by creating a 
postcritical speculative theology of his own’ 268 Hegel proposes a solution to these 
supposed inadequacies. He argues that art, religion, and philosophy share an identical 
subject-matter or common object, namely ‘God and nothing but God and the self­
unfolding of God’.269 That is to say, these three disciplines seek to provide answers 
concerning certain metaphysical concepts which, Hegel argues, are ultimately 
founded on concept of a divine being.
God is the beginning of all things and the end of all things; [everything] starts from 
God and returns to God. God is the one and only object of philosophy. [Its concern is] 
to occupy itself with God, to apprehend everything in God, to lead everything back to 
God, as well as to derive everything particular from God and to justify everything only
die höchste Einsicht, dass diese Erkenntnis sogar n icht m öglich sei. Glöckner, xv, 53.267 Hodgson, H egel a n d  Christian Theology, p. 12.268 Ibid., p. 13.269 D er G egenstand der Religion wie der P hilosophie ist die ewige W ahrheit in ihre O bjectivität selbst. 
Glöckner, XV, 37. H egel’s thoughts on the relationship between religion and philosophy are discussed 
explicitly in Vorlesungen über die P hilosophie der Religion  [hereafter VPR\, ed. by Walter Jaeschke, 3 
vols (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1984-1987), I, pp. 28-35, 284-302 and G eschichte der Philosophie  
(critical edition o f  the Introduction, ed. by Hoffmeister; Leipzig, 1940), pp. 166-221. See translation 
from the G eschichte  in LH P  I, 61—91. See also Enzyklopädie, secs. 284, pp. 571—573, and 
Phänom enologie des Geistes, ed. by Hans-Friedrich W essels and Heinrich Clairmont (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 1988), pp. 547-556. Translation from the Phänom enologie  in The P henom enology o f  M ind, 
trans. by James Black Baillie, 2nd edn rev (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1949), 783-797
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in so far as it stems from God, and is sustained through its relationship with God. It 
lives by God’s radiance and has [within itself] the mind of God. Thus philosophy is 
theology, and [one’s] occupation with philosophy — or rather in philosophy — is of 
itself the service of God.270
Though each of these disciplines have the same goal in mind, the ways in which they 
seek to achieve it, nevertheless, are radically distinct for Hegel. The distinction lies 
between the interpretative modes particular to each discipline: for art, ‘presentation’ 
(.Darscheinung); for religion, ‘representation’ (Vorstellung); and for philosophy, 
rational (vernünftig) ‘thought’ {Denken). Each interpretative mode represents a stage 
in the methodology of describing the divine, according to varying degrees of 
absoluteness. Presentation need not concern us in the present discussion, so let us turn 
immediately to representation and rational thought. The struggle for primacy between 
these two interpretative modes can be seen, under various guises, throughout the 
history of Western civilisation: in ancient Greece (between Xoyoq and puBoq); in the 
medieval era (between ratio and fides); and in Hegel’s own time, the German 
Enlightenment, a certain aspect of the problem is also exposed (the tension between 
superstition and fanaticism).271 In his article in Philosophical Studies, William 
Desmond gives an invaluable summary of these two perennial modes of expression:
Religious representation invites man to participate in a sacred universe with its rituals 
of worship and reverent invocations of divinity. Rational reflection, by contrast, seems
270 Georg W ilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f  Religion  [hereafter LPR ], ed. by 
Peter C. Hodgson, trans. by R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson and others, 3 vols (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University o f  California Press, 1984, 1985, 1987; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), I, p. 84.271 William Desmond, ‘Hegel and the Problem o f  Religious Representation’, in P hilosophical Studies 
(Ireland), 30 (1984), 9 -2 2  (pp. 9 -10).
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to introduce a critical pause in this participation, demanding a certain detachment from 
naive commitments, asking the thinker to consider crucial ambiguities that may mark 
religious representation.272
Representation is the mode of expression particular to religion, by which 
metaphysical truths are sought to be expressed imagistically, by ‘picture-thinking’. As 
Luther writes, ‘External things in religion must precede internal experiences which 
come through [i.e. are mediated by] external things, for God has resolved to give 
nobody the internal gifts except through the external things. He will give nobody the 
Spirit and Faith without the use of external word and sign’.273 Hegel claims, however, 
that ‘[in] picture-thinking, reality does not receive its perfect due [...] it does not attain 
to what it ought to show forth, viz. spirit’.274 Although ‘knowledge is an essential 
element of the Christian religion itself,275 and representation is concerned with 
presenting this religious knowledge, it is unable to do so explicitly.276 It is thus 
confined to parables, analogies, and mythologies, and does not attempt to answer 
questions rationally. On account of this, representation tends to express its content 
somewhat ambiguously. In Hegelian terms, it does not bear within it its own 
‘immediate interpretation’: it is ‘meaningful in-itself (an-sich), but not always for- 
itself (fur-sichy .277 Representation serves as a mediator between finite and particular 
human beings and the infinite and universal God, and as such always retains within it
272 Ibid., p. 9.273 Martin Luther, Wider die him lichen Propheten vom  Sacrament, n. (1525).274 Georg W ilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology’ o f  Sp irit [hereafter PS], trans. by A. V. Miller 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 412.275 ‘D as Erkennen liegt daher in der christlichen Religion s e lb s t’. Werke, xv, 35.276 Conor Cunningham, G enealogy o f  N ihilism  (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 101.27 Desmond, p. 15.
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an element of the finite, sensuous, and particular.278 Representation, and theology in 
general, treats the concept of God as an external object, something which is not only 
outside the discipline itself, but also as something set ‘over and against creation’.279 
This treatment can cause the dignity of the concept of God to suffer, as he becomes 
something superfluous or ‘tacked on’ to creation. However, this ‘object’ 
representation of God is treated by Hegel as a natural stage in man’s historical 
development, according to Hegel’s system of periodization. This system belongs to 
his Tübingen period, where, along with his studies in theology, Hegel expressed an 
interest in the discipline of anthropology.280 Anthropologically, Hegel declares the 
concepts of ‘intuition’ (Anschauung), ‘idea’ (Vorstellung), and ‘concept’ or ‘notion’ 
(Begriff) as ‘systematic principles’.281 Intuition is concerned with aesthetics, idea with 
religion, and concept with philosophy. Historicizing anthropology, Hegel places 
aesthetics as belonging to the ancient world, religion to the medieval world, and 
philosophy to the modem world.282 Theology, as the study of the object of religion, 
belongs to the Middle Ages within Hegel’s anthropological framework. Just as in the 
ancient and medieval world, where knowledge of the universal was preceded logically 
by objectifying it as a transcendent reality beyond the world of particulars, so to was 
the concept of God treated in these stages of development. The nature of God could 
not be known without first externalising him as personal, yet transcendent, being,
101a., p. iz.279 Cunningham, p. 101.280 Lukäcs, The Young H egel, P- 27.
281 n  ■ j281 Ibid.282 Ibid.
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separated from man and creation.283 For Hegel it is now possible, and necessary, at 
this point in history to provide an account of religious truths expressed through a 
more modem mode of expression, that is in the language of philosophy. This 
transition, as Fackenheim notes, provides Hegel with a means to move beyond 
‘object’ theology and towards ‘relational’ theology.284 The concept of God may now 
be expressed as the living process by which ‘the implicit unity of divine and human 
nature becomes actual and attains concrete existence’.285 As a caveat, however, it 
must be said that while the ‘theological content of faith’ has, for Hegel, a real 
significance only because of philosophy, this religious content (for example, the 
Passion and Resurrection of Christ) must first be an experience fe lt, and only then 
subsequently interpreted by reason.286
For Hegel, the ‘philosophic idea is the idea of God’,287 and philosophy is the 
‘true Theodicaea, the justification of God’.288 Philosophy, Hegel argues, escapes the 
difficulties of religious representation by its use of rational thought to render the 
content of philosophy, or the philosophical concept (Begriff).289 Where representation
283 Frederick Charles Copleston, ‘Hegel and the Rationalization o f  M ysticism ’, in N ew  Studies in 
H egel's Philosophy, ed. by Warren E. Steinkrus (Oswego, N ew  York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1971), pp. 187-200 (p. 195).284 Emil Fackenheim, The Religious D im ensions in H eg e l's  Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1967), p. 178 note.285 1D er G eist ist daher der lebendige Process, dass die an sich seyende E inheit der göttlichen und  
m enschlichen N atur fü r  sich und  hervorgebracht w erde'. Werke, X V I ,  p. 210.286 Harris, N ight Thoughts, p. 89. Cf. Encyklopädie der philosophischen W issenschaften im 
Grundrisse, ed. by Karl Rosenkranz (Berlin: L. Heimann, 1870), pp. 137-141.287 L H P ,m , p. 11.28 LPH , p. 477.289 Some ‘leftist’ Protestant Hegelians, however, argue against H egel’s philosophical ‘mending’ o f  
theology, such as Eberhard Jüngel. Cf. Jüngel, G o d  as the M ystery o f  the World: On the F oundation o f  
the Theology o f  the C rucified  One in the D ispute between Theism and  Atheism  (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
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occludes religious truths by draping them in the trappings of mysticism, thought seeks 
to express them rationally and philosophically. What Hegel seems to be attempting 
here is no less than an attempt to universalise the content of religion.290 In order to do 
this, Hegel must first liberate religion from its usual dependence on revelation 
(religious texts or other forms of gnosis) by integrating it into a philosophical 
framework. By removing this crutch, Hegel is also allowing Christianity to escape the 
typical criticisms of the Enlightenment, which took the form of either attacks upon 
historical validity of its revelatory dogmas, or general complaints about its supposed 
mystical obscuratanism. In this way, the concept of God can now move, in 
Heidegger’s parlance, beyond ontotheology —  beyond the dualism of the creator and 
the created.291
The question then arises as to whether, or not, Hegel is arguing for an end of 
religion, as philosophy, or so it seems, has usurped its position as the ultimate source 
of religious truth 292 As Conor Cunningham enquires, ‘is religion no longer essential
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1983), pp. 63 -100 . This argument is typical o f  left Hegelians who, 
as Paul Lakeland comments, perform a ‘radical surgery on the Hegelian corpus’ in amputating H egel’s 
argued relation o f  theology from philosophy. Paul Lakeland, ‘A  N ew  Pietism: H egel and Recent 
Christology’, The Journal o f  Religion, 68 (1988), 57—71 (p. 70).290 Stephen D. Crites, ‘The Gospel According to H egel’, The Journa l o f  Religion, 2, 46 (1966), 2 4 6 -  
263 (p. 247). In this way Hegel was declared by Errol Harris to be the ‘Christian philosopher par 
excellence’. Cf. Errol Harris, ‘H egel and Christianity’, Owl o f  M inerva, 13 (1982), 1 -5  (p. 1).291 Cunningham, p. 101. It may be suggested that H egel is recollecting the position o f  Aquinas in his 
own movement away from Augustinian illumination theory. However, where Aquinas does seek to 
establish his own rational framework independent o f  revelation, it w ill com e to rely on certain 
foundational first principles, which Hegel w ill com e to view  as defective.292 As, first among all others, is argued by Feuerbach. For a more m odem  argument, cf. Walter 
Jaeschke, ‘Speculative and Anthropological Criticism o f  Hegel: A  Theological Orientation to Hegel 
and Feuerbach’, Journal o f  the A m erican A cadem y o f  Religion, 3 ,4 8  (1980), 345—364.
82
once its content has been appropriated and sublated by philosophy?’293 Firstly, it 
ought to be made clear that what Hegel is not doing is attempting to amputate the 
truth from religion and reattach it to philosophy. In fact, Hegel concedes that there are 
some theological doctrines (such as the Christian doctrine of the Trinity) which 
philosophy does not necessarily need to render in rational language, although in fact 
Hegel later will.294 In general, the truth of religious dogmas may remain where it is, as 
these dogmas already recognise God as infinite spirit, and, when philosophy expresses 
them in a different form, it is merely repeating the same truth, albeit presented in a 
more universalising format.295 This raises a further question, however: if the 
theological picture-thinking of representation is being used simply as content for 
philosophy, does this imply the relationship between religion and philosophy is a 
symbiotic or parasitical one? In the hierarchy of the arts, does philosophy, according 
to Hegel’s understanding, rank higher than theology? An exploration of this argument 
comes by way of Paul Ricoeur and Louis Dupre, both of whom argue for a dialectical 
relationship between the content of theology and the form of philosophy. Theology 
perpetually provides inexhaustible content to philosophy in a ‘continual dialectic’, 
and so philosophy ‘does not abolish but legitimates all the shapes that lead to the 
ultimate stage; furthermore, Denken is but the ability to recapitulate the inner
293 Cunningham, p. 102.294 LPR, I, p. 157. Hegel defended the doctrine o f  the Trinity against Tholuck. Cf. Friedrich Tholuck, 
Die speculative Trinitätslehre des späteren Orients: E ine religionsphilosophische M onographie aus 
handschriftlichen Q uellen der Leydener, O xforder und  Berliner B iblio thek  (Berlin: [n. pub], 1826). 
See also Chapter Two o f  this thesis.295 Copleston, p. 198, n. 28.
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dynamism of representation’.296 Further, when this concerns the content of Judeo- 
Christian religious belief, then, as Dupre argues, ‘the development of the mind never 
leads beyond Christian faith: [...] faith continues to provide the content of 
philosophical thought’.297 Such arguments mirror Hegel’s own sentiments, that 
‘religion can exist without philosophy, but philosophy cannot exist without 
religion’.298 Philosophy ‘only unfolds itself when it unfolds religion, and when it 
unfolds itself it unfolds religion’.299 To reiterate, Hegel’s identification of the 
subject-matter of religion with that of philosophy serves as no less than an attempt to 
universalise the content of religion. Where his own religion is concerned, Lutheran 
Christianity, to which he had a committed allegiance, Hegel is attempting to introduce 
an element of reflective self-awareness and self-understanding.300 As Copleston 
comments in his article ‘Hegel and the Rationalization of Mysticism’, Hegel is 
following ‘the programme of St. Anselm and other mediaeval theologians, the 
programme of “faith seeking understanding’” .301 However, while scholastics of both 
Catholic, and indeed later Protestant, orthodoxy applied philosophy to religion in 
order to bring the message of Christianity closer to the perceived original intention in 
design of its authors, Hegel is attempting to transform the content of Christianity from
296 Paul Ricoeur, ‘The Status o f  Vorstellung  in H egel’s Philosophy o f  R eligion’, in M eaning, Truth and  
G od  (Notre Dame, IN: University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1982), pp. 70 -8 8  (pp. 86-87).297 Louis Dupre, ‘H egel’s Absolute Spirit: A  Religious Justification o f  Secular Culture’, in Hegel: The 
Absolute Spirit (Ottawa: University o f  Ottawa Press, 1984), pp. 127-138  (p. 128).298 LPR, ffl, p. 148.29 ‘[Die Philosophie] explicirt daher nur sich, indem sie die Relig ion explicirt u n d  indem sie sich  
explicirt, explicirt sie de Religion  ’. W erke, xv, p. 37.30 Copleston, p. 188.301 Ibid.
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mere bible-based religion into idealist metaphysics. This struggle, writes G. R. G. 
Mure, comprises a ‘strenuous and uncompromising effort, which has no serious 
parallel, to rationalize and to bring to light the mystic union of God and man 
proclaimed by men such as Meister Eckhart and Jakob Böhme, to reveal it as a union 
through distinction for which the whole world is evidence’.302
To say in conclusion of this comparative examination of Böhme and Hegel’s 
thought, it becomes apparent that, while Hegel finds the content of Böhme’s work to 
be both worthy of mention and a source of inspiration in his own work, the 
representational mode of expression in which that content is rendered (whether it 
comes from his early period as a rejecter of Protestant orthodoxy, his Hermetic period 
of silence, or his return to the Reformation) is utterly inferior to the language of 
philosophy. Fortunately, as, according to Hegel, because both philosophy and 
theology share an identical common subject-matter that content can be rescued by 
stripping away religious analogy, metaphor, and parable, so that the kernel of truth 
that remains can be expressed in the clear and rational language of thought. In this 
way, commentators such as David Walsh are led to conclude that ‘such qualifications 
aside, when Hegel comes to the content of Böhme’s speculation he is clearly a 
believer’.303
302 Geoffrey Reginald Gilchrist Mure, The P hilosophy o f  H egel (London: Oxford University Press, 
1965), p. 103.303 Walsh, ‘The Historical D ialectic o f  Spirit’, p. 18.
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CHAPTER II 
THE CONCEPT OF GOD
The doctrine of the Trinity, as both promulgated and affirmed down through the ages 
by Christian orthodoxy, may be summarised as simply the existence of the one God as 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, three persons sharing one nature. The concept of the 
triune nature of God within Christian orthodoxy has become inseparable from the 
concept of God, owing to both its scriptural and historical doctrinal affirmation.1 As 
the Athanasian Creed (more commonly known as the Quicunque Vult; the fourth or 
fifth century formative statement of faith on the concept of God) declares, according 
to the universal Christian faith:
We worship one God in Trinity and the Trinity in unity, neither confusing the persons 
nor dividing the substance. For there is one person of the Father, another of the Son, 
and another of the Holy Spirit. But the godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the 
Holy Spirit is all one: the gloiy equal and the majesty co-eternal. Such as the Father is, 
such is the Son, and such is the Holy Spirit. Uncreated is the Father; uncreated is the 
Son; uncreated is the Spirit. The Father uncreate [sic], the Son uncreate: and the Holy 
Spirit uncreate. The Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible: and the Holy 
Spirit incomprehensible [...] The Father is made of none: neither created, nor 
begotten. The Son is of the Father alone: not made, nor created, but begotten. The 
Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son: neither made, nor created, nor begotten, 
but proceeding. So there is one Father [...] one Son [...] one Holy Spirit [...] In this 
Trinity none is afore, or after other: none is greater, or less than another; but the whole 
three persons are co-etemal together: and co-equal. So that in all things, as is 
aforesaid: the unity in Trinity and the Trinity in unity is to be worshipped.2
1 The scriptural argument for the Trinity and its oneness is based upon certain interpretations o f  
passages such as Deuteronomy 6. 4. ( ‘the Lord is our God, the Lord alone’) and James 2. 9 ( ‘i f  you 
show partiality, you commit sin’) , and the baptismal formula found in Matthew 28. 19 ( ‘in the name o f  
the Father and o f  the Son and o f  the H oly Spirit’).2 The authorship o f  the Latin original o f  this creed is attributed to Athanasius. The extract here 
reproduced in English is from The B ook  o f  Com m on Prayer  (1662; repr. Cambridge: Cambridge
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As is clear in the extract above, the doctrine of the triune God, and the how each 
person of the Trinity relates to the other, is treated by Christian orthodoxy as an 
‘incomprehensible’ truth or unrevealed ‘mystery’,3 something beyond the limits of 
human understanding. This treatment of the Trinity as a mystery is common to the 
Christian tradition —  as Luther declared ‘how this intertrinitarian relation is carried 
on is something that we must believe, for even to the angels, who unceasingly behold 
it in delight, it is unfathomable. And all who have wanted to comprehend it have 
broken their neck in the effort’.4
But, as will become apparent, neither Hegel nor Böhme’s conception of the 
Trinity (for both, die Dreieinigkeit) perfectly mirrors the traditional understanding as 
declared above, and it is precisely upon the consideration of the Trinity as entirely an 
mysterious concept that the most resonant tenors of their criticisms will come to be 
heard. Hegel argues that the Trinity ought not to, in fact, be dispensed with as a mere 
mystery, rather, according to a new formulation, the doctrine of the Trinity must 
become something of which it is possible to speak affirmatively. The Christian 
religion is, by its very nature, a ‘revealed’ (<offenbare) religion, and, as such, any 
notion of the mysterious should not be a part of its constitution.
University Press, 1968), pp. 27 -29 .3 The term ‘mystery’ is here meant in its theological sense, referring to the ‘particular elements [that is 
to say, the established doctrines] o f  the divine plan [ ...]  which transcend the ordinary meanings o f  the 
word associated with the intellectual problems needing resolution or [ .. .]  requiring explanation’. Our 
Sunday V isitor’s Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. by Peter M. J. Stravinskas, rev. edn (Huntington, I. N.: 
Our Sunday Visitor, 1998), p. 694.4 Martin Luther, The Com plete Serm ons o f  M artin  Luther, ed. by Eugene Klug, 11 vols (Grand Rapids, 
M. I.: Baker Brook House Company, 200), X ,  p. 1009.
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In the Christian religion God has revealed himself, i.e. he has given men to understand 
what he is, so that he is no longer a concealment, a secret, This possibility to know 
God lays upon us the duty to do so; and the development of the thinking spirit which 
has proceeded from this basis, from the revelation of the divine being, must finally 
proceed to grasp in thought that which has at first been exhibited to spirit in feeling 
and representation.5
Mystery, for Hegel, is naturally considered to be mysterious, but only to the faculty of 
the understanding. Speculative reason, on the other hand, ‘transcends mystery’ and 
provides the ‘rational tools to make sense of it’.6 In fact, the perichoretic, or mutually 
relating, discourse of the Trinity is, for Hegel, the discourse of reason itself. At its 
heart, the Trinity is, for Hegel,
The mystery of God [das Mysterium Gottes]; its content is mystical [der Inhalt ist 
mystisch], i.e., speculative. But what is for reason is not a secret [ist kein Geheimnis]. 
In the Christian religion one knows, and this is a secret only for the finite 
understanding, and for the thought that is based on sense experience.7
As such, Hegel claims that his formula for the divine process of self-consciousness 
and self-manifestation which is the Trinity can be rendered in the language of the 
concept itself (that is as in the language of Denken, in philosophical terms), and not
5 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, P hilosophy o f  H istory: Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der 
W elgeschichte [hereafter VPH\, ed. by Georg Lasson, 4 vols (Hamburg: Meiner, 1934), I, p. 45. 
Translation in LPH, p. 15. Further on this point, Hegel writes it is ‘the nature o f  the Christian religion  
to [ .. .]  know God cognitively, God’s nature and essence, and should esteem this cognition above all 
else’ (LPR , I, p. 88; VPR , I, 4), and ‘Religion is the mode, the type o f  consciousness, in which the truth 
is present for all m en’. See The E ncyclopedia Logic  [herafter Geraets], trans. by T. F. Geraets et al. 
(Albany: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 1991), n; Werke, vm, p. 23. Further, Hegel concludes 
that ‘God is only in and for thought’ (LPR, I, p. 209; VPR, I, 118).6 William Desmond, H e g e l’s God: a C ounterfeit D ouble?  (Hants: Ashgate, 2003), p. 103.7 LPR, ffl, p. 192
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solely through the medium of the imagistic language of the Vorstellung (as are 
traditionally orthodox trinitarian notions).8 In order for the concept of the Trinity to be 
understood therefore, and not simply dispensed with as a mystery, it must, according 
to Hegel, be appreciated in spirit (appreciated as both a part and the whole of Hegel’s 
entire rational framework).9 In this way commentators have declared that, for Hegel, 
‘the rational exposition of trinitarian theology is the highest task of philosophy’.10 
Further, within the current of the Christian tradition, Hegel’s reformulation of 
traditional trinitarian doctrine serves to be understood by the foundational, so called 
‘anti-negative’ approach of traditional Christian theology, and articulates the 
manifestation of the universal subject of all experience, namely God.11
This kind of analysis of Hegel’s articulation of the Trinity may also be 
successfully applied to Böhme, for he, too, is concerned with defining how exactly 
the concept of God ought to be constituted. Böhme acknowledges that, while 
Christians say that ‘God is threefold, but one in essence’, such a doctrine is usually 
‘misunderstood by the ignorant as well as by the half learned’.12 Like Hegel, Böhme 
does not suppose that the Trinity ought to be dispensed with as a mere mystery, rather 
it should be treated as something which is entirely capable of apprehension ‘to the 
spirit resting in the love of God’.13 One would expect, however, Hegel’s criticism of
8 O’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, p. 71.9 Spirit, p. 257, n. 78.10 Harris, N igh t Thoughts, p. 155.1 O’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, p. 64.12 Myst. M ag., 7. 5.13 Aurora, 10. 26.
89
representative formulations of trinitarian doctrine to naturally extend to Böhme. 
While they, in fact, do, such criticisms will be seen to be unjustified, for it is on this 
particular subject that Böhme admits his own failures due to his perennial use of 
imagistic language. Böhme is quite clear that, if he is to make the Trinity 
understandable to reason, he cannot ‘speak [...] in a devilish [erroneous] manner’, the 
mysteries of God cannot be ‘understood in a terrestrial sense, but [must be regarded] 
from a higher point of view, in a supernatural aspect’.14 So-called ‘devilish’ or 
‘earthly language’ is insufficient to describe ‘what there is of joy, happiness, and 
loveliness contained in the inner wonders of God’.15 Böhme acknowledges that, 
although he is often ‘forced to give terrestrial names to that which is celestial’ — to 
render representationally that which is rational — he hopes that the reader ‘may form 
a conception [of what he truly means to say], and by meditating about it penetrate 
within the inner foundation’.16
This chapter examining Hegel and Böhme’s analysis of the Trinity shall be 
approached according to the tripartite Christian narrative of the eternal generation of 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Hegel and Böhme’s conceptions of the Father will 
concentrate upon their thoughts on the supposed dual nature of the Trinity, as 
immanent and economic, represented by the twin historical representations of the
14 Ibid., 23. 17-33. See also Böhm e’s ‘D e Electione Gratiae’ [hereafter Grace], in D e E lectione  
Gratiae and  Q uestiones Theosophicae, trans. by John Rolleston Earle (London: Constable, 1930), 3. 
19.15 Jakob Böhme, C oncerning the Three Principles o f  the D ivine Essence  [hereafter Princ.], trans. by 
John Sparrow (London: 1648; John M. Watkins, 1909), 14. 90.16 Grace, 3. 19.
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Father as deus absconditus and deus revelatus. The treatment of the Son will focus 
upon their shared rejection of the orthodox interpretation of the Trinity as one 
composed of ‘persons’, and the importance of God’s historical incarnation, the divine 
movement from abstraction to subjectivity. Finally, an assessment of the Holy Spirit 
in the light of the notion of ‘eternal generation’ will be considered, along with the 
question of whether or not the Holy Spirit is considered by Böhme and Hegel to be 
the conclusion of the ‘grand circuit’ which is the Trinity.
S e c t i o n  O n e
T h e  F a t h e r
Both Hegel and Böhme’s trinitarian schemes are formulated in strong opposition to 
those of religious orthodoxy’s, in particular to the declared separation, according to 
orthodox Christian spheres, between the immanent and economic trinities. On the 
most superficial level, it may be said that the immanent trinity is ‘who God is’ and the 
economic trinity is ‘what God does’. This immanent (or ontological or essential) 
trinity can be said to be a description of the interior, ad intra life of the divine, 
understood as a mutually relating ‘conversation’ such as that which is spoken of in 
the first chapter of John’s Gospel. The economic trinity is said to refer to the ad extra 
life of the triune God, as involved in creation and salvation history, reflecting and
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revealing the more obscure nature of the preceding immanent trinity.17 The economic 
trinity is, according to commentators such as Hodgson, ‘the outward re-enactment 
(not simply repetition) of the inward trinitarian dialectic —  a re-enactment that is 
necessary to the self-realisation of God and that is already implicit in the trinitarian 
“play of love with itself” .18 Orthodoxy’s distinction between immanent and economic 
trinities is claimed to be a necessary one, for God is generally conceived as a being 
apart from the world; his existence and identity are not considered to be contingent 
upon creation. Nevertheless, for Christian orthodoxy, God must also be somehow 
involved with the world, for he is conceived of as a personal being, the object of faith, 
prayer, and devotion. The Trinity, in other words, cannot ‘merely [be] a play of love 
with itself but an engaged and serious love for others’.19 Emil Fackenheim writes of 
this relationship in The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought that,
W e have lon g  rejected  a right-w in g  d issip ation  o f  the actual w orld  into th e lo g ica l 
realm : th is w ou ld  b e sp ec ified  b y  th e d issip ation  o f  th e w o rld ly  trinitarian incursion  
into a tim e less  trinitarian p lay, and w e  h ave a lso  rejected  a le ft-w in g  reduction  o f  id ea  
and spirit to  w orld ly  finitude: th is w ou ld  be sp ec ified  b y  th e reduction  o f  th e w orld ly  
trinitarian incursion  to a d iv in e se lf-rea liza tion  w h ich , bereft o f  a p re-w orld ly  trin ity to  
sustain  it, cou ld  n ever be co m p lete  [ . . . ]  the p re-w ord ly  trinitarian p lay  is com p lete , 
apart from  its w orld ly  m anifestation ; y e t  th is latter —  n o m ere repetition o f  the p lay  
—  is as real for p h ilo so p h ic  com p reh en sion  as it is  for C hristian faith. T h e trinitarian  
G od is w h o lly  real apart from  the w orld  and w h o lly  real in  it, and o n ly  b ecau se o f  h is 
pre-w orld ly  reality  can  h is w orld ly  m an ifestation  b e c o m p le te.20
17 ‘Econom y’ (oiicovogia) is also a term favoured by the Alexandrian Fathers for the Incarnation, a 
doctrine through which the econom ic trinity is generally understood. Cf. John Ignatius Dollinger, The 
First A ge o f  Christianity and  the Church, trans. by Henry Nutcombe Oxenham (London: Wm. H. 
Allen, 1867), p. 168, n. 2.18 Hodgson, Christian Theology, p. 130. Cf. also LPR, in, p. 195, 292.19 Ibid.20 Emil Fackenheim, The Religious D im ension in H egel's Thought (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
University Press, 1967), p. 205.
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Does orthodoxy then, according to Fackenheim’s account, support a hierarchical 
prioritisation of the immanent over the economic trinity, or vice-versa? Historically 
speaking, the immanent trinity took precedence over the economic according to 
classical theology, while in later years, as a result of the Reformation, the economic 
came to head the hierarchy.
For Luther, the logical gulf that exists between immanent and economic 
trinities is represented by two distinct characterisations of the first person of each 
trinity, the Father. The first characterisation of the Father is that of deus absconditus: 
God as absent from and beyond creation, theologically equivalent to Eckhart’s 
Uberwesentliche Gottheit or the Pseudo-Dionysius’s UTcepouciaq 0eap%ia,21 and 
representative of the immanent trinity. The second is that o f deus revelatus: God as 
revealed to creation, representative of the economic trinity. Further along this line, 
Luther envisions powers or potentia (inspired from mention in scripture of God’s 
Suvcquq and apexq) as expressive of the nature of these two characterisations of the 
Father: that of potentia absoluta (God’s absolute power as present in the immanent 
trinity) and potentia ordinata (God’s ordained power, as manifested to creation 
through the economic trinity).22 Luther’s division between God’s potentia absoluta 
and his potentia ordinata is made in the following way. God’s absolute power 
remains transcendent, that is to say above creation, and so, beyond the reach of man.
21 O ’Regan, G nostic Apocalypse, p. 70.2 Miller, ‘Luther and Boehm e’, p. 282.
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In Luther’s parlance, it constitutes the ‘will of his good pleasure’: in short, it is his 
divine purpose ‘as seen from eternity’.23 God’s ordained power, ‘his will of the sign’, 
is revealed to the world, accessible to all through the divine personage of Jesus 
Christ.24 It is this ordained power that is the proper object of theological speculation, 
for it is manifested in the world through visible representations of God, such as 
revelation, baptism, and the Eucharist. As Luther writes, ‘the ordained power, that is 
on [sic] the incarnate Son [...] Let us gather around the child lying in the lap of his 
mother Mary and at the victim hanging on the cross; truly there we shall contemplate 
God; there we shall look into the very heart of God itself.25 The explanation for 
Luther’s championing of the pre-eminence of the economic over the immanent trinity 
can be reduced to his understanding of the primacy of man’s salvation over any and 
all other religious concerns. For Luther, the will of the unrevealed God cannot offer 
any information as to how man’s salvation can be achieved, while the revealed God, 
manifested in historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth, can. As Luther’s spiritual 
director, Johann von Staupitz, advised him: ‘Why torment yourself with these 
speculations [on the unrevealed God]? Look at the wounds of Christ and at the blood 
shed for you. From these predestination will shine’.26 For Luther, to go beyond God’s 
ordained power and speculate upon the deus absconditus is to go beyond the 
foundation stone of revelation, where there is ‘no faith, knowledge, or understanding,
23 Ibid., p. 282.24 For further treatment o f  Luther’s technical terms, see Luthers Werke, XLn, pp. 294-295 , X L U r, pp. 
458-459 .25 Ibid., XLDi, p. 73.26 Ibid. p. 46.
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an investigation which leads many only to damnation’ 27
It becomes clear that the twin representations of God as deus absconditus and 
deus revelatus are opposed to each other on a fundamental level, for it is declared by 
Christian orthodoxy that it is but the deus revelatus which can be known and spoken 
of affirmatively. Luther, drawing upon his scholastic heritage, argues that the 
unrevealed God, present in the immanent trinity, and as represented by the concept of 
the deus absconditus, cannot be talked about affirmatively by either philosophy or 
theology because he is a being conceived of as having no connection to creation. 
Owing to his via negativa approach, Luther writes that, where the ‘divine labyrinth’ 
of the immanent trinity is concerned, ‘it is insane to argue so much about God outside 
and before time because this is an attempt to understand the uncovered divinity or the 
bare divine essence’.28 Nothing can be known about the immanent trinity, simply 
because it does not manifest itself in creation —  if man were to posit anything about 
it, he would, Luther writes, ‘degenerate into an erratic and vagabond spirit’.29 For 
Luther in particular, and Christian orthodoxy in general, then, God, taken as the 
object of both theological speculation and religious worship, is present only in the 
economic trinity as the deus revelatus.
27 Miller, ‘Luther and Boehm e’, p. 282. In criticising the theological focus upon the nature o f  the 
hidden God, Luther has Pseudo-Dionysius intentionally in his crosshairs. See Anders Nygren, A gape  
and  Eros (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), p. 706. Luther’s stance here is, historically, no new  
departure. Gerschom Scholem comments, in K abbalah  (New York: N ew  American Library, 1974), p. 
89, that the author o f  one o f  the first cabbalistic works, the M a ’arekhet ha-Elohut, ‘was led to the 
daring conclusion that only the revealed God can in reality be called ‘G od’, and not the hidden deus 
absconditus, who cannot be an object o f  religious thought’.28 Luthers Werke, X L n ,  p. 293; 10.29 Ibid., XLn, p. 293.
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This treatment by religious orthodoxy of the revealed and unrevealed God is 
in sharp distinction to both Hegel and Böhme’s thought. Firstly, for both 
philosophers, the concept of the unrevealed God is treated as something about which 
it ought to be possible to speak. For Hegel, the immanent trinity is something entirely 
accessible to reason, while, for Böhme, the same can be, at the very least, 
descriptively branded by various cataphatic monikers. Secondly, the distinction 
between the revealed and unrevealed God, between immanent and economic trinities, 
is treated by both Hegel and Böhme as but a conceptual distinction. In reality, and as 
will be shown, the representations of God as deus absconditus and deus revelatus are 
merged into one concept.
§ 1. 1. Böhme ’s Conception o f the Deus Absconditus
Böhme’s trinitarian scheme serves to be understood as a general precursor to Hegel’s. 
For both, the Trinity is thought of primarily as the narrative of the dialectical self- 
manifestation of the divine, from abstraction and objectivity to subjectivity and 
personhood. In the Six Theosophic Points, Böhme states that ‘without contradiction 
[i.e. ‘opposition’] nothing can become manifest to itself; for if it has nothing to resist 
it, it goes continually outward and does not return again into itself. But if  it does not 
return into itself as into that form which it originally came, it knows nothing of the
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primal being’.30 As it will be for Hegel, this dialectical movement is essential for 
Böhme. Like the Eckhartian conception of the Trinity as ‘one grand circuit’, the 
Böhmean formulation will come to describe the Trinity in a similar pattern, as the 
‘eternal unbeginning birth’ (die ewige unanfängliche Geburt) of God. God, in this 
instance, is not to be understood as having a beginning, but ‘is the eternal beginning 
of the manifestation of God’ (ist der ewige Anfang des geoffenbarten Gottes) f  In 
short, God, for Böhme, is manifested in what he does.
The key to understanding Böhme’s treatment of the Father is through his oft 
used maxim that ‘in yes and no all things consist’,32 meaning that there is a dualistic 
or thetical-antithetical struggle inherent in the understanding of every concept. 
Böhme’s attachment to this maxim is evident in the following passage, which would, 
years later, find itself quoted approvingly in Hegel’s lectures on the history of 
philosophy:
The reader should know that in ‘yes’ and ‘no’ stand all things, whether divine, 
devilish, earthly or whatever it may be called. The One, as the yes is an empty (eitel) 
power and life, and is the truth of God or God himself. He would be unknown in 
himself and there would be neither joy nor exaltation (Erheblichkeit) nor sensibility — 
[life] — within him without the no. The no is a projection of the yes or truth, so that 
the truth might be revealed and be something, wherein there is a contrarium in which
30 Jakob Böhme, S ix  Theosophic Points a n d  O ther Writings [hereafter Theos. Punkt.], trans. by John 
Rolleston Earle (University o f  Michigan Press, 1958), p. 167.31 Myst. Mag., 4 .1 .  Emphasis mine.32 Theos. Frag., 3. 2. See M ichel Henry’s comment that ‘The thought o f  Böhme was thoroughly 
influenced by the idea o f  an opposition and a differentiation interior to the life o f  the absolute and 
constitutive o f  this life precisely in so far as it is no more than a bringing to light o f  manifestation. The 
concept o f  consciousness is thought o f  by Böhme in its solidarity with the concept o f  otherness, mirror, 
splitting, namely in its unity with the ontological process o f  the internal division o f  being’. Michel 
Henry, The E ssence o f  M anifestation, trans. by Girard Etzkom (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973),
p. 108.
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the eternal love might become active, sensible, willing and something to be loved.33
Böhme’s treatment of the Trinity is no less than an attempt to reconcile all dialectical 
distinctions present in the world of creation, between yes and no, lightness and 
darkness, and, most importantly, good and evil.34 On the celestial level, it is Böhme’s 
aim to maintain God’s primacy as the creator of all things, and yet keep him free, in 
true theistic fashion, from the invidious position of being the cause of evil. On the 
terrestrial level, Böhme is attempting to show a clear path how man can be saved 
from his evil nature.35 As one commentator succinctly puts it, ‘the impulse [behind 
Böhme’s theogonic account] is the desire to solve the problem of evil: “it is not easy 
to avoid the appearance of making God susceptible of evil’” .36
Seeing we are not to speak of God, what he is, and where he is, we must say, that God 
himself is the essence of all essences; for all is generated, or bom, created, and 
proceeded from him, and all things take their beginning out of God [...] But there is 
yet this difference: that evil neither is, nor is called God; this is understood in the first 
principle, where it is the earnest fountain of the wrathfulness, according to which God 
calls himself an angry, wrathful, jealous God. For the original of life, and of all 
mobility, consists in the wrathfulness; yet if the same [...] be kindled with the light in 
God, it is then no more tartness, but the severe wrathfulness is changed into great
The key symbol of Böhme’s conception of the immanent, pre-worldly, or primordial
3 ‘Betrachtung Göttlicher Offenbarung’, in Säm tliche Schriften, IX ,  3. 2. The ‘contrarium ’ is the term 
employed by Böhme to refer to the dialectical opposition which, he argues, exists between all things. 
Compare with ‘Geschichte der Philosophie’,  Säm tliche Werke, x ix , pp. 319-320 .34 The particulars o f  this dialectical relationship between good and evil is more fully treated in Chapter 
Three o f  this thesis.35 Miller, ‘Luther and Boehm e’, p. 283.36 Stoudt, p. 196. Stoudt is quoting Schleiermacher here. See Speeches on Religion to Its C ultured  
D espisers, trans. by John Oman (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Truebnpr & Co., 1893), p. 49.37 Princ. 1, 1-2 .
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trinity is the ‘abyss’, the ‘mysterium magnum’, or the ‘Groundless’(Ungrund— the 
term’s similarity to Echkart’s Abgrund or Urgrund here is clear)’, roughly attributable 
to the Gnostic 7tX.f|pco|ia or the deus absconditus of traditional orthodox 
Christianity.38
God is the eternal unity, the unmeasurable one good, having nothing before or after it 
that could possibly endow it with something or move it. It is without any inclinations 
or qualities [i.e. it is unpredicated], without any beginning in time, within itself only 
one. It is purity itself, without any contact; requiring neither place nor locality for its 
dwelling, being at once outside of and within the world. Into its depth no thought can 
penetrate, neither can its greatness be expressed in numbers, for it is infinity itself. All 
that can be counted or measured is natural or figurative, but the unity of God cannot 
be defined. It is everything, and has been recognised as good, and is called ‘good’, 
because it is eternal mildness and beneficence within the sensitivity of nature and 
creature, the sweetest love. For the unity in its aspect as good issues out of itself, 
introducing itself into willing and moving. There the unity lives and penetrates the 
willing or moving, and the willing and moving experiences the mildness of the unity. 
This is the foundation of love in the unity, of which Moses says, ‘The Lord our God is 
a holy God, and there is no other besides him’.39
Astrologically, the Groundless corresponds to the planet Saturn, the inward-looking 
‘Greater Malefic’, the Father of the gods,40 while alchemically, it is represented by the 
‘element’ salt and the metal lead, the prima materia for alchemical transmutation.
38 Whether, in fact, Böhm e’s primordial trinity is properly spoken o f  as an immanent trinity is the 
subject o f  some debate. O ’Regan lists (G nostic Apocalypse, p. 236, n. 1) the commentators who 
disagree with the identification o f  the Groundless with the immanent trinity as Franz von Baader, 
‘Fermente Cognitionis in Säm tliche Werke, 16 vols, n, pp. 257, 319, 356; Koyré, La philosophie de 
Jacob Boehm e, pp. 340-343 , and a difficult to find work by Dionysius Andreas Freher, subject to 
private viewing in the National Library, Dublin, Ireland. See Christopher Walton, N otes fo r  an 
Adequate B iography o f  William Law, 1854-1861  (London: [n. pub.], 1854), pp. 259-265 . The 
perceived differences between both notions are, nevertheless, o f  a discrete and, quite arguably, 
insignificant variety. This thesis will, therefore, continue with O ’Regan’s established convention and 
persist in referring to Böhm e’s primordial trinity as an immanent one.39 Theos. Frag., 1.1.40 Each planet has a particular role in Böhm e’s system: Saturn is the institutor o f  corporeality and the 
source o f  the wrath o f  God. A urora  26. 2, 12.
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Cabalistically, it can be likened to the supernal realm beyond the Tree of Life 
paradigm, the ‘infinite’ (Ain-soph, p x  tyio), or the ‘nothing’ (Ayin, V); the eternal unity 
which is said to exist beyond subject-object relations.41 The Groundless is at once the 
first person of the immanent trinity, and yet is extra-trinitarian — it is a realm of non- 
being before the creation of the Trinity. In virtue of this conception of being 
‘everything’ yet ‘nothing’, the Groundless is described using various cataphatic and 
apophatic monikers throughout Böhme’s work, such as: ‘the being of beings’ (Wesen 
des Wesens) (Myst. Mag., 1. 2, 1. 6); ‘the one and the simple’ (Myst. Mag., 1. 2, 1. 6, 
29. 1; Grace, 1. 3); ‘the eternal good’ (Myst. Mag., 3. 2; Clavis, #2; De Incarnatione 
Verbi, n, 5. 34); ‘root’ (Wurzel) (Myst. Mag., 1. 8, 60. 38), Tight’ (IV, n, 3. 4); 
‘nameless’ (ohne Namen) (Myst. Mag., 1. 8, 60. 38); ‘ungraspable’ (unbegrieflich); 
‘inexpressible’ (unaussprechlich)-, ‘beyond nature’ (ausser der Natur) (Myst. Mag., 
60. 38_; ‘not an essence’ (Myst. Mag., 1. 6); ‘hiddenness’ (Verborgenheit); and 
‘beyond beginning’ (unanfängliche).42 In short, the Groundless constitutes a locus 
where the divine ‘nothing’ (nichts), God’s existence, meets the divine ‘something’ 
(Etwas), his revealed nature. The dual nature of God indicated by Böhme here by the 
use of such apophatic and cataphatic monikers is, perhaps, attributable to his Lutheran
41 Gershom G. Scholem, M ajor Trends in Jew ish M ysticism  (New York: Schocken, 1946), p. 221.42 For a more extensive list, see O ’Regan, G nostic Apocalypse, p. 32. Böhm e’s apophatic god-names 
recall various mystical traditions. They evoke Gnosticism, for the Father is often described as ‘the 
incomprehensible, the unthinkable, who surpasses all thought’, Pseudo-Dioynsius, who refers to the 
godhead as ‘ineffable’ (appriToq), ‘inconceivable’ (áSiavvexoq), and ‘incomprehensible’ 
(ájtepíXejtToq), and Eckhart, who refers to God, among other apophatic titles, as ‘nothing1 (Nichts). 
See Evangelium  Veritatis, ed. by M. Malinine, H. Ch. Puech, G. Quispel, and others (Zürich: Rascher, 
1956), 17. 5; Pseudo-Dionysius, D ivine N am es  1, 1-5; Meister Eckhart, D ie deutschen und  
lateinischen Werke, ed. by Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1936-), 
sermons 2, 3, 9, 17, 26, 29, 53, 57 -5 9 , 77.
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heritage —  Luther’s distinction between the divine as both the ‘God of wrath’ 
(Zorngott) and the ‘God of mercy’ (Barmhertziggott).43 Böhme’s use of these 
monikers seem to imply a God who is without form or order, without limit and 
unbounded, and yet seeking to be reconciled in to systematic thought. In short, the 
Groundless is portrayed as something beyond the dialectic, beyond Luther’s 
distinctions of wrath and love, and beyond conventional morality of good and evil.44
For it cannot be said of God that he is this or that, evil or good, or that he has 
distinctions in himself. For he is in himself natureless, passionless, and creatureless. 
He has no tendency to anything, for there is nothing before him to which he could 
tend, neither evil nor good [...] There is no quality or pain in him [...] [He] is a single 
will in which the world and the whole creation lies [...] He is neither light nor 
darkness, neither love nor wrath, but the Eternal One.45
God is the eternal unity [...] which has nothing after nor before him that can give him 
or become him anything, or that can move him; and he is devoid of all tendencies and 
properties. He is without origin in time and in himself one only, as a mere purity 
without attigence. He has nowhere a place or position, nor quires such for his 
dwelling; but he is at the same time out of the world and in the world, and deeper than 
any thought can plunge. If the numbers of his greatness and depth should be for a 
hundred thousand years together, his depth would not have begun to be expressed; for 
he is infinitude [...]; but the unity of God cannot be expressed, for it is through 
everything at the same time 46
The first person of this primordial trinity is equated with the ‘eternal will’ (die ewige 
Wille or, simply, Urwille), a divine desire which lies ‘in the recesses of this abyss’.47
43 Miller, ‘Luther and Boehm e’, p. 283.4 See Schelling’s comment that ‘there must be a being before all basis and before all existence, that is, 
before any duality at all; how can w e designate it except as “primal ground,” or rather, as the 
“groundless” ’. O f H um an Freedom , trans, by James Gutmann (Chicago: Open Court, 1936), p. 87.45 Grace, 1.3.46 Theos. Frag., 1.1.47 Hans Lassen Martensen, Jacob Boehme: H is Life and  Teaching, trans, by T. Rhys Evans (London:
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The eternal will is described as the ‘essence of essences’,48 and the ‘beginning and is 
called God the Father’.49 In short, it is the Groundless seeking a ground, the ‘cause of 
all being’,50 the first cause which brings the second person of the Trinity into 
manifestation. The Groundless cannot endure in the state of contradiction, between 
being and yet not-being, of all and yet none. Happily, it possesses the Eckartian divine 
‘spark’ (Funklein or Spinier) which is the eternal will, the indwelling desire to come 
to know itself. This will is the possibility, the potentiality, the seed for self- 
consciousness; the desire to move from chaos to order, from contraction to expansion, 
and from boundlessness to limit.51 It is unclear, however, in Bohme’s writings, how 
exactly the eternal will functions as the cause or catalyst for this movement towards 
self-consciousness; whether it is something that happens to the Groundless, or is 
something the Groundless wills itself.52 Nevertheless, God in himself, writes Bohme, 
‘has no more than one desire, which is to give and bring forth him self.53 For this to 
be possible, for the Groundless to know itself, it is necessary, Bohme argues, for it to 
distinguish itself from itself. The Groundless, to put it simply, requires a ‘ground’ 
(Grund); the nichts requires an Ichts; the no-thing requires something. ‘The nothing,’
Hodder and Stoughton, 1885), p. 57.48 Princ., 4. 56.49 Jakob Bohme, O f the Incarnation o f  the Christ [hereafter Incarnation ], trans. by John Rolleston 
Earle (London: Constable, 1934), n, 2. 4.
50 Ibid.51 This divine will to m ove from boundlessness to limitation is found throughout Gnosticism —  the 
unlimited Father desires to become ‘limited’ (opoq) in order to be ‘comprehended’ (KaraXaPEiv). Cf. 
‘The 4th Treatise’, in The N a g  H am m adi Codex I  (Codex Jung), ed. by Harold W. Attrdige (London: 
Brill, 1985), 75. 13-21.52 O ’Regan, Gnostic Apocalypse, p. 33. Whether the Groundless ‘w ills its own w ill’ has obvious 
problematical implications.53 Grace, 1.18.
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Böhme writes, ‘hungers after the something, and this hunger is the desire [...] For the 
desire has nothing that it is able to conceive. It conceives only itself, and draws itself 
to itself [...] and brings itself from abyss to byss [Vom Ungrunde in Grund] [...] and 
yet remains a nothing’.54
Had the hidden God, who is merely one essence and will, not led himself by his will 
out of himself, had he not brought himself out of eternal comprehension in the 
temperamenta into a differentiation of wills, and had he not led the same 
differentiation into a subjectivation of natural and creaturely life, and did this same 
differentiation not stand in strife in life, how then would the hidden will of God, 
which in itself is single, become manifest to itself?55
Böhme comes to the realisation, as Hegel will come to do, that the Father of the 
immanent trinity is an insufficient representation of the criteria needed for divine self- 
revelation.56 Both philosophers conceptualise divine self-revelation as bi-partite: as 
coming to self-consciousness and self-subjectivation on the one hand, and as coming 
to self-manifestation on the other. The eternal will of the Groundless is the push 
towards self-consciousness, but not self-manifestation. Therefore, a second trinity is 
posited, an economic divine will to appear in the world of creation, for the deus 
absconditus to appear as deus revelatus. As Böhme writes,
For if there were only one will then all beings would constitute only one thing, but in 
opposition each raises itself in itself for its victory and exaltation. And in this conflict
54 Myst. Mag., 3. 5.5 Jakob Bohme On D ivine Contem plation  [hereafter Contem plation], trans. by John Sparrow (London: 
Printed for M. Simmons, 1661), 1 .10.  The ‘Tem perm entum ’ is B6hm e’s term for the proper ‘balance’ 
o f  a being; how it orients itself towards the dialectic o f  being and non-being.56 Walsh, ‘The Historical Dialectic o f  Spirit’, p. 25.
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stands all life and growth, and thereby the divine Wisdom is revealed and comes in a 
formation to contemplation and to joyousness since in overcoming there is joy but a 
single will is not revealed to itself, for there is neither evil nor good in it, neither joy 
nor sorrow.57
As such, the process of God’s emanation is treated by Bohme in a seven stage 
narrative which attempts to avoid identifying God as the ultimate source of evil. As 
he writes in the Aurora,
The whole or total God stands in seven species or kinds, or in a sevenfold form of 
generating; and if these births or genitures were not, then there would be neither God, 
nor life, nor angel, nor any creature. And these births or genitures have no beginning, 
but have so generated themselves from eternity [...] These seven generatings in all are 
none of them the first, the second, or the third, or last, but they are all seven, every one 
of them [...] I must set them down one after another, according to the creature ly way 
and manner, otherwise you could not understand it.58
These seven ‘species’, ‘kinds’, ‘forms’ (Gestalten), ‘source spirits’ (Quellgeister), 
‘properties’ (Eigenschaften), or ‘qualities’ (Qualitäten) are, in Böhme’s words, ‘the 
mobility, surge, or drive of a thing’ (die Bewiglickeit, Quellen, und der Trieben eines 
Dinges).59 Each quality (Qualität originating etymologically from Quellen or Quell, a
57 Schriften, vn; Myst. M ag., 11.8.58 Aurora, 23. 15-19.59 Ibid., 1. 3. Walsh draws a comparison between Böhm e’s seven qualities and Goethe’s seven stages o f  
the Urpflanze. The Esoteric O rigins o f  M odern Ideological Thought: Boehm e and  H egel (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University o f  Virginia, 1978), p. 94. See Ronald D. Gray, G oethe the Alchem ist: A  Study  
o f  A lchem ical Sym bolism  in G oethe's L iterary and  Scientific Works (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1952), p.74. For the significance o f  Böhm e’s settling the number o f  the qualities at 
seven, see Julius Evola’s comment in The H erm etic Tradition, trans. by E. E. Rehmus (Rochester, V. 
T.: Inner Traditions, 1995), p. 52 that, ‘Metaphysically, seven expresses the three added to the four 
[. . .]  seven is the manifestation o f  the creative principles (triad) in relation to the world made up o f  the 
four elements; the full expression o f  nature creating nature (natura naturans) in action’. See also 
Wilhelm Heinrich Roscher, ‘D ie Sieben- und Neunzahl in Kultus und Mythus der Griechen’, 
Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen K lasse der Kgl. Sächsischen G esellschaft der 
W issenschaften, 24 (1904), 19—34 .
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surging force, or Quail or Quahl, meaning pain)60 is a ‘surging vitality’ {ein quellende 
Kraft), and ‘a power of life’.61 One commentator imagines Böhme’s conception of the 
qualités as ‘an egressive energy, an inherent libido’,62 likening it to an urge much like 
Henri Bergson’s élan vital.63 Specific to the divine, however, the qualities constitute 
the ‘powers of expression in God, manifested in the temporal-material world’.64 They 
inform, as Magee comments, all reality and ‘are the Grundbegriffe for all the 
sciences’.65 These qualities are highly reminiscent of the sephirah of the cabbalistic 
‘Tree of Life’ paradigm, as both attempt a narrative description of God’s descent from 
the purely spiritual or supernal realm to the material world. As the Cabbala was, from 
the medieval era to the Renaissance, appropriated by many Christian mystics and 
natural philosophers, a certain degree of Hermeticism was introduced to the Tree of 
Life paradigm. This element of Hermeticism took the form primarily of astrological 
and alchemical correspondences to the various stages in the manifestation of God. 
Böhme’s own seven qualities share these Hermetic correspondences almost exactly, 
which are illustrated diagrammatically at the end of this chapter.66
The seven qualities, independent of their Hermetic attributions, are listed by 
Böhme in many of his works, and are as follows: (1) ‘sourness’ {Herb)', (2) 
‘sweetness’ (Süss); (3) ‘bitterness’ {Bitter)-, (4) ‘heat’ {Hitze)-, (5) ‘love’ {Liebe); (6)
60 O’Regan, Gnostic A pocalypse, p. 41. Cf. Koyre, p. 247; Stoudt, p. 83ff.61 Aurora, 1. 6.62 Stoudt, p. 83.63 Cf. Jacques Chevalier, Bergson  (Paris: Plon, 1926), pp. 192, 193, 221.64 O’Regan, Gnostic A pocalypse, p. 41.65 Magee, p. 160.6 See pp. 170-171.
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‘tone’ (Ton or Schall); and (7) ‘body’ (Corpus). These seven qualities are organised 
by Böhme into two triads. The first three qualities, identical in name and in concept to 
Galen’s humours, constitute Böhme’s immanent, pre-worldly trinity —  or ‘Wheel of 
Anguish’ in his own terminology —  with the first quality of sour as representative of 
the Groundless, the first principle, the point of departure, being both no-thing and yet 
everything in seed.67 The final three qualities (five, six, and seven) make up Böhme’s 
economic trinity, as revealed to the world of creation. The fourth quality, lying 
between the immanent and economic triads, being alternately named ‘heat’ or 
(lightning) ‘flash’ (Schrack), serves as a point of transition between these two 
trinities, between the unrevealed and revealed God. The fourth quality represents a 
creative flash as the result of the first three qualities having fulfilled their original 
reXoi;, that of coming to self-consciousness. Heat is the alchemical fire of calcination, 
the burning down of the inflexible base metals, the ‘ardent source’ of life’s begetting, 
the ‘burning, self-consuming life-heart’, the ‘source of regeneration’ and the ‘new 
life’s centre in God’.68
These qualities represent different ways of talking about the Father’s 
manifestation. Further, they have logical connotations which seek to ‘reveal the God- 
consciousness within man’.69 How this is revealed is through Böhme’s use of 
alchemical symbolism, through the triad of salt, mercury, and sulphur.
67 Epistles, 47. 37.68 Jakob Böhme, The Threefold L ife o f  M an  [hereafter Threefold], trans. by John Sparrow (London: [n. 
pub.], 1650; repr. by Watkins, 1909), 8. 18, 9. 71 -72 . Stoudt, p. 113.69 Stoudt, p. 197.
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The ancients said that in sulphur, mercury, and salt are contained all things. This 
refers not so much to the material as to the spiritual aspect of things, namely, to the 
spirit of the qualities wherefrom material things grow. By the term ‘salt’ they 
understood the sharp metallic desire in nature; ‘mercury’ symbolised to them the 
motion and differentiation of the former, by means of which each thing becomes 
objective and enters into formation. ‘Sulphur’, the third quality, signified the anguish 
of nature.70
In terms of the Trinity, be it immanent or economic, Böhme attributes salt as 
descriptive of the nature of the Father (represented in the first and fifth qualities), 
mercury of the Son (represented in the second and six qualities), and sulphur to the 
Holy Spirit (represented in the third and seventh qualities). Böhme is keen to note, 
however, that this narrative and its accompanying symbolism does not constitute, as it 
were, the whole story of God. Böhme exhorts the reader ‘not to understand in an 
earthly manner the high supernatural meaning’, rather, in the process of his 
manifestation, God ‘does not go through all the spirits equally’, but ‘touches [upon 
them] or stirs them’.71
§1.2.  Hegel’s Treatment o f Böhme ’s Trinitarian Dynamic
To turn now to Hegel’s thoughts on the Böhmean scheme, it is true that, while Hegel 
acknowledges that Böhme’s trinitarian speculation as ‘one of the most remarkable
70 Jakob Bohme, The Clavis [hereafter Clavis], trans. by John Sparrow (London: Printed by M. 
Simmons, 1647), 46.71 Grace, 3. 10; A urora, 10. 35.
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attempts [...] to comprehend the innermost nature of the absolute essence’, naturally 
he does not accept any of Böhme’s representative thinking about God. Böhme’s list of 
the sensual categories of God’s manifestation (the qualities of sourness, sweetness, 
bitterness, etc.) are regarded by Hegel as, on first glance, confused and lacking in 
rational thought. As Hegel writes, there appears to be nothing ‘stable and constant 
within it, since he [Böhme] always experiences the inappropriateness of the 
representation to what he wants [to say]’.72 A more recent commentator also puts it 
that Böhme’s mode of expression has ‘no constancy of mind. The ideas all run 
together without a principle of order to guide them; expressions are forever changing 
and any attempt to give a coherent account of them would only delude itself.73 It is 
due to the crutch picture-thinking that Böhme can comprehend only certain moments 
or events in God’s manifestation, such as the contrarium between good and evil, but 
cannot reconcile such into a totality. God may be declared as an absolute essence, but 
Böhme cannot give a clear and rational account why this is in fact so. As Hegel writes 
in the History o f  Philosophy.
The basic idea for [Böhme] is the striving to hold all in an absolute unity — the 
absolute divine unity, and the unification of all absolutes in God. His chief, one may 
even say his only thought, which goes through all, is in general the Holy Trinity — to 
encompass the divine trinity in all, all things as its revelation and exposition. So that it 
is the universal principle in which and through which everything is: and indeed, such 
that all things have only this trinity in themselves, not as a trinity of the imagination 
[.Phantasie], but really —the absolute idea.74
12Briefe von und  an H egel, ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister and R olf Flechsig, 4 vols (Hamburg: Meiner, 
1952-1961), I, pp. 381-382 . Trans, in Walsh, ‘The Historical Dialectic o f  Spirit’, p. 18.73 Walsh, p. 18. Based upon H egel’s similar comment in G eschichte der P hilosophie, p. 304.74 ‘Geschichte der Philosophie’, in Säm tliche Werke, X I X ,  301. Trans, in Walsh, p. 18.
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Hegel rejects Böhme’s use of apophatic soubriquets for the unmanifest Godhead as 
wild and fantastical;75 however, Böhme’s seven part qualitative analysis of God’s 
manifestation is recognised as having a particular kind of merit. As Hegel approvingly 
writes in the Philosophy o f Nature:
Qualification or ‘inqualification’, an expression of Jakob Bohme’s [thought], a 
philosophy which goes deep but into a murky depth, signifies the movement of a 
quality (astringency, bitterness, fieriness, etc.) in itself, insofar as it posits and 
establishes itself in its negative nature (in its torment or Qual) from out of an other 
and in general its unrest in itself, by means of which it brings forth and maintains itself 
only through a struggle.76
Hegel fails, however, to give Böhme his proper due, for, as has been stated, Böhme 
does admit that the language and symbolism he uses to describe God’s manifestation 
should be understood only speculatively. Similarly, Böhme’s use of the apophatic 
monikers of negative theology, describing God as ‘nothing’, are not, he writes, to be 
taken in a literal sense.
Hegel also eschews Böhme’s via negativa approach to describe the deus 
absconditus, and, as such, his descriptions are almost entirely cataphatic. His 
approach is not Dionysian, however —  Hegel does not seek out ‘God-names’ as if to
75 O ’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, p. 130.76 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’, in Säm tliche Werke, IV, p. 129. Trans, in 
Walsh, p. 29. See also H e g e l’s P hilosophy o f  N ature: Part tw o o f  the Encyclopaedia o f  the 
P hilosophical Sciences (1830), trans. by A. V. M iller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 114: 
‘Qualierung  or lnqnalierung, an expression o f  Jakob Böhm e’s, whose philosophy goes deep, but into a 
turbid depth, signifies the movement o f  a quality (o f  sourness, bitterness, fieriness, etc.) within itself in 
so far as it situates and fastens itself in its negative nature (in its Quahl) from out o f  an other —  
signifies in general the quality’s own internal unrest by which it produces and maintains itself only in 
conflict’.
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define God as a particularity, for he admits that ‘predicates as particular 
characteristics are not appropriate to the nature of God’.77 At his most abstract, Hegel 
describes the Father as the ‘universal spirit that particularises itself.78 He is ‘the 
whole’ (das Ganze), ‘wholeness’ (Ganzheit), and ‘totality’ (Totalität). He is ‘the 
One’ (both der Eine, the personal one, and das Eine, the non-personal one), ‘the ov’, 
‘the abyss’, and ‘the depths’.79 What Christian orthodoxy calls God is, according to 
Hegel, purely the deus revelatus. It is God as seen through the eyes of finite spirits, as 
the object of faith (Glaube) and devotion (Andacht), expressed through the medium 
of representation. The deus revelatus exists only in religion, and, as such, is in a 
purely objective relationship to man.80 Therefore, the deus revelatus is as a finite 
spirit himself, contingent upon mankind, and not absolute. Hegel’s God, however, 
expressed through the ontological narratives of the Encyclopedia and in the 1831 
lectures, is the ‘absolute idea’, identical with the traditional conception of the 
orthodox deus absconditus. Nevertheless, it is Hegel’s maxim that ‘God is God only 
so far as he knows himself —81 for the divine to be spoken of according to his
7 LPR, in, pp. 76, 277-278 . Cf. Dionysius the Areopagite, The M ystical Theology and  the D ivine  
Nam es, trans. by C. E. Rolt (London: Dover Publications, 2004).78 Ibid., p. 192.79 Ibid., p. 97. It might be argued that, although the God-names o f  ‘abyss’ and ‘depths’ are opposed to 
each other in an etymological sense, H egel’s pairing o f  the two may be indicative o f  the dialectical 
agon which lies at the heart o f  the deus absconditus. On an historical note, the god-name ‘depths’ has 
its origin in the Gnostic creation myth, where it is stated that, o f  the Father and his angels, ‘the depths 
knew them, yet they could not know the depths, in which they were, neither could they know  
themselves’ (4th Treatise, 60. 19).80 J. A. Leighton, ‘H egel’s Conception o f  God’, The P hilosophical Review , 5 (1896), 601 -618 , (p. 
610).81 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, H e g e l’s P hilosophy o f  M ind, trans. by William Wallace (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 298.
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definition, he must distinguish himself from himself, and come to self-consciousness. 
He must move away from his aspect as deus absconditus, ‘other’ himself, and present 
himself as the deus revelatus. Hegel’s treatment of the Father is, therefore, as both 
deus absconditus and deus revelatus'. he is both God in his aspect as distinct and 
unknown to creation, and God in his aspect as present in creation, in salvation history. 
Where the Christian religion is concerned, there cannot be a God who is only ‘in- 
itself, for the Christian God is a ‘living God’.82 Hegel realises, as did Bohme, that 
self-consciousness does not equal self-manifestation. The immanent trinity is only 
‘one side of the absolutely eternal Trinity, it is only the Godhead by itself in 
reciprocal contemplation and recognition [Anerkenntnisy P  Therefore, an economic 
trinity is posited, wherein the Father enters into the world of creation.
[God] has entered into a relationship with evil [creation] and the medium is the 
abomination of the mixture of the two [...] but it must be converted into its opposite, 
the Son must go through the earth, to overcome the evil, and when he appears as victor 
on one side he awakens in the other the self-recognition of God, as the recognition of 
its new unity with God, or as the Spirit of God. Thereby the medium becomes a 
beautiful divine medium, the universe of God.84
82 Thomas J. J. Altizer, ‘Hegel and the Christian God’, Journal o f  the A m erican A cadem y o f  Religion, 
59 (1991), 71-91 (p. 76).83 Hoffmeister, D okum ente, p. 304. Trans, in Walsh, p. 24.84 Ibid., p. 305. Trans, in Walsh, p. 25.
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§ 1. 3. Hegel ’s God and its Historical Traces
Many Hegel scholars have had great difficulty in characterising the nature of Hegel’s 
God. While the greatest corollary to Hegel’s conception of ‘spirit’ is with the God of 
Judaism and orthodox Christianity, the relation between the two is not entirely 
analogous.85 It might be suggested, however, that Hegel’s conception of the divine 
bears some resemblance to that of other, heterodox systems. Hegel himself argues that 
this is not unusual, as the notion of three persons in one god is itself not unique to 
Christianity. Hegel writes that ‘traces’ (Spuren) of the triadic structure are found in 
both religions and philosophies preceding Christianity: Hinduism possesses a divine 
triadic structure (the Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva Trimurti);*6 Pythagoras speaks of a 
divine triad; Plato, the Neopythagorians, and the Neoplatonists address and redress 
the three forms of the World Soul; and even Kant employs a triadic structure in his a 
priori division of concepts.87 The strongest resemblance to Hegel’s conception of the
85 This is argued in many commentaries o f  H egel’s philosophy o f  religion, in particular by Quentin 
Lauer in H e g e l’s Concept o f  G od  (Albany, N. Y.: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 1982). See also 
Peter Hodgson, ‘Georg Wilhelm Friedrich H egel’, in N ineteenth Century Religious Thought in the 
West, ed. by Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Patrick Sherry, and others (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), pp. 81-121 (n. 6 and passim).86 Or, indeed, the divine union o f  Brahman and Atman. O f the experience o f  this union Hegel writes in 
the Phenom enology. ‘With this wholly abstract purity o f  continuity, that is, indeterminateness and 
vacuity o f  conception, it is indifferent whether this abstraction is called space, pure intuiting, or pure 
thinking; it is altogether the same as what the Indian calls Brahma, when for years on end, physically 
motionless and equally unmoved in sensation, conception, fantasy, desire and so on, looking only at the 
tip o f  his nose, he says inwardly only Om, Om, Om , or else nothing at all. This dull, empty 
consciousness, understood as consciousness is —  being '. Cf. PhS, p. 97; WL I, 89.87 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 70. Some o f  these ‘traces’ might be considered 
somewhat spurious, as H egel’s knowledge o f  the medieval world has been described as ‘largely 
ignorant’, and his familiarity with the oriental is limited to the naïve pro-Hellenic view  that the East 
constitutes a direct antitype to the occidental. Cf. Altizer, p. 76.
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Trinity may be said to be with Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism.88 The resemblance to 
Gnosticism, particularly Manichaeism, is apparent for both systems are defined by the 
narrative of a quasi-divine being descending into the material world, and the recovery 
of its fully divine identity through the process of salvation history. Such a 
resemblance is, however, partial: Manichaeism, as with most, if not all, Gnostic 
systems, treats the material world as an other which cannot ultimately be reconciled to 
the being of God,89 whereas, in Hegel’s own ontological system, this is not argued to 
be the case.90 Similarly, a Platonic or Neo-Platonic resemblance to Hegel’s God lies 
in that both systems promote the concept of the life of a divine being whose 
generation is emanationist: the divine projects itself or ‘exits’ (exitus) into matter, and 
later ‘returns’ (redditus) to itself.91 Despite this similarity, Hegel’s system diverges 
from the Platonic in that spirit exits, returns, and is enriched by the experience, 
coming to embrace all of reality within itself.92 These divergent conceptions of God 
serve as antecedents to Hegel’s own idea; they are forms in which this truth, this idea, 
has fermented.93 The main point, for Hegel, nevertheless, is to know that these
8 As is argued by Gerald Hanratty’s in his articles on the subject. Cf.: Gerald Hanratty, ‘Hegel and the 
Gnostic Tradition: I’, Philosophical S tudies  (Ireland), 30 (1984), 23—48; ‘H egel and the Gnostic 
Tradition: II’, P hilosophical Studies  (Ireland), 31 (1986—1987), 301—325.89 J. Zandee, ‘Gnostic Ideas on the Fall’, Num en, 11 (1964), 13-74  (p. 21).90 Nor is it Bohm e’s position, for he advances that a resolution or unity between God and the material 
world is indeed possible. Cf. Nicolaus Berdyaev, ‘Unground and Freedom’, in Six Theosophic Points  
and Other Writings, X X X I V .91 John Macquarrie, In Search o f  Deity: A n  Essay’ in D ialectical Theism  (London: SCM Press, 1984), 
p. 130. See Chapter Three o f  this thesis.92 Walsh, ‘The Historical Dialectic o f  Spirit’, p. 16.93 This idea is most fully realised in the following passage from lectures on the philosophy o f  religion: 
‘The concept o f  the preceding religions has purified itself into this opposition, and because this 
opposition has manifested and exhibited itself as an existing need, it has been expressed in this way: 
‘but when the time was fulfilled, God sent his Son’ [Galatians 4. 4.]. That means: when the need for
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appearances, ‘wild as they are, are rational —  to know that they have their ground in 
reason, and to know what sort of reason is in them. But at the same time one must 
know how to distinguish the form of rationality that is present and not yet adequate to 
the concept’.94
T his v a st con glom eration  o f  v o litio n , in terests and activ ities is  th e  sum  total o f  
instrum ents and m ean s w h ich  th e w orld  spirit em p loys to  a cco m p lish  its end, to m ake 
th is end co n sc io u s  and to  g iv e  it rea lity  [R ea litä t];  and its end  is s im p ly  that o f  fin d in g  
itse lf, o f  com in g  to  term s w ith  itse lf, and o f  con tem platin g  its ow n  actu a lity.95
W ithin  the idea, ev en  that w h ich  appears to  b e past is n ever lo st. T h e id ea  is  o f  the  
present, and the spirit is im m ortal; there is n o  past or future tim e at w h ich  it did n ot or 
w ou ld  n ot ex ist; it is  n ot over  and d on e w ith , nor d o es it n ot y e t  ex is t  —  on  the  
contrary, it ex ists  ab so lu te ly  n ow . T h is in fact m eans that th e p resen t w orld  and the  
present form  o f  se lf-c o n sc io u sn e ss  o f  the spirit contains w ith in  them  a ll the stages  
w h ich  appear earlier in  h istory.96
A more modem philosophical resemblance to Hegel’s conception of God has been 
suggested, to that of Spinoza’s notion. The accusation has been made that Hegel
spirit came into existence, spirit manifested the reconciliation’ ( VPR , I, p. 121). Translation in Stephen 
D. Crites, ‘The Gospel according to H egel’, The Journa l o f  Religion, 46 (1966), 246 -263  (p. 252). 
Otto Kühler notes that the above quotation from Galatians is one o f  the four scriptural citations which 
are most common to H egel’s corpus. The others are: ‘The letter kills, the Spirit makes alive’; ‘God is 
Spirit, and those who worship him must worship him in Spirit and truth’; and ‘Spirit w ill lead you into 
all truth’. As Crites comments (p. 262, n. 13), H egel’s preference for each quotation is evident in each 
case. Cf. Otto Kühler, Sinn, Bedeutung und  A uslegung  der heiligen Schrift in H egels Philosophie  
(Leipzig: Published for S. Hirzel, 1939), p. 89.94 LPR, in, pp. 288-289 .95 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the P hilosophy o f  W orld H istoiy: Introduction, Reason  
in H istory, trans. by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 74; D ie Vernuft 
in der G eschichte, ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1955), p. 87.96 Reason in H istory, p. 150; Vernuft in der G eschichte, p. 182.
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considered himself, and was considered by others, to be a Spinozist or pantheist,97 
that his conception of the divine was one in which ‘everything, the whole, the 
universe, this complex of everything existing, this infinity of many things, individual 
things, that all this is God’.98 While it is true that, for Hegel, the infinite is inclusive of 
the finite, and that God is the unity of all that is, God cannot be reduced to the essence 
or identity of all finite things, as a simple universal or substance.99 There is a great 
distinction between Spinoza’s idea of God as ‘absolute substance’ and Hegel’s 
concept of the same as an ‘absolute person’. Hegel does not simply reframe Spinoza’s 
God as a personable being, rather he contends that the concept of God simply as 
absolute substance is not well enough defined by philosophical standards.100 If God is 
a substance, Hegel argues, even an absolute one, he becomes limited. Thus 
philosophy itself becomes limited, as its content is God, and, as such, cannot provide 
the answers that Hegel claims it does. Nevertheless, it is difficult to be entirely sure if 
this interpretation of Hegel’s response to the charge of pantheism is indeed correct. 
As Cunningham notes, Hegel’s definition of God as an absolute person is somewhat 
nebulous as Hegel fails to satisfactorily define what a ‘person’, in this sense, actually 
is. It is clear that Hegel identifies substance with subject (Subjekt), and that God can
97 It has long been argued, subsequent to the ‘p ^ th eism  controversy’ o f  the nineteenth century, that 
Spinoza’s philosophy cannot be rightly be called pantheism, as it does not describe the process o f  God 
as absorbed into the world, but the world as absorbed into God. Spinoza’s conception o f  God may 
thereby be properly defined as ‘p a n th e is m ’, or, in H egel’s words, as ‘acosmism’ (LPR, i, pp. 3 7 6 -  
377). Cf. Hodgson, p. 68.98 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on P hilosophy o f  Religion: O ne-Volum e Editions  — The 
Lectures o f 1827, ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley: University o f  California Press; One-Volume edition,
1988), p. 123.9 Leighton, p. 607. Cf. Werke, XI, 53, 56.10 Cunningham, p. 103.
115
be easily conceived within Hegel’s system as an absolute subject or absolute 
subjectivity (,Subjektivität), but the notion of absolute personhood itself is vague.101 
Spinoza’s conception of God, however, remains significant for Hegel’s treatment of 
the Trinity, but not for the most obvious of reasons. Rather, it appears that when 
Hegel thinks o f the work of Spinoza, he is really thinking of Böhme’s thought. Hegel 
refers to Spinoza’s God as ‘the abyss of substance’ (der Abgrund der Substanz). The 
term Abgrund, as has been mentioned, owes its origin to Eckhart, and is, as Magee 
comments, the ‘conceptual ancestor’ to Böhme’s Ungrund (in point of fact, Böhme, at 
times, misprints Abgrund for Ungrund in some of his texts).102 For Hegel, the sense 
of the term Abgrund is clearly synonymous with the ‘unmanifest, undeveloped, 
potentia of Böhme’s Ungrund1.103 Hegel’s sense of the synonymy of this term is 
illustrated in the following passage:
[S p in o za ’s] p h ilosop h y  has o n ly  a rig id  and u n y ie ld in g  substan ce and n ot y e t  spirit; in  
it w e  are n ot at h om e w ith  ou rse lv es [m a n  is t  n ic h t b e i s ich ] , G od is  n ot spirit here, 
b ecau se  h e is  n ot the triune [der D r e ie in ig e ]. S ubstance rem ains rigid  and petrified , 
w ith ou t B ö h m e ’s sources [Q u e lle n ]; for  the individual determ inations in the form  o f  
d eterm inations o f  the understanding are n ot B ö h m e’s sou rce-sp irits [Q u e llg e is te r ], 
w h ich  en erg ise  and expand in  on e another.104
In the discussion of Hegel’s formulation of the Trinity so far, some distinct 
Augustinian overtones may have been recognised. Like Augustine, Hegel conceives
101 Ibid. Cunningham may be referring to the passed in the 1827 manuscript, which cryptically defines 
‘person’ as ‘the infinite subjectivity o f  self-certainty; it is reflection into se lf  through distinction’ (L P R , 
m, pp. 82-83).102 Magee, p. 163.103 Ibid.104 LHP  m, p. 288; Werke, x x , 166.
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of the Trinity as a ‘trialectical model of subject and object mediated by a third’.105 
While it is unlikely that Hegel would have been directly acquainted with Augustine’s 
work, he would have shared his Neoplatonic foundation,106 and have been familiar 
with the trialectical form from his reading of Kant.107 Hegel’s return to the 
Neoplatonic is especially evident in his discussion of the perichoresis present among 
the moments of the Trinity.108 We have spoken briefly of this perichoretic dialogue 
before; for Hegel, this perichoresis is not motivated by love in the traditionally 
Christian sense, rather Hegel returns to more Platonic ideal. Whereas in orthodox 
belief the love expressed by God towards his Son is of an overflowing, and of an 
altruistic kind (i.e. it is agapaic), Hegel posits a love motivated by an erotic desire 
proceeding from a lack (of self-understanding), equivalent to Bohme’s conception.
105 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 134.106 Ibid. See also Peter C. Hodgson, G od in History: Shapes o f  Freedom  (Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1989), pp. 55 -70 . Augustine’s trialectical m odel o f  the Trinity can be successfully applied to the 
Hegelian formulation, but only representationally. As Hegel writes in the Science o f  L og ic : ‘To take 
numbers and geometrical figures (as the circle, triangle, etc. have often been taken), simply as symbols 
(the circle, for example, as a symbol for eternity, the triangle, o f  the Trinity), is so far harmless enough; 
but, on the other hand, it is foolish to fancy that in this way more is expressed than can be grasped and 
expressed by thought. Whatever profound wisdom  may be supposed to lie in such meagre symbols or 
in those richer products o f  fantasy in the mythology o f  peoples and in poetry generally, it is properly 
for thought alone to make explicit for consciousness the wisdom  that lies on in them; and not in 
symbols, but in nature and in mind. In symbols the truth is dimmed and veiled by the sensuous element; 
only in the form o f  thought is it fully revealed to consciousness: the meaning is only the thought itse lf  
(PhS, p. 215; WL, I, 228-229).107 This familiarity is mentioned explicitly in the Logic, where H egel writes that where ‘the sphere o f  
the spirit trichotomy predominates [. . .]  it is one o f  Kant’s merits to have drawn attention to this’ (EL,  
§ 230, Z; Geraets , p. 298).108 This itepixtnphon; or ‘circuminsession’ (alternately termed by the Greek Fathers as Kpaon;, 
or ouyKpavq) is traditionally defined as ‘intima existentia Unius P ersonae in Altera, sine confusione  
Personae seu  Personalitatis'' (Dollinger, p. 167, n. 3). Cf. Fulgentius o f  Ruspe’s comment in De F ide  
ad  Petrum  (1. 4.) that ‘Totus Pater in F ilio  et Spiritu  Sancto est, e t totus F ilius in Patre et Spiritu  
Sancto est, to tusque Spiritus Sanctus in Patre et F ilio e s f .  Noted in Johannes Perrone, Prcelectiones 
Theologicae, 2 volumes (Paris: [n. pub.], 1842), I, p. 4. Cf. also John Henry Newman, Arians o f  the 
Fourth  Century  (London: Rivington & Co., 1833), pp. 189, 190.
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The first moment, God ‘in his eternal essence’, is motivated to create the second 
moment by the need to reveal himself to himself. The transition from first to second 
moments constitutes a ‘dynamic movement (of desire) seeking fulfilment’, an 
‘ecstatic movement of movement of the self towards the other’.109 Desmond notes that 
Hegel’s conception of God as an ‘erotic absolute’ raises the question regarding 
whether God should not be, by definition, beyond need?110 The answers lies with a 
previously discussed theme: that of the distinction between God before and after 
creation. For Hegel, God before creation is a finite being, and creates out of a need to 
render himself absolute. Creation allows God to reveal himself to himself, as man is 
made in the image of God. As man proceeds chronologically to a more perfect state, 
so does God through this self-reflection. Ultimately, at the end of history, where the 
biblical paradise lost will be regained, man will become perfect, and God absolute. 
God’s erotic love thrusts towards the future, towards the ultimate goal of spirit — the 
institution of God as God.111
Here, Hegel’s ontological scheme departs from Böhme, but only in part. 
Böhme’s deus absconditus is never declared explicitly to be, in any way, ‘finite’, 
rather as fundamentally lacking in something, i.e. ‘definition’. This does betray, 
however, a definite notion of contingency in Böhme’s conception of God, and, in this
109 Desmond, H e g e l’s God, p. 113. See Schleiermacher’s comment in The Christian F aith , trans. by 
Hugh Ross Mackintosh and James Stuart Stewart (London: Continuum International, 1999), p. 8 that 
‘Life [. . .] is to be conceived as an alternation between an abiding-in-self (Insichblieben) and apassing- 
beyond-self (aussichheraustreten) on the part o f  the subject’.10 Ibid.11 Ibid., p. 114.
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way, this notion does seem to then reconcile itself to Hegel’s ontology. While Hegel 
criticises Böhme’s eccentric qualitative narrative of the process of divine self- 
consciousness and self-manifestation, the Böhmean account is, nevertheless, if  not 
identical to the Hegelian conception in letter, it certainly is in spirit. Thus far, the first 
part of Böhme and Hegel’s tripartite trinitarian narrative with reference to the Father 
has been examined. The following section deals with the next person of the Trinity, 
the Son.
S e c t i o n  T w o  
T h e  S o n
The bulk of Böhme and Hegel’s reflections on the Son can be schematised in two 
ways. Firstly, the reflections of both are primarily of an Augustinian nature, in that 
they are chiefly concerned with the Son taken as the vehicle for the self-consciousness 
of the Father. What distinguishes both from the mainstream Augustine-influenced 
Protestant orthodox tradition, however, lies in the fact that their thoughts on the 
subject cannot fully be thought of as entirely Augustinian. For Böhme and Hegel, 
self-consciousness is an historical consciousness, and, as such, the concept of the Son 
is fully bound up in the doctrine of the Incarnation. Further, neither Böhme nor Hegel 
view the Son, nor any part of either the immanent or economic trinities, as ‘persons’. 
This is not to say that either is guilty of the heresy of Sabellianism or modalism, that
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God as Father, Son, and Spirit, simply represent aspects of the one divine nature.112 
Rather each so-called ‘person’ of the Trinity is, for both Bohme and Hegel, treated as 
entirely real and concrete stage or ‘moment’ in the divine process of coming to self- 
consciousness and self-manifestation.
§ 2. 1. The Personhood o f  the Trinity
The application of the idea of personhood to the concept of God is seen as a necessary 
one, not only for Christian orthodoxy, but also for theologians and philosophers of the 
pantheistic type. Even Schleiermacher concedes that if God is taken as a being who 
answers the prayers of his faithful, a personality is indeed required.113 A more recent 
commentator argues that,
[T he fundam ental p rem ise for C hristian orthodoxy] is  th e d istinction  b etw een  person  
(rtpooconov) or h yp ostasis  (u jto a x a a n ;)  and b ein g  ( o b o ia )  or e s sen ce  (cpboig) in  the  
con cep t o f  G od, w ith  prim acy g iv en  to  person  over again st b ein g . A  fundam ental 
p rin cip le o f  [th eo logy ] rem ains th e estab lish ed  form ulation: ‘T he C hristian G od is a 
personal G o d ’. P erson  is to  be stron gly  d istingu ish ed  from  the in d iv idu al and im p lies  
relation , com m un ion , com m un ity  and soc iety . A p op h atic  th e o lo g y  favours a personal 
and participatory k n o w led g e  o f  G od  and rejects ev ery  ‘natural’ and ‘p o sse s s iv e ’ 
ep istem o lo g y.14
112 As was the view  o f  Marcellus (ca. 330), among others, in the early Christian church. This view  has 
been condemned by Christian orthodoxy in many councils, beginning with the Arian council at Antioch 
in 344.
113 Noted in Philip Schaff, H istory o f  the Christian Church, 8 vols (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), in, 
p. 676, n. 2.
114 Marios Begzos, ‘Der Apophatismus in der ostkirchlichen Theologie’, EITIETHMONIKH
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The ‘personality’ of the Trinity is claimed through the relational titles of Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit. These titles serve to be understood as describing the necessary 
relations of the Trinity (which are indeed thought of as relations, and not essential 
properties or accidents), which are given as ‘paternity’ (said of the Father), ‘filiation’ 
(of the Son), and ‘spiration’ (of the Holy Spirit).115 These relational titles denoting 
personality have always, historically, been problematic for Christian orthodoxy, as, 
one the one hand, and as stated, it cannot be said that they simply describe 
expressions or aspects of the divine nature, nor, on the other hand, can it be said each 
person of the Trinity is a being unto itself, for such a view naturally leads to a 
position of ‘tri-theism’, contradicting the declared ‘oneness’ of the Trinity.116
Böhme rejects the notion of personhood, not only of the deus absconditus, but 
the entire Trinity itself. Man ‘can on no ground say that God is three persons, but he 
is threefold in his eternal procreation; he bears himself in a trinity, and yet in this 
eternal procreation is to be understood only one essence, neither Father, Son, nor
EITETHPIS © EOAOriKHL ZX O A H I (El ANEI1IETHMIOYA0H N Q N ), 27 (1986), 177-216  (p. 
196). Trans, o f  article in Harold H. Oliver, The G reek O rthodox Theological R eview , 41 (1996), 3 2 7 -  
357.15 Scott David Foutz, ‘On the Implications o f  the Self-Consciousness o f  the Divine Essence: An 
Examination o f  Augustine’s Application o f  the Triunal Nature o f  Human Self-consciousness to the 
Godhead as found in De trinitate, books 8 -1 5 ’, Q uodlibet, 1 (1999) 20 -6 0 . Alternatively, these 
relations o f  the Trinity can be said to apply to the relational titles o f  God qua  creator, God qua  
redeemer, and God qua  sanctifier.16 In addition this raises the spectre o f  there being three prime movers and three necessary beings. The 
simplicity or oneness o f  God is, perhaps, the single most strongly argued case by classical theists, from 
either the pagan (esp. Parmenides, Aristotle, Plotinus, Avicenna, Maimonides, and the Pseudo- 
Dionysius) or Christian tradition (esp. Aquinas, cf. the Sum m a Theologiae, 1. q3. a a l -8).
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Spirit’.117 As such, Bohme’s understanding of the immanent trinity cannot be 
grounded in Luther’s thought.118 This realisation that the (human) concept of 
personhood cannot be applied to the divine appears most strongly in the Mysterium 
Magnum, where a clear criticism of those who would portray the Trinity in such a 
manner is given:
There is no ground for calling God threefold in person, but that he is threefold in his 
eternal generation [sodern er ist dreyfaltig in seiner ewigen Gebarung]. He begets 
himself in Trinity; and yet in this eternal generation or begetting we are to understand 
only one essence and generation; neither the Father, Son, or Spirit but one eternal life 
[sondern das einige, ewige Leben].119
The rationale for this rejection of personhood is that Bohme’s God is eternally 
generative: for instance, the Father did not create the world at a specific point in time, 
but is continually generative —  the world is thus constantly changing through the 
Father’s continual involvement in salvation history.
I cannot describe to you the whole deity by the circumference or extent of a circle, for 
it is immeasurable; but to that spirit which is in God’s love it is not incomprehensible: 
it comprehends it well, yet but in part; therefore take one part after another, and then
17 Myst. M ag., 7. 11.18 Miller, ‘Luther and Boelim e’, p. 283. Luther’s trinitarian scheme has, in this regard, extended even  
to the modem day. Louis Berkhof argues that, ‘W e should be careful not to set up man’s personality as 
the standard by which the personality o f  God must be measured. The original form o f  personality is not 
in man, but in God; his is archetypal, while man’s is ectypal. The latter is not identical with the former, 
but does contain faint traces o f  similarity with it. We should not say that man is person, while God is 
super-personal (a very unfortunate term), for what is super-personal is not personal; but rather, that 
what appears as imperfect in man, exists in infinite perfection in God. The one outstanding difference 
between the two is that man is uni-personal, while God is tri-personal’. System atic Theology (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1939), p. 85.
119 Myst. M ag., 7. 11.
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you w i l l  see the w h o le .120
I speak  here as to the kind and m anner o f  the d ev il [to sp eak  in a k n o w in g ly  erroneous  
m anner], as i f  the ligh t o f  G od had n ot y e t  k ind led  it s e l f  [ . . . ]  and as i f  the d eity  had a 
beginning; I can in n o  other or nearer w a y  o ffer  it to  you r ju d gem en t, that y o u  m ay  
understand it [ . . . ]  N eith er  can  I declare it to  you  in any other m anner; for I m ust w rite  
so , as i f  th e generating, or geniture o f  G od had or to o k  a  b eg in n in g , w h en  th in gs cam e  
to  b e thus; but I w rite  here rea lly  true, and p rec iou s dear w ord s, w h ich  the spirit a lon e  
u nderstands.121
The monikers of ‘Father’, ‘Son’, and ‘Spirit’ are used by Böhme as simply a 
convenient means to describe this process, as parts of the whole.122 At this stage in his 
process of manifestation, however, God is not aware of his own generative power. In 
virtue of being the deus absconditus, he is, as Luther surmised, unknowable to us, 
but, unlike Luther, Böhme argues that this unknowability extends to even his own 
knowledge of himself. Böhme writes that ‘God himself knows not what he is: for he 
knows no beginning of himself, also he knows not any thing that is like himself, as 
likewise he knows no end of him self.123 As he has not yet indulged in his power of 
creation, there is no other to know him. He has not, in Hegelian terms, arrived at self- 
consciousness. Therefore, God remains at this point as nothing, even to himself.124 
Where Hegel will reformulate the persons of the Trinity as ‘moments’, Böhme does 
the same, calling them ‘effects’, ‘operations’, or ‘principles’.125 The First Principle is 
thought about in terms of ‘eternal nature’ (die ewige Natur), the non-divine ‘other’ to
120 Aurora, 10. 41.121 Ibid., 23. 24-35 .12 Miller, ‘Luther and Boehm e’, p. 284.123 Aurora, 23. 18.124 Myst. M ag., 29.
125 Martensen, p. 60.
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the immanent trinity. Where its necessity is concerned, Bohme draws a number of
similes:
The birth of the eternal nature is like the [thoughts of] or senses in man, as when a 
[thought or] sense is generated by something, and afterwards propagates itself into 
infinite many [thoughts] or as a root of a tree generates a stock and many buds and 
branches, as also many roots, buds, and branches from one root, and all of them from 
that one first root.126
For Böhme, God can only be rightly described as a person in the moment of his divine 
othering, in the historical figure of Jesus Christ. It seems, for Böhme, that it is 
generally misunderstood, by both ‘the ignorant as well as by the half learned’, that 
‘God is not a person except in Christ, [for] he is an eternally generating power and the 
kingdom with all beings’.127 God ‘is generating himself in a threefold aspect, and in 
this eternal generation there is nevertheless to be understood only one essence and 
generation; neither Father, nor Son, nor Spirit; but only the one eternal life, or 
good’.128 This ‘three-fold aspect’ is the immanent trinity, the ‘three-made’ or ‘three­
fold spirit’ (idieser dreifache Geist), the narrative of the self-manifestation of God. It 
is ‘the eternal, unfathomable, divine essence, and in its nature [is] three persons, 
whereof one is not the other’.129 As Hegel will also argue, Böhme conceives each 
being of the Trinity as sharing an identical essence.130 In sum, the Trinity is, for
126 Princ., 3. 9.127 Myst. M ag., 7. 5.128 Ibid., 7. 11.129 Incarnation , n, 2. 4.130 Whether this indeed is strictly true, is subject to debate. W hile Böhme does concede that the beings 
o f  what later came to be called the immanent trinity are united in essence through the processes o f
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Böhme, one essence manifested to the world through one personality, Jesus Christ —  
of ‘the three persons in the deity’, Böhme urges the reader to ‘know that the Lord our 
God is one God only’.131
Hegel, too, labels the traditional attributions of the persons of the Trinity 
(Father, Son, and Spirit) as ‘figurative’ and ‘childlike’. Hegel argues that these 
attributions, when pursued by the understanding, give way to three separate gods and 
a loss of divine subjectivity and unity.
T his is a ch ild lik e  relation sh ip , a ch ild lik e  form . T h e understanding has n o  other  
category , n o  other relation sh ip  that w ou ld  b e com parable w ith  th is in resp ect o f  its  
appropriateness. B u t w e  m ust b e aw are that it is  m erely  a figurative [b ild lich es]  
representation; the Spirit d oes n ot enter in to th is  relation sh ip  [ . . . ]  T h e d ifferen tiation  
that th e d iv in e life  g o e s  through is n ot an extern al [process] but m ust be d efin ed  s o le ly  
a s  in te rn a l,  so  that the first, the Father, is to  b e grasped ju s t  lik e  the last [the h o ly  
Spirit]. Thus the p rocess is  n oth ing  but a p la y  o f  se lf-m ain ten an ce , a p lay  o f  se lf-  
con firm ation.132
A further rationale for this rejection of personhood is that Hegel’s God is eternally 
generative: for instance, the Father did not create the world at a specific point in time, 
but is continually generative — the world is constantly changing through the Father’s 
involvement in salvation history. Therefore, in order to arrive at the truth that ‘all 
three [persons] are Spirit’, Hegel attempts to go beyond the simple representative
differentiation and manifestation, the immanent trinity is also not an essence (kein Wesen ist) as it does 
not yet ‘bring about a determinate divine life’. Cf. O’Regan, G nostic A pocalypse, p. 34; Myst. Mag. 1. 
5-6 .131 Grace, 1. 25.132 LPR, m, pp. 194— 195. Emphasis mine.
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language of both traditional Christianity and Böhme’s system, and categorises these 
beings in the language of Denken. The ‘persons’ of the Trinity are renamed 
‘elements’, ‘spheres’, ‘kingdoms’, or ‘moments’,133 determinations through which 
God develops, realises, and returns to himself.134 The Trinity is not comprised of three 
separate beings or persons, but of one developing personality (Persönlichkeit). 
According to Harris, where the traditional attributions of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
are concerned, Hegel’s construction pursues the following formulation:
[Hegel’s] exposition identifies the persons of the Trinity with the three phases of the 
speculative idea: God the Father is absolute thought — the idea of philosophy 
expounded in metaphysics. God the Son is the divine life of the finite ‘universe’, 
expounded in the philosophy of nature (including Sittlichkeit). God the spirit is the 
totality of speculation, the conceptual motion through which the life of the world 
receives its rational explanation.135
In the 1827 lectures, Hegel expands upon his own new formulation:
(1) First, in and for itself [an-und-fursich], God [is] in his eternity before the creation 
of the world and outside the world. (2) Second, God creates the world and posits the 
separation. He creates both nature and finite spirit. What is thus created is at first an 
other, posited outside of God. But God is essentially the reconciling to himself of what 
is alien, what is particular, what is posited in separation from him. He must restore to 
freedom and to his truth what is alien, what has fallen away in the idea’s self- 
diremption, in its falling away from itself. This is the path and the process of 
reconciliation. (3) In the third place, through this process of reconciliation, spirit has 
reconciled with itself what is distinguished from itself, in its act of diremption, of 
primal division, and thus is the Holy Spirit, the spirit [present] in its community.
13 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 127.134 LPR, m, p. 186. The terms ‘elements’ and ‘moments’ are used throughout the 1824 and 1827 
lectures, while ‘spheres’ and ‘kingdoms’ persist throughout the 1831 lectures (Hodgson, p. 127, n. 1). 
This thesis w ill follow  the tradition o f  m odem  Hegel scholarship in referring to the persons o f  the 
Trinity as moments.135 Harris, N igh t Thoughts, p. 155. Cf. Rosenkranz, H egels Leben, p. 139.
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These are not external distinctions, which we have made merely in accord with what 
we are; rather they are the activity, the developed vitality, of absolute spirit itself.136
To distil the essence of the content of Hegel’s proposed ‘depersonalisation’ of the
Trinity, the traditional trinitarian persons of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit become,
according to Hegel’s new formulation, moments of
1. Universality (Allgemeinheit). In the language of the Vorstellung, the Father, 
transcendent, and removed from creation. In the language of Denken, the idea 
existing as purely in-itself, with an other neither on the immanent level (i.e. 
the A,oyo<;) nor on the economic level (i.e. the koyoc, as incarnated in Jesus 
Christ, or creation).
2. Particularity (Besonderheit). In the language of the Vorstellung, the Father as 
incarnate in his Son, Jesus Christ. In the language of Denken, the othering of 
the universal Father in a particular spirit, as being-for-itself, as self- 
consciousness. It constitutes, economically, the appearance of the idea in 
creation.
3. Individuality (Einselnheit). In the language of the Vorstellung, the 
ungenerated, fullest expression of the nature of God. In the language of 
Denken, the consciousness of God as spirit, God as self-manifest. The fullest 
expression of this idea is as God present, not only to himself, but also to 
creation, as a totality. The third moment is realised historically in through the
136 LPR, m, pp. 273-274; Hodgson, H egel and  C hristian T h e o lo g y p. 127. Emphasis mine.
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death and resurrection of Christ, which constitutes the reconciliation 
(,Versöhnung) and continuing presence of God in creation as spirit.
Here it can be seen that each moment of Hegel’s triad represents a stage in the activity 
of divine self-manifestation: (1) The movement from simple and abstract universality 
or absolute substance existing purely for-itself; (2) to the appearance of universality in 
creation as a finite and differentiated particularity; (3) to the return of said 
particularity to universality as individuality, as absolute spirit or absolute 
subjectivity.137 As Hegel concludes, it is in these three forms ‘that the divine idea 
explicates itself. Spirit is the divine history, the process of self-differentiation, or 
diremption, and return into se lf .138 Each moment is not indistinguishable from one- 
another; their discourse is not perichoretic (mutually relating) per se, rather they are 
chronologically interconnected.139 The first moment is the beginning, the source or 
ground; ‘God in his eternal universality [...] who distinguishes himself, determines 
him self.140 The second moment ‘is the first self-doubled’141, an ‘other’ created by the 
first as a medium for self-reflection, God as ‘posit[ing] an other to him self.142 One 
does not go to two as a ‘mere duality’, but is the institution of a medium for return.143 
For Hegel, as with Böhme, both immanent and economic trinities are really
137 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 127.
138 LPR, m, pp. 186-187; H odgson , H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 127139 O ’Regan, The H eterodox Hegel, p. 68.140 LPR. m, pp. 284-285 .
141 D esm ond , H e g e l’s God, p. 117.142 LPR, m, pp. 284-285 .143 Desmond, H e g e l’s God, p. 109.
128
one and the same, part of the whole that is the eternal Trinity. The persons of the 
immanent trinity do not have any kind of ontological priority over those in the 
economic, or vice-versa, because each is ‘co-essential’.144 Each being of the Trinity is 
present in one another, for that is how Hegel can declare that ‘it is as a totality that 
God is the spirit’.145 The perceived difference is one of mere abstraction.146 Desmond 
argues, however, that this interpretation of Hegel may not in fact be accurate.147 There 
appears to be a ‘blurring’ of both with regards to the second moment (particularity), 
in that it appears to have a ‘double aspect’.148 For Hegel it is both ‘immanent within 
the eternal life of the divine’ and, within creation, seemingly ‘“outside” eternity, 
entirely immanent to itself.149 The second moment both ‘names God in self, self- 
differentiated into an other that is his own other or Son’ and ‘names moment of 
difference between the Godhead itself and creation as other’.150 Simply put, the 
incongruity lies in that the second moment is concerned with self-differentiation in 
the immanent trinity, and creation in the economic trinity.151
14 As is argued by Hodgson {H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 131) and many others. Anselm Min, 
however, argues against the majority opinion, in stating that it is H egel’s opinion that the Father has 
‘ontological priority’ over the other persons o f  the Trinity, by virtue o f  being the source o f  the divine 
nature. ‘The Trinity and the Incarnation: Hegel and Classical Approaches’, The Journa l o f  Religion, 66 
(1986), 173-193 (p. 185).145 LPR, m, p. 283, n. 93.146 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 131.147 Desmond, H e g e l’s G o d , p. 108.148 Ibid.149 Ibid.150 Ibid., p. 109.151 Ibid.
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§ 2. 2. The Incarnation
For Christian orthodoxy, the second moment of the Trinity is invariably caught up 
with the notion of the divine foyoq, which, in John’s Gospel, becomes manifest in the 
historical person of Jesus of Nazareth.152 Literally, the ‘Word became flesh’: the 
divine other, existing before creation, manifests itself ‘in man’s likeness’ in history.153 
The orthodox notion of Sonship, however, applies not to the pre-existent immanent 
other, but to the incarnate God.154 The notion of Jesus as the incarnate ‘son of God’ (o 
mo£ ton 0eou) is derived, primarily, from four thematic justifications in scripture: the 
literal, the moral, the metaphysical, and through the appellation of others. Instances of 
these four themes range from Jesus’ divine conception by the Holy Spirit in Luke,155 
his practise of the traditional formula of Christian moral philosophy in Matthew,156 
the affirmation of his consubstantiality with the Father in John,157 to the variety of
152 John, 1. 1-2; also Revelation 19. 11-13 where John’s figurative representation o f  Christ is called 
the ‘Word o f  God’. John’s use o f  the word Loyoq  to signify the second person o f  the Trinity is based 
upon his reading o f  certain passages from Genesis, the deutero-canonical books, and the writings o f  the 
Alexandrian Jews. See John Ignatius Dollinger, The First A ge o f  Christianity and  the Church, trans. by 
Henry Nutcombe Oxenham (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1867), p. 163. The Johannine reading is one 
which is supported by Bohme and Hegel, against Philo’s Heraclitean conception o f  the Xoyoc as a non­
personal, Platonic universal, for it cannot, as such, be associated with the notion o f  a historical 
Messiah. Cf. Philo, Philonis Judaei: O pera quae Reperiri P otuerunt Omnia, trans. by Thomas 
Mangey, 2 vols (London: [n. pub.], 1742), I, p. 413, n, p. 625.153 Dollinger, p. 172. See Jesus’ declarations to this effect in many passages in John’s Gospel, such as: 
‘before Abraham was, I am’ (rcplv ’A ppaap yeveoGai, eyca eip i) (John 8. 58); the confirmation o f  his 
own divine ‘glory’ (5o£a) ‘before the world w as’ (itpo to o  tov Kocrgov etvou) (John 17. 5); and the 
‘reascending’ (avaPaivov-ra) o f  Jesus ‘where he was before’ (onov  fjv to  npdnepov) (John 6. 62). Cf. 
Strauss, n, p. 19.154 Dollinger, p. 165.15 Luke 1 .35 .156 Matthew 5. 45.157 John 17. 21. Cf. David Friedrich Strauss, The L ife o f  Jesus Critically Exam ined, trans. by George 
Eliot, 3 vols (London and N ew  York: Continuum International, 2005), n, p. 13.
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occasions, throughout the Gospels, where Jesus is called ‘the Son of God’, ‘the 
Christ’ (f) XpiOToq), or ‘king’ ((ktaiA.etx;).158
The necessity of a physical appearance of God in history is accepted by 
Christian orthodoxy in general, and Luther in particular, who ‘rejects the abstract, 
Aristotelian onto-epistemology in favour of interpreted truth discovered in linguistic 
relation to a radically historical source, Jesus Christ’.159 Many subtle theological 
distinctions are drawn in order to separate the appearance of the Xoyoq in creation 
from a mere theophany, in the classical style. As one modem theologian points out:
The presence of God in Jesus is not identical with God’s presence in the world 
generally, as in creation, or the universal presence of the Holy Spirit in the believers. 
Nor is it to be confused [...] with a universal incarnation of God in every human being 
in which God is simply, without distinction, identified with the human in pantheistic 
fashion, in which the Xoyoq becomes Homo generalis, a Platonic universal, turning 
the individuality of humans into a mere appearance. The humanity assumed by the 
Xoyoq did not exist prior to the union with the divine, and it was real humanity, not a 
mere external garment, that the Xoyoq put on, which would turn the Incarnation into a 
mere theophany in human form.160
In this regard, the manifestation of the divine upon the material plane does not 
constitute a gross change of either substance or form. The divine does not 
superimpose itself substantially upon the human, nor does the human superimpose 
itself upon the divine. In the same way, God does not simply appear to be human in
158 Strauss, n, pp. 13-14. Examples o f  the fourth theme, Jesus’ appellation by others as the Son o f  God, 
are, for instance, when the devil issues a challenge to Jesus, ‘If thou be the Son o f  G od’ (Matthew 4. 3), 
Nathanael’s declaration, ‘You are the Son o f  God, the King o f  Israel’ (John 1. 49), Peter’s confession, 
‘You are the Christ, the Son o f  the living God’ (Matthew 16. 16; John 6. 69), and the high priest o f  the 
Sanhedrin’s adjuration to Christ i f  he be ‘the Christ, the Son o f  God’ (Matthew, 26. 63).159 Thom Chittom, ‘Theological Hermeneutics’, Review s in Religion a n d  Theology, 12 (2005), 4 9 3 -  
500 (p. 494).160 Min, p. 178.
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the person of Jesus Christ, nor does Christ, as an historical figure, take on the 
trappings of a god in appearance only. Christ is conceived as outwardly human in his 
‘appearance, attitude, and mien’, but was essentially not ‘a man, like all others’, rather 
‘the incarnate Son of God’.161 In Hegelian terms, the Incarnation is ‘the paradigm case 
of unity in difference’.162
The primary reflection on the Son, for both Böhme and Hegel, is his 
relationship to the Father. This relationship is a problematic one for Christian 
orthodoxy; it often being posited that, although the Father is related to both the Son 
and creation (qua creator), he is not influenced (or affected) qualitatively by this 
relationship. As was Aquinas’s sentiment, God is not related to the world according 
to his intentional being.163 Relation, as a category, takes on a peculiar meaning in 
classical theology, in that ‘the addition of relations to a being does not necessarily add 
to or subtract from its absolute real being and perfection. It relates the subject to its 
term but does not necessarily change or modify it internally in any non-relative 
way’.164 The push, for both philosophers, is to somehow reconcile God’s
161 Dollinger, p. 172. Scripturally, Paul’s Epistles do not directly argue for the supernatural generation 
o f  Jesus, rather it is taken as something which is (traditionally) assumed, for it is stated that Jesus was 
‘bom  o f  a woman’ only (Galations 4. 4.). Similarly, Paul argues against Matthew’s Gospel account by 
stating that Jesus was not, in fact, the descendent o f  Adam, as Christ is fundamentally opposed to him 
by virtue o f  being the ‘new Adam’; the father and founder o f  a new generation opposed to the old. Cf. I 
Timothy 2. 5; Hebrews 9. 15; Ephesians 5. 29 -30; I Corinthians 10. 16-17. Hegel is o f  the same 
opinion as Paul in this regard, in referring to Christ as ‘the second Adam’ (Ph. der Religion, m, p. 126).162 Anslem  Min, The Trinity and the Incarnation: Hegel and Classical Approaches’, The Journal o f  
R elig ion , 66 (1986), 173-193 (p. 178).163 Ibid., p. 180. That is to say, a relation to the world is not part o f  God’s real being. The concept o f  
God would still be intact, for Aquinas, i f  he had no relation to the world, for Aquinas pursues the usual 
orthodox conception o f  God as not being contingent upon creation.164 William Norris Clarke, The P hilosophical A pproach to God: A  N eo-Thom ist Perspective (Winston- 
Salem, N. C.: Wake Forest University Press, 1979), p. 101.
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transcendence from the world in his absolute being, in what he is himself (in 
scholastic terms, in his ens naturale), and yet still preserve a connection or relation to 
created reality. As one commentator puts its, ‘in some real and genuine way God is 
affected positively by what we do [...] his consciousness is contingently and 
qualitatively different because of what we do’.
‘If we would write of the Incarnation,’ Böhme argues, ‘we must reflect upon 
the cause, and consider what moved God to become man, seeing he was not in need 
of this for the realisation of his being’.165 Böhme follows the orthodox theological 
attribution of the Word to the Son. Where the Father is the Verbum Fiat (the act of 
speaking), the Son is the Verbum Domini (the creative word itself, spoken by ‘the 
master’) —  it is ‘the Father that speaks [...] and the Word which is spoken out of the 
centre of the Father is the Son’.166
For it is said [John 1. 1 -3 ]:  ‘In the b eg in n in g  w a s the W ord, and the W ord w a s w ith  
G od, and the W ord w a s G od. T h e sam e w a s in th e b eg in n in g  w ith  G od . A ll th in gs  
w ere m ade b y  h im  and w ith ou t h im  w as n ot anyth ing m ade that w a s m ad e’. In th is  
b r ie f  statem ent w e  h ave the w h o le  ground o f  the d iv in e  and natural revelation  in the  
B e in g  o f  all b ein gs. For ‘in  th e b eg in n in g ’ m ean s the eternal b eg in n in g  in the w ill  o f  
the G roundless for a ground, that is, for the d iv in e apprehension , s in ce  th e  w ill  
apprehends it s e lf  in th e centre for a foundation  [ . . . ]  For th e on e w ill apprehends it s e lf  
in the on e pow er, w h erein  lie s  all h id d en n ess, and breathes i t s e l f  forth through the  
p ow er into an in tu ition , and th is w isd om , or in tu ition , is the b eg in n in g  o f  the eternal 
m ind, as the co n sp ectio n  o f  itse lf. T h is am ounts to  say in g , the W ord w as in the  
b eg in n in g  w ith  G od, and w a s  G o d  h im self. T h e w ill  is the b eg in n in g  and is ca lled  G od  
the Father, and h e apprehends h im s e lf  in  pow er, and is ca lled  th e Son [ . . . ]  A nd in th is  
con n ection  it is  said: T h e W ord  ( i.e ., the form ed  p ow er) w a s in the b eg in n in g  w ith  
G od. For here tw o  th in gs are to  be understood: n am ely , the unform ed pow er, i.e ., in 
In \  and the form ed p o w er  w h ich  is the w ith , for it has co m e into som eth in g  and so  into
165 Incarnation, I, 1. 5.16Threefold, 1. 40. See Stoudt, p. 204.
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motion. The In is still, but the with is formed and compacted, and from this 
compaction and motion arise nature and creature, together with all being.167
When the Father speaks his Word — that is to say, when he generates his Son — 
which is done continually and eternally, that Word first of all takes its origin in the 
first or acrid quality [i. e. ‘sourness’], where it becomes conceived; in the second or 
the sweet quality it receives its activity; in the third it moves; in the heat it arises and 
ignites the sweet flow of power and the fire. Now all the qualities are made to bum by 
the kindled fire, and the fire is fed by them; but this fire is only one and not many. 
This fire is the true Son of God himself, who is continuing to be born from eternity to 
eternity.168
It is clear that Böhme realises the necessity of the Father to posit the Son in order to 
come to self-consciousness. When the Father comes to ‘apprehend himself in power’, 
to project specific visions upon the mirror of creation, he is then ‘called the Son’.169 
Böhme uses the imagery of ‘Will’ or ‘Eye’ and ‘mouth’ to describe the relationship 
between Father and Son.170 Where the Father is the Will, the Son is ‘the Will’s mouth 
or understanding’, the ground of the Groundless, the ‘other’ in the perichoretic 
dialogue of the immanent trinity.
The Father is the first of all conceivable beings, but if the second principle were not 
becoming manifest in the birth of the Son, he would not be revealed. Thus the Son, 
being the heart, light, love, and the beautiful and sweet beneficence of the Father, but 
being distinct form him in his individual aspect, renders the Father reconciled, loving, 
and merciful. His birth takes place in the fire, but he obtains his personality and name 
by the ignition of the soft, white, and clear light, which he is himself.171
167 Grace., 2. 7 -11 . Emphasis mine.168 Aurora, 8. 81.169 Incarnation, n, 2. 4.170 This analogy is, at its heart, Gnostic. For example, a passage (55. 5) in the so-called ‘Fourth 
Treatise’ o f  the Codex Jung  reads, ‘since he [the Trinity] is for him self alone [sic] understanding, since 
he is for him self alone eye, since he is for h im self alone mouth’. Cf. Pahor Labib, Coptic G nostic  
Papyri in the Coptic M useum  a t O ld  Cairo, 11 vols (Cairo: Cairo Government Press, 1956) I, pp. 3, 4, 
7, 8, 11-46.171 Princ., 4. 58.
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Bohme makes use of a secondary kind of imagery to describe this Father-Son, 
Groundless-ground relationship. The divine relationship is something akin to the 
cabbalistic relationship of an ‘eternal’, ‘second’, or ‘secret’ sun to the sun of our solar 
system. This secret sun was believed to be the true source of light behind the sun, 
which did not illumine the earth through its own power.172 As Bohme writes:
The light and the power of the sun disclose the mysteries of the external world by the 
production and growth of various beings. Likewise God, representing the eternal sun, 
or the one eternal and only good, would not reveal himself without the presence of his 
eternal spiritual nature, wherein alone he can manifest his power. Only when the 
power of God becomes differentiated and relatively conscious, so that there are 
individual powers to wrestle with each other during their love-play, will be opened in 
him the great and immeasurable fire of love by means of the forthcoming of the Holy 
Trinity.173
As the sun in the terrestrial plane transforms acerbity into concord, so acts the light of 
God in the forms of eternal nature. This light shines into them and out of them; it 
ignites them so that they obtain its will and surrender themselves to it entirely. They 
then give up their own will, and become as if they had no power at all of themselves, 
and are desirous only for the power of the light.174
172 Another reading o f  this analogy refers to the Incarnation specifically, in that while the ‘power’ o f  
the sun is impossible to conceive for human beings on earth, it, nevertheless, exists as a definite body 
in space and time (Hartmann, Boehm e, p. 239). As Böhme writes, ‘W e may compare the sun to Christ 
in his aspect as a created being, and the whole depth o f  space may be compared to the Father’ 
( Incarnation , 1. 8.). Cf. Jakob Böhme, ‘The Considerations upon Esaiah Stiefel’s Booke [sic] 
Concerning the Threefold State o f  Man and the N ew  Birth’ [hereafter Stiefel], in The R em ainder o f  
Books written by Jacob B ehm e  [sic], trans. by John Sparrow (London: Printed by M. S[immons] for 
Giles Calvert, 1662), 2. 422; llA p o l. Tilke, 2. 251. This kind o f  solar analogy applied to the divine has 
its basis as far back as the Egyptian religion, where a division was made between the so-called  
‘heavenly’ sun (Tum ü  or Atüm ti, lit. ‘creator’) and the ‘earthly’ sun (K hopri, ‘he who appears’). Cf. 
Gaston Maspero, D aw n o f  Civilization, trans. by M. L. McClure (London: Kessinger one vol. repr. o f  
1894 two-volume edition, 2003), p. 138. This analogy may have filtered down to the Old Testament 
writers through the Egyptian captivity, and to the N ew  Testament variation where ‘the brightness o f  the 
sun is manifested in its rays’ (Döllinger, p. 162) through Hellenic conquest o f  Egypt. Cf. Hebrews 1. 
3; Colossians 1. 15.173 G race, 2. 28.174 Theos. Punkt., 5. 3.
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What again distinguishes Böhme from his Hermetic and cabbalistic peers is that this 
imagistic relationship between Father and Son is, of course, taken to be one of pure 
analogy. While, according to his seven-stage narrative, the Son is represented by the 
second and sixth qualities of ‘sweetness’ (immanently), and ‘tone’ (economically), 
and hermetically by the expansive, embracing powers of Jupiter and Mercury,175 
Stoudt comments, nevertheless, that ‘Böhme asserted that God dwelt beyond analogy 
because he was not the aethereal deep: He is like the heavens, but he is not the 
heavens. His Christ was like the sun, but he was not the sun. This analogy 
interpenetrates all reality.’176
In short, Böhme’s inward-looking, contractive first principle requires an 
outward-looking, expansive second principle for the same reason. This othering, the 
creation of a ground for the Groundless, is God’s coming to self-consciousness.
In th is ch aos the eternal n oth ing  com prehends it s e l f  in  an ey e  or eternal p ow er o f  
seein g , for the b eh o ld in g , fee lin g , and fin d in g  o f  itse lf. In such  ca se  it cannot b e said  
that G od has tw o  w ills , on e to  ev il, and the other to  good . For in  th e unnatural, 
uncreaturely d eity  [i.e . th e im m anent trinity] there is  n o th in g  m ore than a s in g le  w ill, 
w h ich  is ca lled  a lso  the on e G od; and h e w ills  in  h im s e lf  n oth in g  m ore than ju s t  to  
se ize  and find  h im self, g o  out from  h im self , and w ith  th e ou tgo in g  bring h im s e lf  into  
in tu ition  [ . . . ]  There is n o  cau se o f  the d iv in e  p ow er [ . . . ]  save  the o n e  w ill, that is to  
say, the on e G od w h o  brings h im s e lf  in to a th reefo ld n ess as into an appreh en sib ility  o f  
h im self. T h is ap preh en sib ility  is  the centre [ . . . ]  and is ca lled  the heart or seat o f  the  
eternal w ill o f  G od, in  w h ich  the G roun dless p o sse ss e s  it s e l f  in  a ground. T h is heart 
[ . . . ]  o f  the G roun dless is the eternal m ind  o f  th e w ill, and y e t  has n oth in g  b efore it that
175 Jupiter, for Bôhme, corresponds with man’s capacity for reason (A urora  25. 112), and is thus the 
power behind all life (Aurora  26. 16). Mercury corresponds with the creative word, the Verbum Fiat, 
which acts as a catalyst for Jupiter, bringing to life what would be inert (Clavis 26; Threefold, 9. 96).176 Stoudt, p. 86. Emphasis mine.
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can will, save only this one place of its self-discovery. The first will is therefore the 
father of its heart or the place of its discovery [...] The unfathomable will [...] 
generates itself within itself into a place of apprehensibility. And the place is a ground 
and beginning of all beings, and possess in turn the unfathomable will, which is God 
the Father.177
As stated, Böhme makes a division between God’s coming to self-consciousness, and 
God coming to self-manifestation. Böhme’s immanent trinity is concerned with 
coming to self-consciousness, his economic trinity is concerned with self­
manifestation. Self-consciousness is, for Böhme, logically prior to self manifestation.
The Son is a person other than the Father, for he is the light-world, yet dwells in the 
Father, and the Father begets him in his will. He is truly the Father’s love, as well as 
wonder, counsel, and power, for the Father begets him in his imagination [that is to 
say, in thought], in himself, and leads him forth through his own fire, through the 
principle, through death, so that the Son makes and is in the Father another world or 
another principle than the fire-world in the darkness.178
Further,
Had the hidden God, who is merely one essence and will, not led himself by his will 
out of himself, had he not brought himself out of eternal comprehension in the 
temperamenta into a differentiation of wills, and had he not led the same 
differentiation into a subjectivation of natural and creaturely life, and did this same 
differentiation not stand in strife in life, how then would the hidden will of God, 
which in itself is single, become manifest to itself.179
In terms of Böhme’s qualitative narrative, while the Groundless has found its ground 
in-itself (as represented by the transition from the first to second qualities, from 
consciousness to self-consciousness), it has not done so for-itself (in terms of self­
17 Grace, 1. 8ff.178 Incarnation, II, 3. 11. Emphasis mine.179 Contemplation, 1. 10.
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manifestation). The mirroring of God has, thus far, taken place ‘in the darkness’, and 
now it ‘craves for the light’; to show itself in creation. Thereby, the fifth quality is 
posited: the Groundless as entering into substantiality, the Father of the economic 
trinity, or ‘love’ in Böhme’s terminology. The quality of love is, for Böhme, a 
‘theogonic hypostatization’, ‘the tendency of the many to be encompassed within the 
One’, likened, by one commentator, to the centripetal force of Plotinus, the 
e7tiGTpo<pr|.180 Astrologically, it is represented by the movement from Saturn to 
Venus, from a contracted, restrictive nature, to an expansive, uni vernalising love.
The first three [qualities] are m erely  q u a lities co n d u civ e  to  life , th e fourth is  life  itself, 
but th e fifth  is the true Spirit. W h en ever th is p ow er has b een  ev o lv e d  from  the fire, it 
liv e s  w ith in  all th e others and ch an ges them  all in to its ow n  sw ee t nature, so  that 
p ain fu ln ess and en m ity  cannot be foun d  therein  in any sh ape w h atever.181
The fifth  q uality  is the true lo v e-fire , w h ich  in the ligh t separates from  the pain fu l fire, 
and w h ere in  d iv in e lo v e  appears as a substantial b ein g . It has w ith in  i t s e l f  a ll the  
p ow ers o f  d iv in e w isd om ; it is  th e trunk or the centre o f  th e tree o f  eternal life , 
w herein  G od the Father b eco m es revea led  in h is  S on  b y  m ean s o f  th e speaking  
W ord.182
For Böhme, then, the consequence of this divine will for a ground (the divine Tove- 
play’ in Böhmean terms) is two-fold. Firstly, this desire will result in God’s self- 
subjectivation and self-consciousness. Secondly, it will result in God’s self­
180 Stoudt, p. 209. Cf. Eduard Zeller, D ie P hilosophie der Griechen, 6 vols in 3 parts (Leipzig: [n. 
pub.], 1881), III, 2, p. 47ff.181 Jakob Böhme, A Table o f  the Three Principles  [herafter Tab. Princ.], trans. by H. Blunden and John 
Sparrow (London: Printed by M. Simmons, 1654), 1. 46.182 Grace, 3. 26.
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manifestation.183 The first result becomes the xeXoq of the immanent trinity, while the 
second result is the goal of the economic trinity. Immanently, this divine desire will 
be realised in the diremption or ‘othering’ of the Groundless, as the Xoyoq. 
Economically, the desire will be realised in the manifestation of the 'koyoq in creation, 
in the historical person of Jesus Christ. Whether immanent or economic, however, 
both trinities are, for Böhme, united by a general will: the will of the Groundless for a 
ground. This is represented by Böhme alchemically, for while all other attributions 
change in the immanent to economic transition, its elemental nature remains the same 
—  ‘one spirit [separating] into two principles’.184
B eh o ld  a bright flam in g  p iec e  o f  iron w h ich  o f  it s e l f  is dark and b lack , and th e fire so  
penetrates through the iron that it g iv e s  light. N o w , the iron d o es n ot ce a se  to  be; it is 
iron still; and the sou rce o f  the iron retains its ow n property; it [the fire] d o es not take  
th e iron into it but it penetrates through the iron; and it is  iron then as w e ll  as before, 
free in  itself; and so  a lso  is  the sou rce o f  the fire; in  su ch  a m anner is the so u l se t in  
th e deity; the d eity  penetrates through the sou l, and d w e lls  in th e sou l, y e t  th e sou l 
d oes n ot com prehend  the deity, but th e d eity  com prehends the so u l.185
The content of Bohme’s thought on the Incarnation is strongly reminiscent of Hegel’s. 
For Hegel, God is only as such if he reveals or manifests himself. Throughout the 
Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion this sentiments recurs: ‘Spirit that does not 
appear is not’,186 ‘God is a living God who is real and active’,187 and ‘A God who
183 Stoudt, p. 201.184 Jakob Böhme ‘Vierzig Fragen von der Seelen [hereafter Seel. F rag]’, in Säm tliche Schriften, m, 1. 
66.185 Threefold, 6. 84ff.186 Werke, XI, p. 18.187 Ibid., p. 24.
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does not manifest himself is an abstraction’.188 Christ, therefore, embodies ‘the 
immediate certainty and presence of divinity’; the ‘that which is (das /si)’.189 For the 
truth ‘to become certain to men, God must appear in flesh in the world’.190 The 
establishment in the orthodox mindset that Christ was at once fully divine (vere 
Deus), ‘consubstantial with the Father’ and fully human (vere homo), ‘consubstantial 
with man’ serves to illustrate this point191 Christ’s life, death, and resurrection 
represent the life of God himself, which, though immanent in history, yet remains 
utterly transcendent.192
For Hegel too, the second moment of the Trinity is invariably bound up with 
the >.6yoq. Hegel’s envisioning of the foyoq  is identical to Bohme’s, in that it is 
envisaged according to the Lutheran scheme of the union of God and man, rather than 
the highest expression of the revealed nature of the divine.193 As Lakeland comments, 
the importance of the Incarnation, for Hegel, as with modem theologians such as Karl 
Rahner, is in that there is no ‘definitive and absolute gulf between divine and human’, 
that there is ’a clear revelation of a relationship of nonexclusiveness between God and 
human beings’.194 Due to this focus upon the importance of the humanity and 
historicity of Christ, Emilio Brito argues that Hegel’s christology approaches a kind
18 Ibid., p. 135.189 VPH, m, p. 132.190 Ibid., p. 141, and passim.191 Claude Welch, ed. and trans., G od a n d  Incarnation in M id-N ineteenth Century G erm an Theology: 
G. Thomasius, I. A. Dorner, A. E. B iederm an  (New  York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 208.192 Anselm K. Min, ‘The Trinity and the Incarnation: Hegel and Classical Approaches’, The Journal o f  
Religion, 2, 66 (1986), 173-193 (p. 177).193 Emilio Brito, L a Christologie de H egel: Verbum Crucis (Paris: Beauchesne, 1983), p. 575.194 Lakeland, p. 68.
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of ‘reverse Arianism’, in that the abstractness of the Father is seen as inferior to the 
more concrete moments of Son and Spirit.195 As Hegel has it,
[T he secon d  m om ent], d eterm inacy, activ ity  determ in ing itse lf, w h ich  accord in g  to the  
broadest d esign ation  is k oyoq  —  ration ally  d eterm in ative activ ity , or p rec ise ly  the  
w ord . T he w ord  is th is  s im p le  se lf-ex p ressio n  that neither m akes nor b eco m es a hard 
and fast d istinction , but rather is im m ed iate ly  p erceived , and that, b eca u se  it is so  
im m ediate, is lik ew ise  taken up into interiority and returns to  its or ig in.196
For Hegel, the relationship (Verhältnis) between the Father and the Son is as follows. 
God, as Father, is not aware of his own generative power. In virtue of being the deus 
absconditus, he is, as Luther surmised, unknowable, but, unlike Luther, Hegel follows 
Böhme in arguing that this unknowability extends to even his own knowledge of 
himself. As he has not yet indulged in his power of creation, there is no other present 
to know him. He has not, in Hegelian terms, arrived at self-consciousness. Therefore, 
God remains, at this point, as nothing, even to himself. Nevertheless, the Father has 
an in-dwelling nascent spark (the Eckhartian Fünklein or Spinier) or drive to come to 
self-consciousness, as a pre-requisite to manifesting himself in creation, to distinguish 
himself from himself.197 This creative act of distinguishing is not in the manner of 
creatio ex materia, rather it is out of God’s own being, from ‘the nothingness of the 
world itself, out of which the world has been created’.198 The result of this
195 Brito, La christologie de H egel, p. 585. Cf. Lakeland, p. 65.196 LPR, m, p. 97.197 H egel’s Trieb  is associated, by some commentators, with the theological conception o f  kenosis, for 
Trieb  is precisely the struggle with ‘a primordial nothingness or emptiness’, a ‘nothing’ which is 
attempted to be willed into being. Cf. Altizer, p. 73.198 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, B e g r iff der Religion, ed. by Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Felix
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distinguishing or ‘othering’ is God as posited as the Son. The Son, as the Father’s 
other, is distinct from the Father in part (qua Son opposed to Father), but not as a 
totality. Although distinct from the Father, the Son does not persist outside the being 
of God, for the identity of the Father is preserved in the otherness (Andersseiri) of the 
Son. The Son is the Father’s self-expression —  the Son is the divine ‘gathering- 
together’ (Sichsammeln), who ‘unites the two qualities of being the totality in itself 
and of being posited as other’.199
In the Son  G od k n ow s h im s e lf  as G od. H e says to  h im self: I am  G od. T h e in -itse lf  
ce a se s  to b e n ega tive . T h e separating and the sphere o f  G o d ’s se lf-c o n sc io u sn e ss  is  
therein  recon ciled  w ith  h is  sim p licity , and the k ingd om  o f  th e S on  is co m p lete ly  [one  
w ith ] the k ingdom  o f  th e Father. The se lf-c o n sc io u sn e ss  o f  G od is  n ot a turning into  
i t s e lf  and an othern ess o f  th e Son , ju st  as it is n ot the othern ess o f  that w h ich  turns into  
i t s e lf  or o f  th e s im p le  G odhead, but the con tem p lation  in the S on  is [G od ’s] 
con tem plation  o f  th e  latter as h im self, y e t  so  that th e S on  rem ains Son, as the 
inseparable and at the sam e tim e as the separate.20
God, taken in his aspect as a simple essence, as the unknown Father, cannot for Hegel 
rightly be called God, for he has no knowledge of himself. ‘God’, as Walsh succinctly 
puts it, ‘as an absolute essence is not absolute God’.201 Walsh continues that it was 
Böhme’s greatest achievement in recognising that the Father, taken without his Son,
Meiner, 1966), p. 147. See Chapter Three o f  this thesis.19 Walsh, ‘The Historical Dialectic o f  Spirit’, p. 20; Hegel, D ie absolute Religion, ed. by Georg 
Lasson (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1929), p. 91.20 Hoffmeister, D okum ente, p. 304. Compare with Böhm e’s observation ‘The Father is called a holy 
God only in the Son (that is in the power o f  light in the divine joy-kingdom, as in the great gentleness 
and love), for that is his true revelation within which he is called God’. Schriften, vn, Myst. M ag., 7. 
14.201 Walsh, ‘The Historical Dialectic o f  Spirit’, p. 19.
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his revealer, his selfhood (Ichheit) is in fact no God at all.202 It is when the Father 
gives up his abstractness, his universality, through the creation of the Son that he may 
be properly termed ‘God’.203 As Hegel’s summarises in the philosophy of religion 
lectures, ‘the universal must pass into actuality through the particular’.204 In this way, 
the Incarnation, as a paradigm, is the xékoç into which the world is ‘drawn’.205 
Hegel’s determination to end ‘mystery’, therefore, ends with the Incarnation, which is 
the final ‘ending of all mystery whatsoever’.206 Hegel quotes Bohrne in his own 
realisation of this truth, for, he writes, ‘no thing can be revealed to itself without 
opposition (Entgegensetzung); for if there is nothing that opposes (setzt entgegen) it, 
then it always goes out of itself and does not return again to itself. If it does not return 
into itself, as into that from which it originated, then it knows nothing of its origin’.207 
Hegel concedes that the relationship between Father and Son is taken from ‘organic 
life and is expressed in imaginative form’.208 Since neither the Father nor the Son for 
Hegel are treated as actual persons, however, the relation is a purely figurative one. 
Therefore, it ‘never entirely corresponds with to the truth that is sought to be 
expressed’.209 Though the Father eternally begets the Son, in distinguishing himself
203 As Altizer comments (p. 74), it is at this stage where ‘[God] is known as freely externalizing itself, 
abandoning itself to the shape o f  an immediate being’.204 VPH, I, p. 85. Trans, in Crites, ‘The Gospel According to H egel’, p. 248.205 VPH, m, p. 727; LPH, p. 320.206 Altizer, p. 86.207 ‘Geschichte der Philosophie’, p. 313. The quote originates in Böhm e’s ‘Vom  Göttlicher 
Beschaulichkeit’, in Säm tliche Schriften, IV , 1. 8. Trans, in Walsh, ‘The Historical Dialectic o f  Spirit’, 
p. 19.208 LPR, m, p. 79.209 Ibid.
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from himself, no real persons are created by this relationship for ‘God himself is this 
entire activity’.
G od is the b eg in n in g , h e acts thus; but he is lik ew ise  the end , the to ta lity , and it is as 
tota lity  that G od  is  spirit. G od as m erely  th e Father is  n ot y e t  the truth (thus in  the  
Jew ish  R elig io n  he is co n ce iv ed  o f  w ith ou t th e S on). H e  is  rather both b eg in n in g  and  
end; he is  h is ow n  presup position , con stitu tin g  h im s e lf  a s p resupposition; h e is the  
eternal p ro ce ss.210
S e c t i o n  T h r e e  
T h e  H o l y  S p ir it
Christian orthodoxy describes the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Trinity, 
distinct from, but coequal, coetemal, and consubstantial with the Father and the Son. 
It is depicted as God ‘in the fullest sense’, and, as such, remains ungenerated and 
proceeds (èicjtopeÛEcQai) or is ‘spirated’ (breathed out) from the Father to the Son.211 
The argument for the Holy Spirit’s procession from the Father is based upon 
scriptural descriptions of the Spirit as being ‘of God’ or ‘of Christ’ (cf. I Corinthians
2. 11-12; Galatians 4. 6; Romans 8. 9). The Holy Spirit’s procession from the Father 
is affirmed by the earliest of Christian statements, such as the Nicene Creed (‘I 
believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and the giver of life, who proceeds from the
21 Catholic Encyclopedia, p. 503. The Holy Spirit is conceived o f  as ungenerated for it is said to 
appear throughout the course o f  salvation history, even prior to the Incarnation. It is active in creation 
(Genesis 1. 2.), involved in historical biblical events (e. g. Deuteronomy 34. 9.), and is the inspiration 
o f  the prophets (e.g. Isaiah 61. 1).
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Father and the Son’), and the Athanasian Creed (‘The Holy Spirit [...] neither made, 
nor created, not begotten, but proceeding). In more recent times, the procession of the 
Spirit from Father to Son is testified to by such orthodox doctrinal statements such as 
the Articles o f the English Church (‘The Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and 
the Son’), and the Westminister Confession o f  Faith (‘the Holy Spirit eternally 
[proceeds] from the Father and the Son’).212
The Holy Spirit is represented by Böhme as the third and seventh qualities of 
‘bitterness’ and ‘body’ according to his generation narrative. Hermetically, they are 
represented by the reconciling powers of Mars and the moon (Luna).213 In terms of 
the intertrinitarian relation, where the Son is the mouth of the Father, the Holy Spirit 
is the Word it speaks. As Böhme writes in the Six Theosophical Points, ‘if the 
Godhead according to the first and second principle is to be regarded only as a spirit 
and without any conceivable essentiality, there is in it nevertheless the desire to
212 Cf. Richard Watson, Theological Institutes: Or, a View o f  the Evidence, Doctrines, M orals, a n d  
Institutes o f  Christianity, 2 vols (New  York: Lane & Scott, 1851), I, p. 628; The Constitution o f  the 
Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. (1946 edition) (Louisville, K. Y.: Office o f  the General Assembly, 
1995), p. 19. This notion o f  the procession o f  the Holy Spirit —  based upon interpretations o f  
Galatians 4. 6, Romans 8. 9, and Philippians 1. 19 —  from the Father and the Son (ex Patre F ilioque  
procedit), and not solely from the Father, through  the Son (ex Patre p e r  Filium  procedit) has always 
been problematic for relations between the Western and Eastern churches. The Greek Fathers are o f  
varying opinions regarding this matter: Dionysius the Areopagite, Theodoret, and Gregory Palamas 
have it that the Spirit proceeds (EKjropeheoGai) from the Father only; while Cyril o f  Alexandria (along 
with the Western Fathers Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome) taught that the Spirit proceeds (Kpo'ievai 
or the Latinprocedere) from both Father and Son. The F ilio q u e  issue’ or ‘controversy’, as this dispute 
has come to be known, stems from the translation o f  the Greek terms for procession in the N ew  
Testament to the Latin. As Maximos the Confessor wrote to Marinus, ‘It is true, o f  course, that they 
cannot reproduce their idea in a language and in words that are foreign to them as they can in their 
mother-tongue, just as w e too cannot do’. See Letter to M arinus, p. 91, 136. See The Pontifical Council 
for Promoting Christian Unity, ‘The Greek and Latin Tradition Regarding the Procession o f  the Holy 
Spirit’, L 'O sservatoreR om ano, 20 September 1995, pp. 3, 6.213 Mars, for Bohme, is conceived o f  as a symbol o f  angst and wrath (Sig. Rer. 4. 20), a Platonic need 
which is desperate to be satisfied. Luna is called ‘the lustful container’ (Stoudt, p. 254; S ig  Rer. 4. 27), 
the Platonic plenty which satiates all desires (Sig. Rer. 4. 27).
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evolve a third principle, wherein rests the spirit of the two first principles, and 
wherein it will become manifest as an image’.214 The third being of the immanent 
trinity will become the source of revelation in the world, of salvation history, and will 
allow for the formulation of Böhme’s economic trinity. For Böhme, Spirit is ‘the first 
will to nature [...] the former and framer in nature [...] He is the bringer forth, the 
conductor, and the director’.215 Where the Father remains the substance of creation, 
and the Son the push to create, Spirit, ‘bom of will, is their instrument’.216
T he Father is  th e p o w er  [ . . . ]  and th e S on  is th e ligh t and the sp lendour o f  the Father 
and the H o ly  Spirit is the m ovin g  or ex it  [A u sg a n g ]  ou t o f  the p ow ers o f  the Father, 
and o f  the Son , and th e form s, figures, and im ages o f  a ll [ . . . ]  and m o v es or acts, form s  
or fram es, and im ages all that is  in th is w o r ld.217
The H o ly  Spirit reveals the G odhead in  nature. H e ex ten d s the sp lendour o f  the  
m ajesty , so  that it m ay b e recogn ised  in th e w on d ers o f  nature. H e is n ot that 
sp lendour itse lf, but its p ow er, and h e in troduces th is sp len dou r o f  th e m ajesty  into the  
substantiality  w herein  th e G odhead is rev ea led.218
Spirit is ‘the fashioner and former of all nature’ (Threefold, 4. 77), ‘the work-master 
of the world’s birth’ {Aurora, 13. 77), ‘the creator of all’ {Threefold, 8. 72), and ‘the 
opener of nature’s divinity’ {Threefold, 4. 84). Spirit ‘dwells in man’s soul’ {Aurora, 
preface 88), where he is ‘responsible for [his] original, essential spirit’ {Incarnation, I, 
10. 1). At the end of history, Spirit bears the responsibility of ‘[filling] the world,
214 Theos. Punkt., 1. 25.215 Threefold, 4. 77.216 Incarnation, n, 10. 11.217 Aurora, 7. 42—43.218 Threefold, 4. 82, 5. 39.
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bringing it into conformity with God’s will’.219 The relationship here between the 
Father and the Spirit is that of the ‘alpha and omega’ of Revelation, the beginning and 
end of eternal generation. It signifies the complete transition from the divine no to the 
divine Yes, the movement from the no-thing of the Groundless, to the everything of 
Spirit. As the circuit comes to completion, the first quality appears in the seventh, 
final quality. This is strongly reminiscent of the Hermetic axiom ‘as above, so below’.
T he seven th  p rin cip le is the corporeal com p reh en sion  o f  th e other q ualities. It is ca lled  
‘essen tia l w isd o m ’ or the ‘b od y  o f  G o d ’. T h e third p rin cip le appears in th e seven  
form s o f  nature in  so  far as th ey  h ave b een  brought in to com p reh en sib ility  in th e  
seventh . T h is prin cip le or state o f  b ein g  is  h o ly , pure, and good . It is ca lled  the eternal 
uncreated h eaven  or the k ingdom  o f  G od, and it is ou tsp oken  from  th e first p rin cip le , 
o f  the dark fire-w orld  and from  the h o ly  ligh t-flam in g  lo v e -w o r ld.20
The seventh form is the state of being wherein all the others manifest their activity, 
like the soul in the body. It is called nature, and also the eternal essential wisdom of 
God.221
Hegel’s depiction of the Holy Spirit is not entirely dissimilar to the orthodox 
account: spirit is seen as naturally coequal with the other moments of the Trinity, and 
constitutes the complete depiction of the nature of God. that ‘by the obedience of one 
the many are constituted (KaracrtaBfioovxat) ’ .222 According to orthodoxy, however, 
the ‘fullest mission’ of the Holy Spirit was instantiated after the glorification of
219 Seel. Frag., 20. 11.20 Grace, 4. 10.21 Tab. Princ., 1. 49.22 Romans 5. 19.
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Christ.223 It is, for Hegel, as a product of Christ’s Resurrection that spirit owes its 
entire genesis. Hegel’s spirit is generated during a particular point in history: the 
death and Resurrection of Christ. In this way Hegel’s interpretation is closer to John’s 
Gospel than the orthodox account, where the Holy Spirit is conceived of as a kind of 
locum tenens (whom John calls an ‘advocate’, a ‘comforter’, or a ‘helper’) for the loss 
of the physical presence of Christ.224
An important variation between the second and third moments of Hegel’s 
trinitarian scheme is that God, as present in Jesus Christ, indicative of the second 
moment of the trinity, is distinct from God as present in the Holy Spirit, as in creation 
in general. As has been stated, Hegel considers himself neither a Spinozist nor a 
pantheist, and, as such, argues that God is not incarnated in his creatures as some 
Platonic universal.225 Though, anthropologically, Hegel follows the Hermetic narrative 
of man as the plicpoKoopoq (or, stronger still, Hegel echoes the Paracelsian scheme in 
particular, and envisions man as the piKpoGeoq),226 the individuality of creatures still 
needs to be preserved. As such, the third moment is but an extension of the narrative
23 This orthodox reading is based upon the following passages: John 20. 22-23; Acts 2. 1—13, 8. 17, 
11. 12, 15. 28, 16. 6, 19. 6; I Corinthians 12. 4ff.24 John 14. 16, 15 .26 .25 Min, ‘The Trinity and the Incarnation’, p. 178.26 PN, in, p. 108. H egel’s appropriation o f  the doctrine o f  macrocosm-microcosm comes as no 
surprise, for it has long been associated with German mysticism, and, therefore, German Romanticism. 
German mysticism ‘from Hildegard on [ .. .]  is preoccupied with large and small “worlds”, ranging from 
the absolute world o f  divinity to the microworlds encompassed by the smallest organism, space, or 
discrete things’. Cf. Andrew Weeks, G erm an M ysticism  fro m  H ildegaard o f  Bingen to L udw ig  
W ittengenstein  (Albany: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 1991), p. 9. Stoudt argues (p. 89, n. 3), 
based upon Schleiermacher’s view, that the macrocosm-microcosm relation began with the Peripatetics 
and Stoics, who knew it as ‘the great analogy’. The doctrine was later revived in the Renaissance by 
W eigel and Paracelsus. See Schleiermacher, Speeches on Religion, p. 133-134. See Chapter Three o f  
this thesis.
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of Hegel’s ontological system, of God becoming present (Gegenwart) to himself 
through the creation of an other. Where through the second moment God becomes 
present to himself in ‘the interiority of his spirit’, it is through the third moment that 
God becomes present to himself totally, embracing the entirety of his ‘concrete 
historical existence’.227
While it is true for both Christian orthodoxy and for Hegel that the Father is 
eternally generative of the Son, the Son dies only once and for all sins.228 This is of 
significance to Hegel, because here the consummate dualism between the eternal, 
transcendent Father and the finite, particular Son is depicted. It is in the third moment, 
of spirit, then, that the dialectic between the universal and the particular is overcome. 
The third moment of the Trinity occurs historically at the death and the Resurrection 
of Christ, for it is clearly stated in the 1831 lectures that, ‘The abstractness of the 
Father is given up in the Son — this then is death. But the negation of this negation 
[i.e. the Resurrection of Christ] is the unity of Father and Son —  love, or the Spirit’.229 
Further, in the Philosophy o f  History, it is stated that it is ‘only after the death of 
Christ could spirit come upon his friends; [...] only then were they able to conceive 
the true idea of God’.230 For the transcendent God to pass into true finitude, death is a
27 Min, ‘The Trinity and the Incarnation’, p. 192.28 1 Peter 3. 18.29 LPR, m, p. 370.230 VPH, m, p. 741; LPH , p. 328. Cf. also VPR , in (1), pp. 190-198. The E T W  interprets this even 
somewhat differently —  Christ’s death is taken as the reflection o f  the hatred the Sanhédrin had 
towards this attempt at transvaluation in particular, and ‘the mortified national vanity o f  the Jews’ in 
general (Positivity , p. 70). Simply put, the historical Christ had to die as the world was unprepared to 
receive his message. Further in the E TW , H egel considers the Resurrection as reality o f  faith alone, as 
Christ appears only to his friends {Spirit, pp. 291-295; cf. John 20. 14-29; Luke 24. 3 6 -4 1 )
149
sine qua non. Death is the hallmark, result, or ‘the highest peak’ of finite being,231 for, 
as Paul has it, ‘the wages of sin [of which finite being is very much an exercise in] is 
death’.232 In this way, the Crucifixion of Christ has been declared to be the 
speculative locus of Hegel’s system.233
the highest finitude is not the real life in temporality, but death, the pain of death; this 
is the highest negation, the most abstract, the natural itself, the limitation, finitude in 
its highest extreme. The temporal, perfect existence [Dasein] of the divine idea [...] 
becomes evident only in Christ’s death. The highest abnegation [Entausserung] of the 
divine idea — ‘God has perished, God himself is dead [Gott selbst ist totf — is a 
monstrous, horrible representation, which brings before the representation the deepest 
abyss of estrangement.234
What ought too to be remembered is that the Crucifixion is also the Resurrection, that 
they are ‘two sides of a single event’.235 The ‘temporality, particularity, historicity, 
finitude’,236 or, indeed, the ‘earthliness’, which compose the original negation of the 
first moment, die, and are themselves negated, upon the Cross with Christ. Hegel’s 
argument here is completely heterodox, for it is his argument that the physical 
presence of Christ is obliterated completely during this third moment.237 Christ
231 Attributed to Hegel, noted in Crites, ‘The Gospel According to H egel’, p. 256.232 Romans 6. 23.23 James Yerkes, The Christology o f  H egel (Albany, N. Y.: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 
1983), p. 3.234 VPR, in, pp. 157-158. The line ‘G ott se lbst ist t o f  is quoted by H egel here, and elsewhere, from the 
Easter hymn ‘O  Traurigkeit, o HerzeleicT. Crites notes (p. 263, n. 23). The significance o f  this line for 
philosophy has not gone unnoticed by later hymnists, for, in the most recent editions o f  the 
Evangelisches K irchengeangbuch, the line now reads ‘Gotts Sohn liegt to f .  Cf. Donald M. Borchert, 
‘The Influence o f  Hegel in Contemporary God-Is-Dead Theology’, Praxis (Zagreb), 8 (1971), 2 0 3 -  
214.235 Crites, ‘The Gospel According to H egel’, p. 257.236 Ibid.237 It is this christological point which Brito calls the most anti-Christian in H egel’s philosophy o f
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returns to the world in spirit only, and the enduring presence of Christ in the 
community is only as spirit. A further accusation of heterodoxy here may be raised: is 
there, then, a place within Hegel’s christology for the Second Coming or Tta.po'oola? 
Commentators on Hegel have two readings of the Hegelian ‘end of history’ —238 the 
‘absolutist’ and the ‘epochal’. The ‘absolutist’ interprets Hegel’s eschatological 
scheme as reaching a final and definite conclusion, the closure of his system, where 
‘spirit [has reached] [...] the completion of its work’.239 The conclusion ends with 
spirit realising its own freedom and attaining ‘complete knowledge of itself.240 The 
‘epochal’ reading, though agreeing that spirit reaches the state of realizing its own 
essence, does not see such as an end to history, but instead a new departure, ‘leaving 
the future open to progress’.241 The ‘absolutist’ reading, however, appears to be 
somewhat antiquated, based on interpretation that Hegel argues for a literal end of 
history, that, in a Christian context, the goal of spirit has been already achieved at the 
moment of the Resurrection, and a further return to the world would be of no 
consequence.
For Hegel, the moments of Father and Son do not remain entirely separate 
distinctions within the Trinity, but are reconciled in the third moment.242 Spirit 
constitutes the ‘self-recognition of the first [qua creator] in the second [qua
religion. Cf. Brito, La christologie de H egel, p. 585. Cf. also Lakeland, p. 65.238 PhS, 103.239 PhS, 486. This is Brito’s argument, cf. Brito, L a Christologie de H egel, passim.240 Daniel Berthold-Bond, ‘H egel’s Eschatological Vision: Does History Have a Future?’, H istory and  
Theory, 1, 27 (1988), 14-29 (p. 15).241 Ibid.242 Min, ‘The Trinity and the Incarnation’, p. 190.
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created]’,243 and the erotic love that ‘binds’ them. For Hegel, this erotic love is the 
ethical life of the Trinity, which
m ean s p rec ise ly  th e g iv in g  up o f  particularity, o f  particular p erson ality , and its 
ex ten sio n  to  u n iversa lity  —  so , to o , w ith  friendship . In friend sh ip  and lo v e  I g iv e  up  
m y  abstract p ersonality  and thereby w in  it back  as concrete. T h e truth o f  p erson ality  is 
foun d  p rec ise ly  in w in n in g  it back  through th is im m ersion , th is b e in g  im m ersed  in  the  
other.24
Here a distinctly Augustinian overtone can again be recognised. Like Augustine, 
Hegel conceives of the Trinity as a ‘trialectical model of subject and object mediated 
by a third’.245 For Hegel, love is the ‘distinguishing of two’, and ‘the subsequent 
sublation of that distinction’.246 ‘Where I’, Hegel writes, ‘have my self-consciousness 
not in myself but in the other,’ both ‘the other and I are only this consciousness of 
being-outside ourselves and of our identity’.247 The I and the other relate to each other 
through ‘intuition, feeling, and knowledge of our unity’.248 In life, when anything 
attempts to relate to something else, it has a certain amount of distinction to 
overcome. Life itself is seen as the eternal struggle between the I and the other, 
universality and particularity, thesis and antithesis, the ‘back and forth’. It is 
diversification and unification, and is ultimately ‘the resolving of contraction’.249 For 
Hegel, this phenomenon is seen even in the family life of finite spirits, where there is,
243 Desmond, H e g e l’s God, p. 117.24 LPR, m, pp. 285-286 .245 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 134.246 LPR, m, p. 276; Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 136.247 LPR, m, p. 276.248 Ibid.249 Ibid., p. 281.
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for instance, ‘a natural unity of members who are persons,’ but also an ‘ethical unity’ 
which subsists in love.250 The life of the divine family is no different: the Trinity is 
eternally in a ‘play of love with itself.251 Therefore, the old maxim that ‘God is love’ 
is given new meaning in Hegel’s trinitarian scheme, for the Trinity is precisely this 
distinguishing and reconciling relationship. ‘When we, say “God is love,” we are 
saying something very great and true [...] Love is a distinguishing of two, who 
nevertheless are absolutely [non-relationally] not distinguished from each other’.252
Everything concrete, everything living, contains contradiction [Widerspruch] within 
itself; only the dead understanding is identical with itself. But the contradiction is also 
resolved [aufgelöst] in the idea, and the resolution [die Auflösung] is spiritual unity. 
The living thing is an example of what cannot be grasped by the understanding. ‘God 
is love’ is an expression very much to the point; [...] as ‘love’ God is a person, and the 
relationship is such that the consciousness of the One [der Eine, the personal one] is to 
be had only in the consciousness of the other. God is conscious of himself [...] only in 
the other, in absolute extemalization. This is spiritual unity in the form of feeling. In 
the relationship of friendship, of love, of the family, this identity of one with the other 
is also to be found [...] [This is] the substantial, universal, ethical relationship as 
such.253
It is through love that the sublation of the prior distinction of Father and Son is 
achieved: God now appears as ‘remaining present to himself, and is spirit only 
through this process of being brought forth’.254 This new unity does not simply mean
250 Ibid., pp. 82-83 . This sentiment appears even in the early theological writings, in which Hegel 
declares that, ‘Even in the expression “a son o f  Koresh”, for example, which the Arabs use to denote 
the individual, a single member o f  the clan, there is the implication that this individual is not simply a 
part o f  the whole; the whole does not lies outside him; he him self is just the whole which the entire can 
is’. Knox, p. 260; Nohl, p. 308251LPR, m, p. 195, 292.252 Ibid., p. 276.253 Ibid., pp. 192-193.254 Ibid., pp. 284-285; Hodgson, H egel a n d  Christian Theology, p. 128. Cf. Desmond, p. 109.
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that the aspects of Father and Son cease to be, that they are enveloped by spirit, rather 
their identities are preserved in a superior understanding of God, in ‘the most concrete 
and encompassing of [all] trinitarian symbols’.255 This symbol is one which recognises 
that, while the Father ‘produces eternally his son’, and ‘distinguishes himself from 
himself, God nevertheless is ‘this whole act. He is the beginning, the end, and the 
totality’.256 As Macquarrie puts it, spirit ‘as subject, knows itself as reflected in the 
object, while the object in turn knows spirit as the original subject’.257 God is now 
present as absolute spirit, as a whole, as wholeness, as a totality.
The Trinity, then, for Hegel, is ‘one grand circuit’, but is a circuit which is 
sometimes finite, and sometimes eternal.258 Moreover, each moment shares its essence 
with the other by virtue of being involved in a ‘living relationship’. Where lifeless 
objects are concerned, ‘the whole is other than the parts’.259 For living beings, which 
the moments of the Trinity are to be, analogously, considered, an identical essence is 
shared (for it is only through unreflective thinking that they are conceived of as 
having a separate essence), and the whole is present in every single part. For example, 
the so-called ‘other’ posited by God in the second moment is not something truly 
foreign to its essence which might ‘delimit the absolute or render it finite’.260 Hegel 
makes it clear he is simply using a kind of spatial imagery to differentiate the
25 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology , p. 133.256 Werke, xn, p. 185.257 Macquarrie, p. 130.258 Desmond, H eg e l’s God, p. 111.259 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 260.260 Ibid., p. 129.
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moments of the divine idea as an-sich and fiir-sich, God in his eternal essence, and 
God as present in creation. The relationship between the first and second moment is 
not one of ‘likeness’, but of a ‘modification’ of the life shared between both. Harris 
likens their relationship to that of a clan or tribe to its members. The clan does not 
relate to its members in the capacity of whole-to-part, rather the entire nature of the 
clan is present in every member of the community.261
Hegel further considers the partite ‘wholeness’ of the Trinity in his reflections 
on the first chapter of John. Hegel echoes Jesus’ ‘vine and branches’ analogy,262 that
A tree which has three branches makes up together with them one tree; but every son 
of the tree, every branch (also its other children, leaves and blossoms) is itself a tree; 
the fibres bringing sap to the branch from the trunk, are of the same nature as the 
roots; a tree stuck upside down in the earth will put forth leaves from the roots spread 
in the air, and the boughs will root themselves in the earth - and it is just as true that 
there is only one tree here, as that there are three trees.263
For Hegel, the ‘oneness’ of the tree is contained in each part of the triad of the roots 
(symbolic of the Father), the trunk (the Son), and the branches (mankind, in and 
through which spirit moves). Where the ‘other children are concerned’, the fruit of the 
tree, is taken by Hegel to symbolise the ‘three moment of the process of development
261 Harris, Tow ard the Sunlight, p. 360.262 ‘I am the true vine, and my Father is the vine-grower. He removes every branch in me that bears no 
fruit. Every branch that bears fruit he prunes to make it bear more fruit. You have already been  
cleansed by the word that I have spoken to you. Abide in me as I abide in you. Just as the branch 
cannot bear fruit by itself unless it abides in the vine, neither can you unless you abide in me. I am the 
vine, you are the branches. Those who abide in me and I in them bear much fruit, because apart from 
me you can do nothing’. (John 15. 1-5).263 Spirit, p. 261. See also H egels Theologische Judgendschriften, p. 309.
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through which the propagation of the tree takes place in the ordinary way’.264 Harris 
reads a seasonal aspect in to this development: the bare branches symbolise the 
Father, the burgeoning fruition of the tree symbolises the ‘reflective consciousness’ of 
the Son, and the eventual ‘pollination of the blossoms’ symbolises the love of the 
holy Spirit, and the production of new life.265
In summary, the third moment, for Hegel, is the ‘self-recognition of the first 
[qua creator] in the second [qua created]’266 and the love that ‘binds’ them. It is the 
sublation of the prior distinction: God now is as ‘remaining present to himself, and is 
spirit only through this process of being brought forth’.267 God is now present as 
absolute spirit, as ‘a whole’ (ein Ganze), ‘wholeness’ (Ganzheit), or ‘a totality’ 
(Totalität)?6* For Hegel, this transition from universality to particularity is absolutely 
necessary, for it is the very nature of love itself. One ought to be aware, however, of 
other, less metaphysical readings of Hegel’s concept of spirit. For J. N. Findlay, for 
instance, spirit is not seen in its customary light of being ‘the driving power behind 
nature and history’,269 rather,
Hegel’s [...] absolute idealism [...] is not the belief that all things exist only in and for 
a consciousness, but that all things must be seen either as necessary conditions of, or 
as stages towards, self-conscious rationality, towards the conscious rational use of 
universals, or as Hegel calls it [...] spirit. What does Hegel mean by saying that spirit
264 Harris, Toward the Sunlight, pp. 360-361 .265 Ibid., pp. 361-362.26 Desmond, H egel's  God, p. 117.267 LPR, m, pp. 284-285; Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 128. Cf. Desmond, p. 109.268 LPR, m, passim.269 Martin Henry, G. W. F. Hegel: A Secularized  Theologian?, Irish  Theological Quarterly, 70 (2005), 
195-214 (p. 208).
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is the truth of everything, and is such an affirmation in any way valid or acceptable? 
[...] [T]his assertion is not to be metaphysically understood: it does not go beyond the 
facts of human experience, its sense lies in the daylight of our conscious rational life. 
Spirit is in fact exemplified in the three forms of art, religion, and philosophy: is it 
there and nowhere else that Hegel’s absolute is to be found. And that spirit is the truth 
of everything does not mean that spirit engineered the world, or was causally 
responsible for it: spirit makes its appearance at a comparatively late stage in the 
world’s history, it supreme stage, philosophy, is even said to arrive in the world when 
the shades of night are falling.270 Clearly the sense in which spirit is the truth of 
everything in the world is a perspectival sense: it is an Ansicht, a peculiar view of not 
something which underlies the universe or is causally responsible for it.271
Here is not the place to argue the merits of this particular interpretation of Hegel’s 
spirit. Nevertheless, if Findlay’s interpretation were to be considered a true and 
faithful relation of Hegel’s conception of spirit, it bears little resemblance to either the 
biblical accounts, or Böhme’s notion of the Holy Spirit, which is, as previously stated, 
scripturally based, being conceived of as an active force present throughout creation. 
For Findlay’s reading to be true, it could not, then, be said that spirit is identical with 
the Holy Spirit of scripture. In this way, such an interpretation of Hegel’s God serves 
to be understood as an entirely non-Christian one.
270 This is an allusion to H egel’s oft used metaphor for philosophy’s inability to inform, and only ‘de­
b rie f, reality, that ‘when philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape o f  life has grown, and it cannot be 
rejuvenated, but only recognised, by the grey in grey o f  philosophy; the owl o f  Minerva begins its flight 
only with the onset o f  the dusk’. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Elem ents o f  the P hilosophy o f  R ight, ed. by A. W. 
Wood, trans. by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 23. The sentiment 
expressed by this allusion does not originate with Hegel, but harkens back as far as Pythagoras, who 
likens the philosopher to a spectator at the Olympic games (Cf. Magee, p. 89). Similarly, it was 
Jacobi’s maxim that the purpose o f  the philosopher was to ‘disclose existence’. Cf. Frederick C. Beiser, 
The Fate o f  Reason: German P hilosophy fro m  K ant to F ichte  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), p. 67.271 John Niemeyer Findlay, ‘The Contemporary Relevance o f  H egel’, in H egel: A  Collection o f  Critical 
Essays, ed. by Alasdair MacIntyre (New  York: Double-Day & Co., 1972), p. 16. Cottingham’s 
interprets spirit in a similar fashion, that spirit is ‘an ultimate stage o f  development towards which 
history moves. Spirit, as Hegel insists [ .. .]  is not an Aristotelian prime-mover or a Cartesian eternal 
perfect being. Rather it emerges out o f  the progressive struggle o f  humanity to realise itself and 
understand the world’. Cf. John Cottingham, Rationalism  (London: Paladin Books, 1984), p. 94.
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In summary of his reflections on the Holy Spirit, Hegel assents to the revealed 
truth of the three-in-one nature of the divine, the idea that ‘in each spirit all are 
contained’,272 and the dialectical struggle between each non-personal ‘moment’ in its 
drive towards self-consciousness and self-manifestation. For Hegel, what may be said 
of the Trinity as a whole can be said of its parts. No moment has any kind of priority 
over the others constitutive o f the Trinity, for each is ‘co-essential’.273 Each moment 
of the Trinity is present in one another, and, as such, Hegel declares that ‘it is as a 
totality that God is the Spirit’.274 There can be no Father without a Son, nor Son 
without a Father. In this way Hegel’s God strongly resembles the Aristotelian final 
cause, which includes both efficient and formal causes.275
§ 3. 1. The Question o f Quaternity
For Bohme, the narrative of eternal generation, however, does not truly end at the 
level of the Spirit: a further aspect is distinguished. According to his scheme of the 
process of divine self-consciousness and self-manifestation, while the Groundless, as 
Father, projects itself out of itself as the Son, the self-mirroring that goes on between
272 Geschichte der P hilosophie, p. 323.273 As appears evident throughout the 1831 lectures, and as is argued by Peter Hodgson (Hodgson, 
H egel and  Christian Theology , p. 131). Anselm Min, however, argues that it is H egel’s opinion that the 
Father has ‘ontological priority’ over the other persons o f  the Trinity, by virtue o f  being the source o f  
the divine nature (Min, ‘The Trinity and the Incarnation’, p. 185).274 LPR, m, p. 283, n. 93.275 J. A. Leighton, ‘H egel’s Conception o f  God’, The P hilosophical Review , 6, 5 (1896), 601-618  (p. 
603).
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these two aspects of God is the Holy Spirit. But the mirror of the Groundless itself, 
the medium of projection of this self-reflecting dialogue, is what Böhme terms ‘God’s 
visibility’, the ‘eternal idea’, or ‘eternal Wisdom’ (die ewige Weisheit)?16 Böhme’s 
conception of Wisdom is one which has its origin throughout a broad spectrum of 
mystical traditions. Wisdom is taken to be similar to, if  not synonymous with, the 
Shekinah of the early Hebrews, aocpioc of Gnosticism and the Cabbala,277 the world- 
soul of Plato and Plotinus, and Wisdom of Wisdom literature (especially the Wisdom 
of Solomon, and Proverbs).278 Böhme’s Wisdom runs almost parallel to this biblical 
conception, where Wisdom is described as
a breath of the power of God, and a pure emanation of the Almighty; therefore nothing 
defiled gains entrance into her [...] she is a reflection of eternal light, a spotless mirror 
of the working of God, and an image of his goodness. Although she is but one, she can 
do all things, and while remaining in herself, she renews all things; in every generation 
she passes into holy souls and makes them friends of God, and prophets; for God loves 
nothing so much as the person who lives with wisdom. She is more beautiful than the 
sun, and excels every constellation of the stars. Compared with the light she is found 
to be superior, for it is succeeded by the night, but against wisdom evil does not 
prevail.279
According to Böhme’s seven-stage narrative, Wisdom is the seventh and final quality. 
Wisdom is expressed by the quality of ‘body’ {Corpus), signified alchemically by 
silver, the feminine counterpart of masculine gold. Astrologically, Wisdom is
276 Noted in Martensen, p. 59.27 The conceptual relationship between Bohm e’s conception o f  W isdom and the cocpia o f  various 
Gnostic system is a particularly close one, for both are considered to be essential to the understanding 
o f  yet, and yet lie beyond G od’s essential essence. Cf. Zandee, p. 18.278 Stoudt, p. 212.279 Wisdom 7. 25 -30 .
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represented by the moon (or Luna), the essence of which was supposed by the 
cabbalists to be the foundation of the material world. In Böhme’s original 
terminology, Wisdom is ‘the likeness of God’ (Threefold, 4. 41), ‘the likeness of the 
Trinity’ (Ibid), and ‘the likeness according to the deity and eternity’ (.Incarnation, I, 9. 
7). As Spirit is the framer of creation, Wisdom is creation’s ‘framing of itself {Grace, 
1. 16), the ‘figure in the mirror of God’s wisdom’ {Incarnation, I, 9. 6), and the 
‘substance wherein the Holy Spirit works, forms, and models’ {Clavis, 19).
Wisdom is the substantiality of the spirit. The spirit wears it as a garment, and 
becomes revealed thereby. Without it the form of the spirit would not be knowable; it 
is the corporeity of the spirit. To be sure, it is not a bodily, tangible substance, like the 
bodies of men, but has nevertheless substantial and visible qualities which the spirit 
per se does not possess.280
In short, Wisdom is the enduring presence of God in the material world. Wisdom is 
the mirror or speculum of God, the medium of his self-consciousness and self- 
manifestation. It is the divine movement from the possible to the actual. Before the 
inception of the Xoyoq, the mirror of Wisdom reflects nothing save the Groundless 
itself, for there is nothing else in existence to reveal itself. The image of the 
Groundless reflected in the mirror of Wisdom is not a direct representation, rather it is 
speculative, revealing all possible universal attributes of God, a ‘wealth of potential 
glories or miracles which are not yet realised’.281 Simply put, what is reflected upon 
Wisdom is the ‘imagination’ or, in Böhme’s terminology, the magia, of the
280 Threefold Life, 5. 50.281 Martensen, p. 61.
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Groundless. The movement towards concreteness comes about through the Xoyoiq, 
which impregnates the mirror of Wisdom with visions of specificity, so that the 
forthcoming ‘nature of the deity becomes manifest’.282 Wisdom is ‘the begotten 
being’, ‘the mirror and ornament of the Holy Trinity in which the powers, colours, 
and virtues of God become revealed’.283
[Wisdom is the] mirror wherein the [eternal] will beholds itself and finds what it is; 
and in the beholding it becomes desireful of the entity which it is itself. And the 
desiring is a drawing-in [or inspiration], and yet there is nothing that can be drawn; 
but the will draws itself in its own desire, and in its desiring represents to itself what it 
is; and this representative image is the mirror in which the will sees what it is, for it a 
likeness of the will. And we recognize this mirror (in which the will itself always 
beholds and has vision of itself) to be the eternal wisdom of God, for it is an eternal 
virgin without substantial being; and yet is the mirror of all beings, in which all things 
have been seen from eternity, whatever could or was to arise.284
It is in the mirror of Wisdom that God reveals his Word, so that ‘his three-fold nature 
[...] becomes manifest’.285 Where the Father is the mute being, the Son is his mouth, 
and the Spirit is his Word, Wisdom can be seen as the Word’s grammar. Wisdom is 
‘the emanated’ (das Ausgefldssene), ‘the egressed’ (das Ausgegangene), ‘the exhaled’ 
(das Ausgehauchte), the ‘discovered’ (das Gefundene), and ‘the articulated’ or 
‘spoken out’ (das Ausgesprochene).286 Wisdom serves as a female counterpart to the 
masculine three-fold nature of the Trinity. As such, it is conceived by Bohme with 
such feminine imagery as ‘God’s body’ (II Apol. Tilke, 57), ‘the chest or container of
282 Incarnation, n, 2. 3.283 Stiefel, 2. 30.284 Incarnation, n, 1. 9.285 Ibid., n, 2. 12.286 Stoudt, pp. 214-215 .
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God’ (Kasten Gottes) (Ibid., 67), and ‘the receptacle (Incarnation, n, 1. 10). As 
female, Wisdom does not create or beget, but is a passive principle, a ‘virgin’.287 It is 
doubtful that Wisdom is equivalent to the Catholic conception of Mary qua 
QeoxoKoq, for she is ‘not a genetrix, neither herself reveals anything,’ but, ‘She is the 
house of the Holy Trinity, the ornament of the divine angelic world’.288
Not wisdom, but the Spirit of God is the centre, or the discloser. As the soul is 
manifesting herself in the body by means of the flesh, and as the latter would have no 
power if it were not inhabited by a living spirit, likewise the wisdom of God is the 
corporeity of the Holy Spirit, by means of which he assumes substantiality, so as to 
manifest himself to himself. Wisdom gives birth, but she would not do so if the Spirit 
were not acting within her. She brings forth without the power of the fire-life; she has 
no ardent desire, but her joy finds its perfection in the manifestation of the God-head, 
and therefore she is called a virgin in chastity and purity before God.289
The question naturally arises as where, indeed, Wisdom fits in the traditional 
trinitarian scheme. Owing to its various definitions, the Trinity cannot be composed 
of more than three aspects or persons. It is certain, however, that Böhme is not 
arguing for a possible ‘Quatemity’. Where exactly Wisdom belongs in the trinitarian 
scheme can be surmised by returning to the orthodox definition of the Trinity, of one 
substance, three persons. Where Father, Son, and Holy Spirit compose the three 
persons, Wisdom is the one substance. Wisdom is what, to Böhme’s mind, holds the 
Trinity together, as it were: Wisdom is the Trinity’s consubstantiality. Although
287 Theos. Punkt., I, 1. 62.28 Ibid., 1, 1. 10. This is not the opinion o f  O ’Regan, who not only advances that ‘one cannot rule out 
Catholic influence about M aiy the “Mother o f  God’” , also equates W isdom to the conception o f  sancta  
sophia  o f  the Eastern Orthodox tradition (O ’Regan, G nostic Apocalpyse, p. 237, n. 11).289 ilA po l. T i l t ,  2. 64.
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Wisdom is, as Martensen comments, co-etemal with God, it is ‘not God [...] but the 
friend of God’.290 It must be ‘distinct from the three persons although unable to exist 
apart from them’.291 As substance, Wisdom’s relation to each being of the Trinity is 
one of revelation and reconciliation. Wisdom permits the revelation of the Father as 
the Son as other, and allows for the sense of possible alienation between the two to be 
reconciled. This reconciliation takes place through the mirroring of the one in the 
other, which is the Holy Spirit. ‘If this spirit did not exist,’ Böhme writes, ‘God 
would be imperceptible’ to himself and to us.292 In this way, Wisdom is truly the 
oúoía of the Trinity.293
Hegel’s stance on Böhme’s differentiation between the Holy Spirit and its 
counterpart, Wisdom, is somewhat subtle. In the Phenomenology o f Spirit, Hegel 
considers the idea of the Trinity as a quatemity, composed of the immanent Trinity 
and some unknown, nondivine ‘abandoning’ or ‘emptying’. Peter Koslowski 
comments that Hegel had ‘flirted’ with the idea of an ‘other’ to the immanent trinity, 
which was ‘crucially responsible for creation’.294 Clearly, such a quatemity would be 
identical to Böhme’s scheme, but Hegel ultimately decides against such a proposal, 
for ‘counting the moments [...] can be regarded as altogether useless’.295 While there 
is some similarity between Böhme’s eternal Wisdom as the mirror o f the Groundless
290 Martensen, p. 59.291 Stoudt, p. 216.
292 Aurora, 11. 1.293 Stoudt, p. 216.294 O ’Regan, H eterodox H egel, p. 228; Peter K oslowski, ‘H egel —  “der Philosoph der Trinität?” Zur 
Kontroverse um seine Trinitätslehre’, Theologische Q uartalschrift 162 (1982), 105-131.295 PhS, p. 453.
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and Hegel’s creation as the mirror of God, the images the Groundless sees in its 
projection are, unlike in Hegel’s conception, non-specific; they are archetypes or 
blueprints of the possibilities of manifestation of the Groundless,296 the mirror 
‘remains eternally a virgin without bringing forth’.297
For Hegel, if Wisdom were to belong to any moment of the Trinity, it would 
belong to the second moment of the economic trinity, as the portend of the 
Incarnation as represented by the heavenly, archetypal Adam. Wisdom, for Hegel, is 
the capacity of being ‘the primal man who is entirely pure, an existent other as that 
first universality, a particular and determinate [bestimmt] reality’.298 In God there 
cannot be, for Hegel, more than one birth, for birth is an eternal generation. Wisdom, 
then, belongs eternally ‘in the bosom of God’, and any distinction between Wisdom 
and the holy Spirit is, categorically, ‘no distinction’.299
Throughout this chapter, many instances of similarity have been shown 
between Bohme and Hegel’s thoughts on the doctrine of the Trinity. Both assent to 
the revealed truth of the three-in-one nature of the divine, the idea that ‘in each spirit 
all are contained’,300 and the dialectical struggle between each non-personal 
‘principle’ or ‘moment’ in its drive towards self-consciousness and self­
manifestation. Both take the content of what is given as a revelatory truth, and attempt 
to rid it of its mysterious element, to make it not dependent on revelation, but on
296 O’Regan, G nostic Apocalypse, p. 34.297 Incarnation, n, 2. 2.298 LPR, m, p. 99.29 Ibid., p. 97.30 G eschichte der Philosophic, p. 323.
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thought and reason. In this way, both philosophers can be thought o f as attempting to 
make good on the Apostle Paul’s statement on the nature of the divine reality, which 
is first seen as but ‘through a mirror dimly’ (St’ eoonxpou ev aivlypaxi), but later 
‘face to face’ (jtpocrcojtov rcpöq 7cp6ca>juov).301
Where both diverge in their conception of the divine is over Böhme’s 
postulation of yet another divine ‘other’, Wisdom, the mirror of God’s nature in the 
world. On this issue, it might be said that Böhme commits one of the cardinal sins of 
philosophy, that of unnecessarily multiplying entities. In terms of a divine dialectic, 
only one ‘other’ is necessary, which can be considered Christ qua Xoyoq or ‘the 
eternal son’ on the immanent level, and creation or the historical Christ on the 
economic. Nevertheless, it would not be too extraordinary to say that Hegel’s 
philosophy of the Trinity represents the distillation of Böhme’s vision, purged of its 
imagistic or representational form. If Hegel were to sum up the entirety of his 
thoughts on Böhme’s contribution to the philosophy of the Trinity, the following 
passage from the Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion would be an ideal candidate.
His [Böhme’s] way of imagining and thinking is rather fantastical and unrefined; he 
has not yet risen to the pure forms of thinking. But the ruling and fundamental 
principle of all the notions that fermented [in his mind], and of all his struggles [to 
reach the truth], was the recognition of the presence of the Trinity in everything and 
everywhere; e.g., it must be bom in the hearts of persons. It is the universal foundation 
of everything that may indeed be finite from the point of view of truth, but even its 
finitude has the truth in it. Thus Jakob Böhme attempted to represent under this 
category nature and the heart, the spirit of humanity.302
3011 Corinthians 13. 12.302 LPR, m, p. 98.
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Bohme’s recognition of the presence of the Trinity ‘in everything and everywhere’ 
doubtlessly had a strong influence on Hegel. The Trinity, then, for both, constitutes 
not only the narrative of the self-unfolding of God’s nature, but also its importance 
for man and his religion. Though, of course, having its ultimate source in the 
moments of the Trinity, revelatory religion is historically attributable to, as O’Regan 
puts it, ‘divine activity within the sphere of the non-divine and in no way to intra­
divine trinitarian reality’.303 In other words, although revelation is fundamentally 
within the provenance of the Trinity, it is in practise extrinsic. The Hegelian 
reformulation, however, does not make the Trinity a foundational concept at all. 
Kant’s differentiation of the two formulations of the doctrine of the thing-in-itself 
seems to come into play here, between the negative sense of the noumenon of objects 
being as abstractions from perception and the positive, and by Kant’s own admission 
impossible, sense of their being as the products of a ‘special relationship’ peculiar to 
the thinking subject304 However, even if the doctrine of the Trinity is not a 
foundational concept, the revelation dynamic is involved in every moment of the 
divine, including its perichoretic dialogue. In short, revelation is intrinsic to the 
Trinity.305
What may be said to be Hegel’s ultimate aim in championing this new
303 O ’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, p. 73.304 Andrew Bowie, Introduction to G erm an Philosophy: From  K ant to H aberm as  (Cambridge: Polity, 
2040), p. 27.305 O ’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, p. 73.
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formulation is to take the content of what is given as a revelatory truth, and attempt to 
rid it of its mysterious element, to make it dependent not on revelation, but on thought 
and reason. This is attempted through a transition of mediums of the content of 
religion, from the representative language of theology to the conceptual thinking of 
philosophy. In Hegel’s estimation, ‘Philosophy has the end to know the truth, to know 
God, for he is absolute truth, and in contrast to God and his explication, nothing else 
is worth the trouble of knowing’.306 Subsequently, the treatment by Christian 
orthodoxy of the revealed and unrevealed God becomes seen as something in sharp 
distinction to Hegel’s thought. For Hegel the idea of the unrevealed God is treated as 
something which can be spoken of affirmatively: the immanent trinity is something 
entirely accessible to reason. The distinction between the revealed and unrevealed 
God, between immanent and economic trinities, is therefore treated by Hegel as but a 
conceptual distinction. In reality, both the dens absconditus and deus revelatus are 
merged in to one being.
The self-relatedness of the deity of God takes place in an unsurpassable way in the 
veiy selflessness of the incarnation of God. That is the meaning of talk about the 
humanity of God. It is not a second thing next to the eternal God, but rather the event 
of the deity of God. For that reason, the economic is the immanent trinity and vice- 
versa. And thus the crucified one belongs to the concept of God.307
The Trinity then, for Hegel, constitutes not only the narrative of the self-unfolding of 
God’s nature, but also its importance for man and his religion.
306 Werke, XH, pp. 280-281 .307 Jiingel, G od  as the M ystery o f  the World, p. 91.
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A complete answer to the question of where Hegel’s new formulation of the 
Trinity stands as it relates to Christian orthodoxy remains to be answered. Does 
Hegel’s conception follow traditionally orthodox notions, or does it descend into the 
heterodox? If the question is considered beyond the usual wrangling over petty 
theological points and technicalities, and towards a more general account, there is 
much of Hegel’s formulation that can be considered orthodox. Firstly, it can be said 
that Hegel’s arguing for a shared content of philosophy and theology can be seen as 
the extension of the program of the fathers of the early church (Tertullian, Clement of 
Alexandra, and Origen) and the Catholic scholastics who incorporated philosophical 
elements from Neo-Platonism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, and Neo-Aristotelianism into 
their own theological systems.308 Secondly, as Hegel’s formulation owes so much to 
Neo-Platonism, it is therefore strongly reminiscent of Augustine’s trialectical model 
of the Trinity, of subject (the Father) and object (the Son) mediated by a third (the 
Holy Spirit). In turn, this resemblance to Augustine makes Hegel’s conception of the 
Trinity similar to that of Luther and Protestant scholasticism. However, where 
Hegel’s conception of the Trinity is dissimilar to orthodox notions is when those 
notions have an Aristotelian, and not a Platonic, foundation. While Hegel’s concept 
of God is similar in sentiment to Aristotle’s ‘thought thinking itself, when that 
concept is applied to a trinitarian model any such resemblance terminates. Aquinas’s 
Aristotelian trinitarian envisioning of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as a triangle
308 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 54.
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connection by spiration does not match Hegel’s scheme, for the Holy Spirit here is 
not conceived of as logically necessary, and becomes contingent upon Father and 
Son.309 This incongruity with Aristotelianism with congruity with Platonism leads one 
to conclude that Hegel’s conception of the Trinity moves away from (traditional) 
Roman Catholic thinking, and approaches, if  not succeeds, orthodox Protestant 
notions.310 At its heart, however, the God of Bohme and Hegel is one which is 
essentially absent from both Catholic and Protestant scholastic traditions, at least until 
the advent of nominalism and German mysticism.311
309 Ib id , p. 134, n. 8.310 There is much to be said, however, in favour o f  an appropriation o f  H egel’s philosophy by modem  
Catholic writers, particularly o f  the French ‘rightist’ variety: viz. Albert Chapelle, André Leonard, 
Claude Bruaire, and Emilio Brito. See Chapelle’s book, H egel et la  religion  (Paris: Éditions 
Universitaires, 1963) and his essay ‘L’absolu et l ’histoire’, in H egel et la  théologie contemporaine: 
L 'abso lu  dans l ’histoire?, various editors (Paris: Delachux and N iestle, 1977), pp. 205-218 , where it is 
argued that H egel’s Christology is closest to ‘that o f  a Catholic theologian’ (p. 205). Leonard’s article, 
‘L’absolu et l ’histoire selon H egel’, in the same collection, terminates with the statement that H egel’s 
philosophy o f  history requires a Catholic theological complement in order to be fully understood, ‘a 
logic which is closer to that o f  ecclesial tradition’ (p. 93). Similarly, Bruaire’s ‘Hegel et le problème de 
la théologie’, again published in the same collection, argues for the inclusion o f  H egel’s philosophy o f  
religion into ‘a way o f  thinking that is more open and faithful to the thought o f  revelation’ (p. 98). Cf. 
also Brito’s H egel et la  tâche actuelle de la  christologie (Paris: Éditions Lethielleux, 1979) and La  
christologie de Hegel: Verbum Crucis (Paris: Beauchesne, 1983).31 Altizer, p. 76.
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Figure One: Table of Bóhme’s Qualities and their Attributions
Quality Planet Metal Element
1. Sour (Herb) Saturn Lead Salt
Person Description
Father (as Groundless), The divine
‘Eternal W ill’ w ill to
remain
unmanifest
2. Sweet (Süss) Jupiter Quick- Mercury
silver
Son (as ground), 
‘Eternal Nature’
The divine 
will for 
manifestation
3. Bitter (Bitter) Mars Iron Sulphur Spirit (as speculum), 
‘Eternal W isdom’
The
reconciliation 
o f  these twin 
wills
4. Heat (Hitze), Sol Gold 
or Flash (Schrack)
Son (as mediator)
5. Love (Liebe) Venus Copper Salt
6. Tone 
(Ton\ Schall)
7. Body  
(Corpus)
Mercury Tin Mercury
Luna Silver Sulphur
Creativity 
arising 
from the 
play
between the 
previous 
three 
qualities
Father (as object o f  faith) The
beginning o f  
substantiality
Son (as presence o f  God The principle o f  
in history) Life; the
verbum  f ia t
Spirit (as enduring 
presence o f  God), 
‘W isdom’
Corporeality, the 
substance o f  the 
material world
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Figure Two: Böhme’s Trinitarian Arrangements
Immanent Trinity
1. Sour 2. Sweet 3. Bitter
(Saturn, Luna) (Mercury, Jupiter) (Mars, Venus)
Transition Point
4. Heat 
(Sol)
Economic Trinity
5. Love 6. Tone 7. Body
(Venus, Mars) (Jupiter, Mercury) (Luna, Saturn)
Compare with the cabbalistic Tree of Life
Immanent Trinity
l.Kether, 2. Chokmah, 3.Binah 
(Saturn) (Jupiter) (Mars)
Transition Point
6. Tipareth 
(Sol)
Economic Trinity
7. Netzach, 8. Hod 9. Yesod
(Venus) (Mercury) (Luna)
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C H A P T E R  I I I
C R E A T IO N  A N D  T H E  F A L L
Hegel and Böhme’s commentaries on the narratives of the creation and the Fall of 
Man, based upon the opening chapters of Genesis, are products of their last years and 
thereby representative of their mature philosophies. Hegel’s commentaries come from 
his Lectures on the Philosophy o f  Religion, collected and published after his death in 
1831, while Böhme’s primarily come from his Mysterium Magnum completed in 
1623, fourteen months before his death. Both commentaries ought to be set against 
the backdrop of Luther’s interpretation of the Genesis account, as it was in response 
to this that both were, for the most part, writing. Hegel would doubtlessly have been 
familiar with Luther’s commentary from his seminary days, while Böhme, though not 
having Hegel’s advantage of Latin, the language in which Luther’s commentaries 
were originally written, would have been familiar with their content either from 
access to the German editions, or indeed from the sermonised versions, preached 
from the pulpit.1 Exegetically, Hegel and Böhme are similar to Luther in a variety of 
different ways. Luther insisted that he considered ‘knowledge of the subject matter [of 
religion] nothing else than a knowledge of the New Testament, and the entire 
scripture of the Old Testament is clear when this is well understood’.2 Böhme affirms 
Luther’s position, acknowledging that ‘whosoever will read and understand right the
1 Miller, ‘Luther and Boehm e’, p. 262.2 Martin Luther, D. M artin Luthers Werke, K ritische G esam tausgabe  [hereafter Luthers Werke], 65 
vols (Weimar: Hermann Böhlausn Nochfolger, 1883), XLn, p. 600.
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history of the Old Testament, he must set before him two types, viz. externally Adam, 
viz. the earthly man, and internally Christ, and change both these into one, and so he 
may understand all whatsoever Moses and the prophets have spoke in the Spirit’.3 
Hegel goes one step further than both Luther and Böhme, on account of being 
strongly antipathetic to the Old Testament’s Judaic content, and abrogates most of it 
outright. Nevertheless, Hegel concedes that some material is worth philosophical 
scrutiny, in particular the book of Genesis.4
Böhme’s method of comment on Genesis was not based upon any structural or 
grammatical examination of the text itself. Böhme had no Hebrew, so he could not 
read the original text, and, as stated, quite poor Latin, so the use of textual 
commentaries, such as Nicholas de Lyra’s popular Postillae perpetuae in universam
S. Scripturam, were out of the question. The skill Böhme did bring to the table, 
however, was, as one commentator puts it, in putting the Genesis material into ‘new 
frames of reference and new language which was more akin to the seventeenth 
century’s dynamic Weltanschauung than medieval static categories of being’.5 This 
Weltanschauung seems to reject Luther’s structured and ordered approach to biblical 
commentary: each text being painstakingly explored in sequential order, line by line. 
Böhme flits from idea to idea, from one point of inspiration to another — the only 
semblance of order in his commentary is in his own chronology of themes he wishes
3 Myst. M ag., 46. 29.4 Hans Rung, The Incarnation o f  God, trans. by John Stephenson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark 
Publishers, 1999), pp. 111-116.5 Miller, ‘Luther and Boehm e’, p. 263.
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to discuss.6 A great deal of Böhme’s actual commentary consists in the kind of word 
games similar to cabalistic modes of exegesis such as notarikon (]1p,“lü,U) and 
temurah (DÜlin) .7 Such exegetical methods, however, Hegel would doubtlessly with 
the familiar epithet of barbarisch, so Böhme’s usage of such will not be expanded 
upon. What is of significance, however, is that the remaining content of Böhme’s 
Genesis commentary constitutes an imaginative and a-traditional speculative 
exploration of the ‘secret meanings of the hidden spiritual world’,8 a world into which 
Hegel is also attempting to delve.
Whereas the theological concept of creation was viewed by Augustine and 
Luther as purely an ex nihilo act, a formulation supposedly informed by the Genesis 
account,9 Hegel and Böhme subscribe to both the ex nihilo addition, and the 
Eckhartian vision of creation ex Deo. Creation, for Böhme and Hegel, is seen as an 
act of divine self-consciousness on the one hand, and divine self-manifestation on the 
other. Whereas Catholicism (according to Irenaeus and Augustine) and Protestant 
scholasticism would acknowledge ‘a certain domination’ of sin in the life of man,10 
Hegel would subscribe to Böhme’s viewpoint of the creation of the world and of
6 Ibid., p. 267.7 These cabalistic exegetical methods involve the rearranging o f  words and sentences o f  holy texts to 
derive a deeper spiritual (or, indeed, speculative) meaning. For an examination o f  Bohm e’s use o f  such 
exegetical modes, see Steven A. Konopacki, The D escent into Words: Jakob  Boehme: Transcendental 
Linguistics (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Karoma Publications, 1979).8 Myst. M ag., 48. 40.9 Twentieth century Old Testament commentator Derek Kidner affirms this orthodox interpretation o f  
creation, that it is ‘supported by all the ancient versions, and affirms unequivocally the truth laid down 
elsewhere (e.g. Hebrews 11. 3) that until God spoke, nothing existed’. G enesis (Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity, 1967), p. 43.10 Catechism o f  the Catholic Church  (London: Geoffrey Chapman: 1994), S. II, 3, 407.
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human beings as an essentially evil act. In this way, as Schelling notes, Hegel’s entire 
vision of creation has ‘the mythopoetic Böhmean version as its precursor’.11 More 
recently, Harris intimates in Night Thoughts that the Böhmean and Hegelian creation 
accounts are more closely connected than previously imagined.12 What unites the 
Hegelian recollection of Böhme’s formulation is the emphasis on speculative 
interpretation over the literal, biblical sense present in the Genesis narrative.13 As 
Hegel advises, the Bible must be read as any other secular or profane text, with 
regards to what is finite, historical, and external.14 In this way, what should be fully 
appreciated in Hegel’s view is the confirmation of spirit, whose testimony does not lie 
fundamentally in history, but with what exists ‘in and for itself (an und für sich). 
Further, as Frick maintains, there is no barrier in employing non-biblical exegesis, as 
allegory in scripture itself indicates a reality beyond the text.15
In their exegeses of creation and fall, the instances in which Böhme and Hegel 
which will be shown to be similar follows a three part structure. The first part will be 
in their treatment of the two traditional analogues of creation. The second part will 
examine the psychology of Adam, the first human being, with particular regard to his 
relationship with God. In the third part the Fall itself will be discussed, both as an
1 PN, I, p. 86. Cf. O ’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, p. 152.12 Harris, N ight Thoughts, pp. 406-407 .13 O ’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, pp. 169-170.14 Georg W ilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Christian Religion: Lectures on the Philosophy o f  Religion. 
Part III. The Revelatory, Consummate, A bsolute Religion, ed. and trans. by Peter C. Hodgson 
(Missoula, M.T: Scholars Press 1979), p. 256.15 Johann Frick, G ründliche U ndersuchung Jacob  Boehm ens vornehm ster Irrthuemer: So auss dessen 
eigenen Schriften gezeiget u n d  auss H. schrifft w iderlegt werden: Vorrede Dr. E lias Veiels (Ulm: zu 
finden bey W olffgang Kraer Buchbindern druckts Ferdinand Manch, 1697) pp. 2 3 8 -242 . Cf. O’Regan, 
Gnostic  Apocalypse, p. 92.
175
event in itself and its resulting consequences, according to Bohme and Hegel’s 
speculative interpretation.
S e c t i o n  O n e  
C r e a t i o n
The creation of the world, not only for orthodoxy, but also for the entire host of 
heterodox traditions, is the fundamental doctrine of the Christian religion. For 
Christianity, the notion of creation acts as the justification and driving power behind 
any other postulated doctrine. Creation is used to provide an account of the origin of 
the natural world, its inhabitants, and the relationship each one has towards the other. 
Equally, it also seeks to describe the correspondences between created nature, its 
created spirits, and their creator. In the context of a philosophical investigation, the 
creation of the material world is a question which merits some scrutiny. As Luther 
inquires,
For w hat, I ask, d oes a p h ilosop h er k n ow  o f  th e h eaven  and th e w orld  i f  h e d o es n ot  
even  k n ow  w h e n c e  it cam e and w hither it tends? Indeed , w h at do w e  k n ow  about us  
ou rselves?  [ . . . ]  Thus a ll k n o w led g e  or w isd o m  is  based  so le ly  on  the k n o w led g e  o f  the  
m aterial and form al cau se , although  in th ese  in stan ces to o  w e  som etim es talk  
dishonourable n on sen se . T h e e ff ic ien t and fin a l cau se  w e  are unable to d eclare.16
The act of creation is seen, for Christian orthodoxy, as a creative act of which
16 Luthers Werke, XLll, p. 93
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‘nothing’ is its material. This doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is propounded so that the 
creation o f  the world is a notion distinct from creation in the world.17 The creative act 
of the Christian God is differentiated from Plato’s demiurge, who creates the world ex 
materia, from a pre-existent or primordial bXr|. Creatio ex nihilo presents itself as a 
superior notion to the creatio ex materia account, for if Plato’s primordial matter is 
one which is ‘formless and completely without any determinate characteristics’,18 the 
undifferentiated u/fr| is really as nothing, and so identical in concept of the nihil from 
which the world is created according to the orthodox account.19 Macquarrie argues in 
his book, The Principles o f  Christian Theology, that the aspect of the highest 
significance in the conception of ‘creation from nothing’ lies in the relationship it 
highlights between the infinite God and finite spirits. What is to be human is to be a 
particular being, and being finds itself defined in opposition to what it is not. 
Mankind stands in the gulf of being and nothingness, God and the godless, and is, 
therefore, understood only in relation to what it is and what it is not. The nothingness 
from which the world is created, Macquarrie argues, is ‘an essential constituent of 
creaturehood’, it is ‘a universal characteristic of creaturely beings’.20
For Christianity, there are generally two, mutually exclusive, notions, modes,
17 There is a linguistic precedent in the text for this distinction: the Hebrew verb bara  (m s)  is 
translated as ‘to create’, but never with regard to human beings. See James McKeown, Genesis  
(Cambridge and Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2008), p. 20.18 Macquarrie, Principles, p. 215.19 This argument is found in Augustine’s Confessions, bk 10. 1 Iff, and is recollected by Aquinas in the 
Sum m a Theologiae  I, q. 41, a. 1. Later in this articulus, Aquinas argues that the term creatio ex nihilo, 
in addition to meaning ‘creation from nothing’, is really a description o f  the power o f  the divine qua  
first cause. See O ’Regan, G nostic Apocalypse, p. 245, n. 22.20 Macquarrie, Principles, p. 215.
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or analogues of the concept of creation: ‘making’ (synonymous with creatio ex nihilo) 
and ‘emanation’ {creatio ex Deo).21 The first is biblical, strictly following the Genesis 
narrative, and is subject to the most commentary by Christian orthodoxy, The second, 
that of emanation (which Irenaeus describes as a Ttpofkx^eiv 7rpo|3oA,a<;),22 has a 
tenuous scriptural foundation at best, but has had a long tradition of philosophical and 
theological concordance, from the Neo-Platonists of the early church, to the German 
mystics, and beyond. In the first analogue, the God of the Genesis narrative is spoken 
of as a ‘maker’: God ‘made the firmament; he ‘made the two great lights’; he ‘made 
the beasts of the earth; and he ‘made the earth and the heavens’. God ‘formed the dust 
from the ground’ and ‘the rib [...] taken from man he made into a woman’.23 The 
significance of the analogy of God qua maker is that it both represents God in his 
transcendence, as a creator, distinct from his creation, and as freely willing the created 
into existence, in virtue of being an absolutely free being. The second analogue, that 
of emanation, posits the notion that creation is not a fashioning out of a pre-existent 
material, but a literal ‘flowing forth’ of the divine being from within itself to outside 
of itself.
Where Bohme and Hegel are concerned, both agree with Christian orthodoxy 
in thinking of creation as a fundamentally ex nihilo act. Both, too, make the 
distinction between the twin modal forms of creation as ‘making’ and as emanation. 
Where the two differ from Christian orthodoxy is in considering that these modes are
21 Ibid., p. 217.2 Irenaeus, A dversus H aereses, I, 1 .2 .23 Genesis 1. 7; 1. 16; 1. 25; 2. 4; 2. 7; 2. 22.
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not mutually exclusive to each other, but are, in fact, related. Additionally, these 
analogues have, at least at the level of the representation, a chronological hierarchy. 
The emanation of creation will be seen to precede the making of the same, based 
upon a shared reading of an extra-biblical, Gnostic prehistory of creation. This 
prehistory is the celestial fall of ‘the first Son of light’, the angel Lucifer. Both Böhme 
and Hegel will argue that these twin modes have a dialectical relationship: Lucifer’s 
angelic fall serves to be understood, in trinitarian terms, as creation occurring on the 
preceding, immanent level, while Adam’s fall represents creation on the succeeding, 
economic level.
§ 1. 1. Böhme: Anterior Apostasy and Creation as Renovation
Böhme mirrors the orthodox sense of creation in two modes, with the important 
distinction of arguing that one is chronological prior to the other. Both modes, 
nevertheless, are based upon the opening line of Genesis: ‘In the beginning God 
created the heavens and the earth’.24 The terminology Böhme uses in the logical 
separation of these two creative analogues are: that of the creation (emanation) of 
‘eternal nature’ (ewige Natur), the creation of a heavenly world and its angelic 
inhabitants; and the creation (making) of actual earth, or ‘temporal nature’, with its 
denizens of a more bestial variety. This distinction in creation, made by Böhme, goes
24 Ibid., 1.1.
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against the orthodox interpretation of the passage, which is understood as a mere 
merism, a phrase which juxtaposes two opposing ideas to suggest a sense of totality.25 
Böhme’s understanding is based upon his reading of Psalm 104, to God as creator and 
provider, which praises the ‘fire and flames’ as the ‘ministers’ or angels of the 
creative act.
The terms ‘flames and fire’ denotes the central fire of the eternal nature, in which the 
creatures [...] stand, as the particular will of a being. But when God would realise his 
idea in the form of a living creature, as in the form of self-will, he put in motion and 
separated the central fire in eternal nature. Thus the idea became manifest in the fire, 
which was accomplished through the breathing forth of the ‘yes’. Thus the ‘no’, as the 
emanated will of self-receptiveness, took shape in the outbreathed yes, in order that 
the creature might be established in its own will. And thus its own will is understood 
in the central fire, that is, in the properties of the fire, in which the creaturely life 
consists. For if this had not been, then Lucifer could not in self-will have broken 
himself off from the good, and have fallen. If he had not possessed a volition of his 
own, then God’s power must have fallen. But in this way the creature has broken off 
from the good and willed to rule in the power and in the properties of the central fire 
of nature, i.e. in the sphere of transmutation and fantasy; to which the devil likewise 
came.26
The catalyst for this separation of the creative fire and the creation of heaven is 
explained by Böhme as the need for the deus absconditus to reveal himself to himself 
in order to come to self-consciousness, a process which has been discussed, at length, 
in the preceding chapter.
25 Merisms are used often in the Old Testament as a rhetorical device to suggest the all-embracing 
nature o f  God. One o f  the m ost frequently used pairings is between ‘those who go out’, and ‘those who 
go in’, e.g. ‘ Those w ho go out weeping, carrying seed to sow, those w ho go in with songs o f  joy, 
carrying sheaves with them’. Psalm 126. 6. See McKeown, p. 20.26 Theos. Frag., 5. 2 -6 .
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Creation [...] is [...] a manifestation of the all-essential, unsearchable God; all 
whatever he is in his eternal unbeginning, generation, and dominion, of that is also the 
creation, but not in omnipotence and power, but like an apple which grows upon the 
tree, which is not the tree itself, but sprung forth out of the divine desire, and created 
into an essence, where in the beginning there was no such essence present, but only 
the same mystery of the eternal generation, in which there has been an eternal 
perfection [...] For God has not brought forth the creation that he should thereby be 
perfect but for his own manifestation, viz., for the great joy and glory.27
The ‘central fire’ is the creative power of God in his ‘heaven’, i.e. the immanent 
trinity, which, through the process of divine self-differentiation examined in the 
previous chapter, is separated and now flares forth ‘eternal nature’, the heavenly 
world. Eternal nature is understood, in addition to being the substance of the celestial 
world, to serve as a prototype or blueprint for the terrestrial world.28 Böhme offers the 
following analogy to provide an illustration of this concept:
Imagine a mother [a womb] having the seed within herself. As long as she contains the 
seed as such, it belongs to herself, but when it becomes a child then is the seed not 
hers, but it is the property of the child. Thus it is with [creation]. [It has] all been 
configured out of the divine seed; but after this has been done, each is its own [thing] 
to itself.29
Thus it is with the birth of eternal and temporal nature. Eternal nature brings about the 
essence which is used in the making of the material world, an ‘essence without which
27 Sig. Rer. 4. 1-2.28 ‘Eternal nature’ is described, more accurately, as any created realm, other to the immanent trinity. 
Bohme , in fact, posits a number o f  realms other to the earth, the notion which will be dealt with later in 
this section.29 Aurora, 4. 34. Bohme gives further clarification on this idea in the Forty Q uestions (19. 7), stating 
that ‘everything has been from all eternity, but merely as ideas, and not as corporeally existing things. 
Only incorporeal spirits existed [as ideas] in eternity, as in a world o f  magic, where one thing contains 
the other in potentiality’.
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nothing can exist’.30 Therefore, this essence is, Bohme argues, the ‘root’ or ‘source’ 
(Urkund) of manifestation.31
The depth of this substance is without beginning or end, its breadth cannot be reached, 
there are neither years nor time, no cold nor heat, no moving of the air; no sun or stars; 
no water or fire; no sight of evil spirits; no knowledge nor apprehension of the 
affliction of this world; no stony rock nor earth; and yet a figured substance of all the 
creatures of this world.32
The dialectic present between the material world and the celestial world becomes 
clear in Böhme’s account of the two ‘falls’ from God: Adam’s fall is read as echoing 
the angelic fall which permitted such an event to occur in the first place. Böhme 
argues that previous commentators thought they had ‘the axe by the handle’ in the 
interpretation of the ‘making’ analogue of creation, but, nevertheless, have failed to 
give the extra-biblical story of the angelic fall its proper due.33 While this narrative 
may be extra biblical, Böhme’s interpretation of it is accomplished with reference to 
scripture. A difficulty lies, however, in that the scriptural representation of angelic 
beings is seldom clear; whether an angel represents a way in which God expresses 
himself to creation, or if angels are, in fact, actual spirits belonging to some supernal 
order, hierarchically higher than man, is uncertain.34 In the accounts presented in the 
Old Testament, when the burning bush appears before Moses, for instance, it is as an
30 Ohne Wesen nicht bestehen mag. Princ. 1. 27. This essence is the ‘no-thing’ which is the 
Groundless, and so, for Böhme, creation is an inherently ex nihilo  act. Stoudt, p. 245. For a further 
elaboration on this point, see Koyre, p. 321, and ff.
31 Myst. M ag., 4. 17.
32 Princ., 9 .2 1 .
33 Aurora, 13. 2.34 Macquarrie, Principles, p. 234.
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appearance of ‘the angel of the Lord’. The words spoken from the bush, however, are 
from ‘God’ or the ‘Lord’.35 This ambiguity extends into the New Testament: the 
angels are presented as real and personal spirits in Luke’s Gospel, but as insubstantial 
appearances in dreams and visions in Matthew’s.36 This uncertainty is present, too, in 
Böhme’s writings. The angels are made in the concrete image of God and are, 
therefore, ‘the brethren of men’.37 They are the product of the Trinity’s ‘birth’,38 and 
bom of the first principle and the immanent trinity.39 Nevertheless, Böhme also 
conceives of them in a more abstract fashion, as ‘the formed powers of God’s Word’, 
the product of ‘God’s outspeaking’ and ‘his thoughts’,40 or, what Stoudt calls, as ‘the 
formed individualized ideas of God’.41 What, indeed, constitutes an accurate 
representation of the angels, in both scripture and in Böhme’s system, cannot truly be 
known. Philosophical speculation, especially on behalf of the scholastics, on the 
nature of the angels is well known, so it is, perhaps, best to leave the inquiry with its 
most appropriate historical provenance. An argument from Macquarrie, however, 
should be noted, that both representations of angels (as abstract apparitions and as 
concrete beings) can be, nevertheless, reconciled according to their telos, which is, as
35 Exodus 3. 2, 4.36 See Matthew 1. 20, 2. 13, 2. 19, 2. 22; Luke 1. 11, 1. 26, 2. 9.37 Aurora, 5. 2. In this way they resemble men physically, having appendages such as hands and feet 
{Aurora, 12. 78, 83), mouths, and some manner o f  apparatus for breathing, {Aurora, 6. 10) to eat o f  the 
paradisaical fruit {Aurora, 6. 17). They have, however, no limbs {Aurora, 6. 12), teeth or wings 
{Aurora, 6. 17, 12. 84). They are, however, o f  the same substance as God: ‘God has created the holy  
angels, not by means o f  any substance foreign to his own self, but out o f  his own self, out o f  his power 
and eternal wisdom ’ {Aurora, 4. 26).38 Myst. M ag., 8. 1.
39 Princ., 4. 67.40 Theos Frag., 6. 5.41 Stoudt, p. 236.
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Paul has it, the ‘ministering spirits sent forth to serve’.42 We shall, therefore, consider 
Böhme’s understanding of the angel Lucifer in this Pauline light.
Böhme accounts for Lucifer’s fall in two ways: firstly, according to the 
traditional narrative of angelic rebellion against God; and secondly as a failed 
attempted at mimesis of God’s coming to self-consciousness and self-manifestation. 
The first instance describes the traditionally Christian, if ex-biblical, account of 
Lucifer’s rebellion and ejection from heaven, a fate shared with an unspecified 
number of other divine beings.43 Lucifer, interpreted by Böhme from this narrative, is 
represented as the personification of eternal nature, but is discontent with this 
arrangement. Lucifer, Böhme writes, was the
property of eternal nature, and would not live in renunciation, but wished to rule in 
and with the holy name [...] His creaturely will elevated itself [...] and abused the 
holy name in it [...] He [...] broke off from the unity. He wished to rule over the yes 
with the no, for the no had elevated itself in him and despised the yes 44
In Böhme’s terminology, this angelic fall from grace was precipitated by Lucifer’s 
attempt at imitation of God’s own transition from a state of contraction to one of 
expansion, from an inward looking perspective before creation, to a more embracing
42 Macquarrie, Principles, p. 235. See Hebrews 1. 14.43 Lucifer, in Böhm e’s narrative, was not only a denizen o f  heaven, but also ruler o f  the unformed 
earth, in addition to many other ‘worlds’ contingent upon our own realm (see Martensen, p. 204). It is 
highly unlikely that Böhme here is suggesting such worlds are other inhabited planets, for such a notion 
is unfamiliar to his period, rather such worlds should be understood spiritually, as higher noumenal 
planes o f  existence. While Böhm e is not specific in numerating the horde o f  rebellious angels, he does 
number the amount o f  angels as a whole as ‘a thousand times ten thousand (P rinc. 15. 3), which has a 
discrete cabalistic significance.4 Theos. Frag., 7. 2 -7 .
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viewpoint after creation. Lucifer did not fear God’s punishment for he was not a 
‘created’ being (for he was emanated, not made), and, as both Bohme and Hegel 
argue, death is the inevitable consequence of flnitude.45
Lucifer knew well that he himself was not God, and he foresaw the judgment of God; 
but he had no sensible perception of it, but only a bare knowledge [i.e. a theoretical 
knowledge]; his sensible perception was only of the Fire-ground that burned within 
him, and incited him to wish some thing altogether new, to uplift himself above all 
kingdoms and above the whole deity.46
Lucifer’s attempted transition from the one state to the other was impeded, however, 
by his prideful ‘personal (eigener) will’ or ‘self-will’ (Eigenwille), a ‘counter will’ to 
remain contracted and self-sufficient.47 Lucifer withdrew his imagination away from 
the expansive aspect of God, the ‘light-centrum’, and oriented his consciousness 
towards the opposite pole: the contractive ‘nature-centrum’, the ‘dark matrix’, the 
fire-principle, ‘fire’s might’, or the Lutheran ‘wrath’ (Zorn) of God.48 Whereas God 
completed the transition from immanence to economy, and, as a result, in his new 
state ‘moved very meekly and lovingly’, Lucifer, who had not completed this
45 In this way Böhm e’s Lucifer ought to be understood as a Byronic and Miltonian character: ‘I f  he 
made us —  he cannot unmake/ W e are immortal! —  nay, h e’d have us so,/ That he may torture: —  let 
him!’ (Cain: A  M ystery, Act 1, scene 1), and ‘What tho’ the field be lost? All is not lost! [ .. .]  Since, by 
fate, the strength o f  gods,/ and this empyreal substance cannot fail!’ (Paradise Lost, lines 105-117). It 
might be argued that Böhm e’s presentation o f  Lucifer does not, in fact, have scriptural warrant: the 
‘great sea monsters’ o f  Genesis 1 .21  are from the Hebrew tannin  (nm), meaning ‘dragon’, and defined 
as the adversary o f  God (Isaiah 27. 1) or, indeed, Lucifer. The sea monsters are ‘created’ by God in the 
same way the world was, represented by the use o f  the Hebrew verb bärä. Therefore Lucifer is, at least 
scripturally, represented as a created being. See McKeown, p. 25.46 Myst. M ag., 9 .9 ;  Aurora, 14.47 A urora, 13. 48.48 Threefold, 9. 38; Theos. Frag. 1. 1-5.
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ontological transformation, ‘moved very darkly, hard, cold, and fiery’,49 despising 
humility and meekness and willing to act in his own name.50 Because of such a 
substantial disharmony between the substances of Lucifer and God, the relationship or 
understanding between the two was severed forever. And so,
The heart of God should now unite and qualify with the heart of the angel, but that 
could not be; for there was now hard against soft, and sour against sweet, and dark 
against light, and fire against a pleasurable gentle warmth, and a hard knocking or 
rumbling against a loving melodious song.51
Lucifer’s move towards this contractive principle was primarily accomplished in 
thought, and its consequences were a loss in his imagination of the divine world, and 
an imagining of the material world.52 In short, Lucifer imagined himself into the 
world of matter, where he there could be ‘the prince of the world of fantasy’.53 For 
Bohme, then, it was through Lucifer’s imagination that the material world came into 
being. While this imagining particularised Lucifer into a concrete definition, distinct 
and alien from God,54 the world he generated does not bear this concreteness. The 
world Lucifer created is not our material world, but ‘eternal nature’, a kind of 
formless waste, a ‘nothing’ sloughed off by the angelic fall. It is akin to an archetype 
or blueprint of the material world, but a seriously deficient one. It is this nothing,
49 Aurora, 13. 57.50 Grace. 4. 31 ; Myst. Mag. 10. 12.51 Aurora, 13. 58.52 In Böhme ’s parlance, Lucifer lost the power o f  the possession o f  the ‘divine names’. Theos Frag. 8. 
9.53 Stoudt, p. 246. See Sig. Rer. 16. 15.54 Grace, 4. 32.
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generated by Lucifer’s expulsion from the heavenly choir, that will become the 
‘immaterial material’ of creation ex nihilo.
Biblically, this nothing is the töhü wäböhü (1H3T nni) , the ‘waste and void’ 
with which God wrestles at the beginning of time. Seminal biblical commentator 
Franz Delitzsch comments that töhü wäböhü carries the implication of a distortion 
and corruption of an pre-existing order.55 Böhme reads the appearance of töhü 
wäböhü in an identical way, as an event which has catastrophic and poisonous 
(<giftige) ontological consequences as a result.56 Chief among these ‘poisonous 
infections’ is the establishment of the possibility of evil action in creation, which is 
considered in the Gnostic fashion as a place of imprisonment and exile for Lucifer 
and evil.57 ‘The devil resides in this world, and he continually infests external nature; 
but he has his power only in the wrath, in bitter desire.’58 This strange narrative is not 
peculiar to Böhme, but it is found in the corpus of Western literature, in early 
Christian poetry in particular.59
5 Franz Delitzsch, N euer Com m entar über die Genesis (Leipzig: Dorffling & Franke, 1887), § 104. 
Delitzsch’s interpretation is based upon passages from the Prophets which speak o f  the degenerating 
effect o f  the töhü w äböhü , for instance: ‘the streams o f  Edom shall be turned into pitch, and her soil 
into sulphur; her land shall becom e burning pitch [ .. .]  He shall stretch the line o f  confusion over it, and 
the plummet o f  chaos [over] its nobles [ .. .]  all its princes shall be nothing. Thorns shall grow over its 
strongholds, nettles and thistles in its fortresses [ .. .]  Wildcats shall meet with hyenas, goat-demons 
shall call to each other’ (Isaiah 34. 1 1 -1 4 ) , and ‘I looked on the earth, and lo, it was waste and void 
[...]  I looked on the mountains, and lo, they were quaking, and all the hills moved to and fro [ .. .]  there 
was no one at all, and the birds o f  the air had fled [ .. .]  the fruitful land was a desert [ .. .]  all its cities 
were laid in ruins’ (Jeremiah 4. 2 3 -2 6 ) .56 O’Regan, G nostic Apocalypse, p. 43.57 Aurora, 16. 1, 3; 17. 38; Zandee, p. 17. Lucifer’s ultimate fate for Böhme, however, is the traditional 
one, being ‘cast with his legions out o f  his throne, and immediately shut up by the darkness and had 
been grasped by the fierce pride-wrath o f  the hellish foundation’. Theos Frag. 13 .3 .58 Incarnation, I, 2. 4.59 The earliest named English poet, Caedmon, wrote the follow  lines o f  verse in the seventh century:
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Creation is seen, therefore, by Bohme, in a Gnostic fashion, as a divine faux  
pas.60 The consequence of creation in this manner is the movement from ‘eternal 
nature’ into ‘temporal nature, from eternity into time, and the instantiation of the 
possibility for evil which time brings with it.61
The external world, in being born [coming into objectivity], makes for itself a new 
principium or beginning. The generatrix of the temporal is a reproduction of the 
eternal generatrix, time originates in eternity, and even here eternity, with its 
wonderful production, appears, in its powers and capabilities, in an especially 
temporal form and shape.62
The third principle, or the visible elemental world, is an issue of the first and second 
principles, which is produced by the motion and outbreathing of divine power and 
divine will. In it is figured the spiritual world according to light and darkness, and 
brought into a created [objective condition].63
According to the Bohmean narrative, evil, traditionally the partie honteuse of any
‘Behind them their abode/ [ .. .]  stood, [ ...]  void o f  habitants; Since the malignant spirits to their place/ 
o f exile banish’d, left such vacant space [ .. .]  Then our Lord w eigh’d within him self how he/ Might fill 
again each heav’n bright canopy;/ The mansions the proud rebels left behind/ For a new race created he 
design’d.’. The F a ll o f  M an or Paradise L ost o f  Ccedmon, trans. by W illiam H. F. Bosanquet (London: 
Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1860), p. 5. Compare with Nikolaj Frederik Severin 
Grundtvig’s nineteenth century interpretation o f  Caedmon’s poem: ‘World dead; empty and desolate; 
Hell-wildemess; Gloom and darkness; the Shadow-kingdom; the World’s-corpse; Winter night; rocks 
bare; goblins cold; dead forces; Work thereafter; Angels fell; confusion all; —  Spirit brooded over the 
deep’. Martensen, p. 226, translator’s note.60 Compare Bohm e’s thoughts with the statement in the Gnostic G ospel o f  P hilip  (123. 3) that, ‘The 
world began with a false step (icapajvccopa). For he who created it desired to create it imperishable and 
immortal. He (i.e. the creator) fell and had no share in the hope for the world was no imperishable nor 
was its creator’. Cf. ‘Das Evangelium nach Philippus’, Theol. L iteraturzeitnng, 84 (1959), columns 1 -  
26. However, compare these heterodox viewpoints with the interpretations from orthodoxy in 
McKeown (pp. 20, 21): ‘God created a perfect world that later suffered a catastrophe which left it in 
chaos’ and ‘God created the raw material from which he would form the world; he would then proceed 
to shape and order this raw material’.61 This movement from the heavenly to the earthly is suggested by the Genesis narrative itself: the 
phrase ‘the heavens and the earth (Genesis 1. 1) is inverted to read ‘the earth and the heavens’ (Genesis 
2 .4 )62 Myst. M ag., 6. 10.63 Tab. Princ., 5.
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philosophical system, serves to be understood as the inseparable consequence of 
particularity. Evil consists in the positing of a false other or centrum, an ontological 
anomaly in nature.64
Evil neither is nor is called God; this is understood in the first principle, where it is the 
earnest fountain of the wrathfulness, according to which God calls himself an angry, 
wrathful, jealous God. For the original [sic] of life, and of all mobility, consists in the 
wrathfulness; yet if the same [...] be kindled with the light in God, it is then no more 
tartness, but the severe wrathfulness is changed into great joy.65
Biblically, this possibility appears as ‘darkness’; that ‘darkness covered the face of the 
deep, while the spirit of God swept over the face of the waters’.66 Darkness is, 
traditionally, the scriptural signature of evil and of the wrath of God.67 However, here 
the second analogue of creation comes into play: the fashioning or ‘making’ of the 
tohu wabdhu into the concrete material world. This is accomplished, Bohme argues, 
by God’s direct intervention into the state of fallen nature. Bohme’s commentary now 
moves from extra-biblical tradition into the actual narrative from Genesis. The 
creation of the concrete world, ‘temporal nature’, is accomplished in the customary 
way, through the Verbum Fiat and the Fiat lux.
64 Martensen, p. 211.65 Princ., 1. 1-2.6 Genesis 1 .2 .67 The biblical sense o f  synonymy between conceptions o f  darkness and wrath is illustrated in the 
following passages from the Prophets: ‘The great day o f  the Lord is near [ .. .]  That day will be a day o f  
wrath, a day o f  distress and anguish, a day o f  ruin and devastation, day o f  darkness and gloom, a day o f  
clouds and thick darkness’ (Zephaniah 1. 14-15); ‘Alas for you who desire the day o f  the Lord! It is 
darkness, not light [ .. .]  Is not the day o f  the Lord darkness, not light, and gloom  with no brightness in 
it?’ (Amos 5. 18-20).
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God spoke: let there be light! and there was light. And with this coming to be light, the 
devil’s might and strength was wholly withdrawn from him in the essence for here the 
light shone in the now awakened power, in the darkness; which light the prince of 
wrath could not comprehend [...] It was the light of nature, which was useless to 
him.68
The ‘light’ spoken of here has been subject to much commentary, both on the part of 
orthodoxy and by Böhme himself. Nahum M. Sama comments that ‘the source of this 
supernal, nonsolar [for the sun has yet to be created] light of creation became a 
subject of rabbinic and mystical speculation [...] this light is the effulgent splendour 
of the divine presence’.69 The light is interpreted by Böhme to be of a Paracelsian 
nature: it is the ‘quintessence’ and ‘source’ of the four terrestrial elements.70 This act 
of creative renovation proceeds from a Quail, the incomprehensible driving force 
behind all reality and which is the core of all living things.71 This Quail, it can be 
argued, serves as a convenient device for Böhme to distance God from the world and 
its inhabitants which, as will later become apparent, will fall into evil. Between the 
darkness engendered by Lucifer’s fall and the appearance of a new light, another 
contrarium or dialectic arose:72 ‘The darkness remained in the wrathful property, not 
only in the earth, but also in the whole deep; but in the light’s nature the light of
68 Myst. M ag., 12. 14. Compare with Psalm 33. 9: ‘For he spoke, and it came to be; he commanded, 
and it stood firm’.69 Nahum M. Sama, JP S  Torah Commentary: G enesis (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society: 
1989), p. 7.70 Princ., 7. 7; Contemplations, 3. 21. For an in-depth study o f  Paracelsus’s conception o f  this divine 
light, see Henry Maximillian Pachter, Paracelsus: M agic into Science: B eing  the True H istory o f  the 
Troubled Life, Adventures, Doctrines, M iraculous Cures (New York: Schuman, 1951), pp. 208-212 .71 Stoudt, p. 257. See Seel. Frag. 1. 51; M yst. Mag. 8. 20. The notion o f  Q uail is, o f  course, pure 
vitalism, and must be seen as the product o f  Böhm e ’s time.72 G elassen 2. 10.
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nature did arise [...] from the quintessence’.73 The dead world, sloughed off by 
Lucifer’s fall, was animated by this light which ‘broke through the darkness’, making 
‘the dead body of nature spring and flourish’. But the light is necessary for the 
darkness, for ‘life proceeds out of death, and death must therefore be a cause of life. 
Else were there no such poisonous, fierce, fervent source fire could not be generated, 
and there could be no essence [...]; hence there would be no light, and also no finding 
of life’.74 Further,
The inner world, the world of light, dwells in the external world, and the latter 
receives power from the former. She blooms in the external power, but this power 
knows nothing of it.75
The powers of eternity work through the powers of time, like the sun that shines 
through water, while the water does not apprehend the sun, but only receives the heat; 
or, like a fire, which glows in the iron, but the iron remains iron nevertheless.76
The spiritual world is hidden within the visible elementary world, and acts through the 
latter, and by means of the separator, or the soul of the outer world, it shapes itself in 
all things according to the character and quality of each thing; but the visible being 
receives the invisible one not in its own power, neither does the external thing become 
changed into the inner one, but the inner power merely takes shape therein, as we may 
see if we observe the growth of herbs, trees and metals.77
Creation is, therefore, the mixture of the light and the good, and the dark and the evil:
11 Myst. M ag  12. 15ff.74 Theos Punkt, 1. 68.75 Ibid., 6. 2.76 Myst. M ag., 12. 20.7 Contem plations, 3. 19. See also: ‘This terrestrial world is based upon the world o f  darkness, and if  
the good had not been also embodied therein, there would be in it no other doing than that o f  the world 
o f  darkness; but this is prevented by the divine power and the light o f  the sun’ {Theos. Punkt., 9. 17); 
‘We see that the earth has a great hunger and desire after the power and the light o f  the sun, and 
likewise the external being craves for the interior one. Thereby it receives the form o f  the latter as a 
light and power, without, however, being able to grasp the interior spirit itself; for the spirit does not 
dwell in the exterior, but has possession o f  its own se lf  in its own interior state’ {Theos. Punkt., 6. 9).
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it is a plane of struggle between these two dialectically opposed forces. As Bohme 
concludes, ‘The external world has been outbreathed from the holy and from the dark 
world. It is, therefore, evil and good, and in love and wrath; but, compared with the 
spiritual world, it is only like a smoke or a fog.78 Goodness is still present in the 
created world, but only implicitly. Bohme uses the following analogy of the 
constitution of a tree to illustrate this notion:
Behold a tree. Outwardly it has a hard and rough shell, appearing dead and encrusted; 
but the body of the tree has a living power, which breaks through the hard and diy 
bark and generates many young bodies, branches, and leaves, which, however, all are 
rooted in the body of the tree. Thus it is with the whole house of this world, wherein 
also the holy light of God appears to have died out, because it has withdrawn into its 
principle, and therefore it seems dead, although it still exists in God. But love ever and 
again breaks through this very house of death and generates holy and celestial 
branches in this great tree, and which root in the light.79
Nevertheless, Böhme argues, creation, just like this tree, will ultimately perish. The 
created world is not identical to God, but is only a created product, and, therefore, 
does not share in his eternity. ‘The external world is not God, and will not be God in 
all eternity. The world is merely a state of existence wherein God is manifesting 
himself.80
78 Myst. Mag., 3. 10.79 Aurora, 24. 7.80 Stief., 2 .3 1 6 .
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§ 1. 2. Hegel on Creation as Differentiation
Hegel makes a similar division between the two modes of creation as Bohme does, 
between the ex Deo emanation of the immanent other of God, resulting in the 
construction of a blueprint of the material world, and the ex nihilo creation of the 
actual world.81 Just as the eternal Son was posited in the immanent trinity as a 
necessary other for God’s coming to self-consciousness, the world is created as a 
necessary distinction for God’s coming to self-manifestation. As Hegel argues, 
‘Merely eternal, or abstract spirit, then, becomes an other to itself: it enters existence, 
and, in the first instance, enters immediate existence. It creates a world’.82 The 
difference between the two analogues is, therefore, between otherness considered 
implicitly and explicitly, between pure concept, existing only in thought and actual 
manifestation (Erscheinung), present in the world of appearance.
The specifics of the process of creation qua emanation are rendered by Hegel 
as ‘positing’ (Setzen), ‘division’ (Urteil), and ‘release’ (Entlassen);83 the sense of 
synonymy with the three moments of the Trinity being readily apparent. ‘Positing’ 
and ‘division’ carry the sense of being a formal declaration or a ‘verbal shaping’, and, 
on account of this, Hegel argues that creation is not primarily a physical act, but an
81 Stephen D. Crites, D ialectic and  G ospel in the D evelopm ent o f  H e g e l’s  Thinking  (Pennsylvania, P. 
A.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), p. 500.82 PhM , 769.83 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theolog\>, p. 142.
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intellectual one.84 They are identical with the Böhmean Verbum Fiat, the biblical ‘let 
there be’, the creative word which begins the process of creation. As Hegel argues, it 
is ‘the absolute judgement or primal division [Urteil] that grants independence to the 
side of other-being; it is goodness that grants the idea as a whole to [this] side in its 
estrangement’.85
The emanation of the other of the immanent trinity is but a passive ‘being for 
another’, lacking in actuality, as its existence is dependent upon the Father.86 This 
‘being for another’ is posited by Hegel in the same way as Böhme’s representation, as 
Lucifer, whom Hegel calls ‘the first-born Son of light’.87 Unlike Böhme’s conception, 
Hegel’s Lucifer, as with any attempt at personalisation of the divine, is but a 
caricature: he has no independent existence. Lucifer, Hegel argues, must not be 
thought of as an independent force, for to do so reduces man to a ‘self with no 
essential reality of his own and the mere ground which couples them [the forces of 
good and evil] together, and on which they exist and war with one another’.88 Lucifer, 
according to Hegel’s account, is, too, represented as the anticipation of Adam, as the 
immanent expectation of the economic.89 Hegel’s representation of Lucifer, like 
Böhme’s, is as a being who desires only to assert his contractive self-will against the
84 Ibid.85 LPR, m, p. 86.86 Crites, D ialectic and  Gospel, p. 501.87 PhM , 111. Lucifer is a Son in the same way that Adam and Christ w ill be considered to be. Each 
represents a necessary stage in the idea o f  sonship.8 Ibid., 773.89 So too, once Lucifer fell, ‘another was at once created [...]  in his place’, namely Christ. Ibid., 771.
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expansive divine. For Hegel, ‘self-centeredness’ is ‘characteristic of evil’,90 and ‘evil 
is nothing else than [...] self-concentration’.91
Nature is the negative because it is the negative of the idea. Jakob Bohme says that 
God’s first-born is Lucifer; and this son of light centred his imagination of himself and 
became evil: this is the moment of difference, of otherness held fast against the Son, 
who is otherness within the divine love.92
The treatment of Lucifer’s fall here echoes the Bohmean account, for in both there is 
Lucifer’s movement out of creation and into the realm of pure thought, becoming 
shut-up in himself and self-centred.93 This self-centredness is the defining 
characteristic of evil in both the Hegelian and Bohmean accounts. A difference, 
however, between the two treatments arises here, for in Hegel’s account it does not 
involve evil as the other of God, in the manner of some kind of Manichean dualism, 
but is an othering of the divine as a process.94
As already noted, Jakob Böhme described this transition to the moment of the Son as 
follows: the first and only-begotten was Lucifer, the light-bearer, brilliance, clarity, 
but he imagined himself within himself, i.e., he posited himselffor himself, advanced 
to being and thereby fell [...] This [first] other is not the Son but rather the external 
world, the finite world, which exists outside the truth.95
As with Böhme’s account, for Hegel Lucifer’s fall is representative of the end of the 
ex Deo, emanationist creative account, and the beginning oft the ex nihilo analogue,
90 PhM , 772.91 Ibid., 773.92 H eg e l’s P hilosophy o f  Nature, p. 19.93 Ibid., p. 468.94 O ’Regan, The H eterodox Hegel, p. 156.
95 L P R ,m , p. 119.
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the ‘making’ mode of the creative process. The Luciferian fall, for Hegel too, is a 
‘falling into time’ and space for spirit; creation in fact being fallen spirit itself.96 As 
with Böhme’s reading of the Genesis tôhû wâbôhû, the godless alien waste 
engendered by Lucifer’s fall, Hegel argues that nature itself has neither knowledge of 
God, nor any relationship to him, except through mankind. Mankind is that which in 
nature is its ‘dependent side’: it ‘recognises the presence of the divine’ in nature, and 
‘raises nature to its truth’.97 Therefore, like the implicit goodness nascent in nature 
according to Böhme’s scheme, Hegel’s divine ‘slumbers’ in nature, awaiting 
prelapsarian man to come to self-consciousness, so it may come to be actualised.98 It 
is the institution of the possibility for evil in the world. ‘The differentiation,’ Hegel 
argues, ‘which in the first [moment] of the idea was only a show [Schein], now comes 
into its own right’.99 The movement from show to manifestation, from infinity to 
finitude, is realised through the appearance of Adam (geschichtlich) as a concrete 
person.
It is no longer absolute but finite spirit that is posited; an inasmuch as what is 
differentiated is itself something internally differentiated into nature and finite spirit,
96 O’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, p. 153. This is also argued by Karl Daub, the Talleyrand o f  German 
thought, in his Judas Ischarioth, oder Betrachtungen iiber das G ute im Verhaltniss zum  Bosen, 2 vols 
(Heidelberg: [n. pub.], 1816-18), written during his Schelling period. Daub’s assent to this idea does 
not necessarily lend a great deal o f  credence to the argument, however, for as Otto Pfleiderer argued, 
Daub’s ‘hopeless addiction’ to the ‘perverse principle o f  speculative thought’ was ever untempered by 
any notion o f  historical criticism. See The D evelopm ent o f  Theology in G erm any Since Kant: and  its 
Progress in G reat Britain S ince 1825 (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 132. One may appreciate the 
irony, however, i f  such a criticism were to be applied to the present subjects o f  this thesis.97 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 146.98 LPR, m, p. 293-294 .9 Ibid., p. 365
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we have the creation of the world, the form in which the Son actually becomes the 
other.100
Hegel posits two divisions: the first being of the Son present in the immanent trinity; 
and the second being the Son present in the economic trinity, and thus in the world of 
creation.101 These two divisions are, as argued in the previous chapter, purely 
representational, for no such a division exists in any rational terms. As Hegel puts it, 
‘This differentiating as something independent is only the explicitly negative moment 
of other-being, of being-extemal-to-self, which as such has not truth but is only a 
moment [...] In God himself this is the disappearing moment of appearance’.102
The final stage of the tripartite nature of creation is a ‘release’, referring to a 
‘letting be’ ‘or letting go’ (Entlassen).103 Just as division is necessary for the positing 
of the other of God, that otherness must eventually be released or sublated. This has 
no deleterious effect upon God, for creation is only a moment, and each moment must 
inevitably disappear (for each moment is, by definition, eine verschwindende 
Erscheinung, ‘a disappearing appearance’).104 And so, God, as concept, becomes 
expanded by this experience. This is the very core of freedom, which is the essence of
10 Ibid. Cf. p. 294, n. 128.101 While the first Son, Lucifer, is annulled by the appearance o f  the second Son, Adam, both are 
ultimately sublated by the coming o f  the third Son, the historical Jesus Christ.102 LPR, m, p. 87-88.103 H egel’s use o f  ‘release’ to describe the letting go o f  the other o f  God is similar in sense to Eckhart’s 
use o f  lassen  and gelassen  to portray the attitude the Christian should have towards worldly goods and 
possessions. See Robert Froman, M eister Eckhart: The M ystic as Theologian  (Rockport, M. A.: 
Element, 1991), pp. 77-80; Oliver Davies, M eister Eckhartt: Selec ted  Writings (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1994), pp. x x ix -x x x i.  The same attitude is espoused by Bohme throughout The Way 
to Christ.104 LPR, m, 88-89.
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spirit: the radically free being, God, releases what is intrinsic to itself, for creation is 
no risk to the freedom of the absolutely free.105 Once creation is released, it becomes a 
moment without selfhood, for it is no longer contained in God, at least 
representationally. It is then the duty of religious consciousness to instantiate the 
element of self into creation, thus playing out the divine drama on the microcosmic 
level.
The phrase ‘the disappearing moment of appearance’ carries overtones of 
Bohme. Hegel considers the creation of the material world as but a blip on the divine 
radar of eternity, ‘it is only a flash o f lightning that immediately vanishes, the sound 
of a word that is perceived and vanishes in its outward existence the instant it is 
spoken’.106
S e c t i o n  t w o  
T h e  P s y c h o l o g y  o f  A d a m
It has been argued, by Christian commentators from the first to the eighteenth 
centuries, that Adam had an incredible understanding of the natural world.107 The
105 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 144.106 LPR, m, p. 88.107 Peter Harrison, ‘Original Sin and the Problem o f  Knowledge in Early M odem  Europe’, Journa l o f  
the H istory o f  Ideas, 2, 63 (2002), 239 -259  (p. 241). This assessment o f  the scope o f  Adam’s 
knowledge is based upon Genesis 2. 19-20, where it is stated that God ‘out o f  the ground [ .. .]  formed 
every animal o f  the field and bird o f  the air, and brought them to man to see what he would call them; 
and whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name. The man gave names to all cattle, 
and to the birds o f  the air, and to every animal o f  the field’.
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extent of what encompassed Adam’s body of knowledge was much contested,108 but 
one thing remained a constant, that the extent of Adam’s knowledge has yet to be 
surpassed. As the seventeenth century churchman Robert South argued, Adam,
came into the world a philosopher, which sufficiently appeared by his writing the 
nature of things upon their names: he could view essences in themselves, and read 
forms with the comment of the respective properties; he could see consequents yet 
dormant in their principles, and effects yet unborn in their causes; his understanding 
could almost pierce into future contingents, his conjectures improving even to 
prophecy, or the certainties of prediction; till his fall it was ignorant of nothing but of
How this supernatural natural knowledge functioned, whether it be the result of direct 
revelation from God,110 or through a greater acuity of Adam’s prelapsarian senses, 
was also subject to much debate. The most common view espoused by Christian 
orthodoxy, however, was that Adam’s mind, before the Fall, was working in perfect 
fashion, possessing ‘a perfect philosophy’, functioning in a manner in which its
108 See Martin Luther, ‘Lectures in Genesis’, in L uther's Works, ed. by Jaroslav Pelikan and H. 
Lehman, 55 vols (St Louis: 1955-19-75), I, p. 68, 120; John Calvin, Com m entary on Genesis, 2. 19, 
ed. and trans. by John King (Grand Rapids, Mich: 1948), p. 131; George Walker, H istory o f  the 
Creation  (London: 1641), p. 193; John Greene, The First M an, or A  Short D iscourse o f  A d a m ’s State  
(London: 1643), p. 1; N icholas Culpeper, Com plete H erbal (Ware: [n. pub.] 1653; repr. by 
Wordsworth Editions, 1995), vn.109 Robert South, Serm ons P reached  upon Several Occasions (Oxford: 1679), pp. 127—128.10 For example, there is the Thomas Morton’s comment on the matter that Adam’s knowledge was ‘not 
gotten by sense, experience, observation, and by his own industry (and yet it was afterward to be 
increased by this means) but engendered in his mind by the finger o f  God’. See Thomas Morton, A  
Treatise o f  the Threefold S ta te o f  M an  (London: [n. pub.], 1596), pp. 222 -223 . For other writers o f  the 
period o f  a similar position, see also Robert Bostocke, The D ifference Betw een The A uncient 
P hisicke ...and  the latter Phisicke  (London: [n. pub.], 1585), Sig. Giv; John Parkinson, ‘Epistle to the 
Reader’, in P aradisi in Sole  (London: [n. pub.], 1629), ; Ambroise Pare, The Workes o f  tha t Fam ous  
Chirurgion Am brose P arey  (London: [n. pub.], 1634), preface; Henry Cornelius Agrippa, O f the 
Vanitie and  Vncertainty o f  A rtes and  Sciences  (London: [n. pub.], 1569), Sigs. 4r, 186r.
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creator had originally designed.111 Seventeenth century theologian George Burches 
exhorted his readers to ‘look how that parts and faculties both of soul and body were 
ordered, and framed, and justified, and exercised in righteousness. So likewise the 
same parts and faculties, both of soul and body are confused, distempered, deformed, 
and perverted by iniquity and sin’.112 As Peter Harrison comments, when, postlapsus, 
Adam was no longer the master of nature, he was also no longer the master of his 
own mind.113 The Fall ‘was thus supposed to have wrought havoc with the internal 
harmony of the human being, resulting not merely in a moral fall, but in a fall from 
knowledge and the ability to discover truth. Original sin, in short, consisted in both a 
propensity for moral wrongdoing and an inability to recognise truth’.114
One of the many issues Protestantism and Catholicism found themselves 
opposed to each other were on the exact consequences of the Fall. For Catholic 
thinkers, the primarily focus of the Fall was the privation of Adam’s supernatural 
powers. Aquinas argued that man’s ‘natural gifts’, his capacity for reason, ‘remained 
after sin’, for ‘the light of natural reason [...] pertains to the species of the rational 
soul, is never forfeit from the soul’.115 Similarly, Descartes followed the Thomistic
11 Harrison, ‘Original Sin!, pp. 242, 244.12 George Burches, M ans Inbred  M alady  (London: [n. pub.], 1655), p. 17.13 Peter Harrison, ‘Reading the Passions: The Fall, the Passions, and Dominion over Nature’, in The 
Soft Underbelly o f  Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth C entury , ed. by Stephen Gaukroger 
(London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 49 -78 .14 Harrison, ‘Original Sin’, p. 243.1,5 Sum m a Theologiae, la  95. 1, Blackfriars edn., ed. by Thomas Gilby, 60 vols (London: Blackfriars, 
1964-1976). Harrison notes ( ‘Original Sin’, p. 245) that Catholic, especially Franciscan, theology  
returned to the Alexandrian Fathers in considering the notion o f  original sin as o f  little real ontological 
or epistemological consequence. See also Norman Pow ell Williams, Ideas o f  the F all and  o f  O riginal 
Sin: A  H istorical and  Critical S tudy  (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927), pp. 410-414 .
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scheme,116 in claiming that the faculty of reason remained intact postlapsus,117 and in 
defining the phenomenon of human error as ‘privations’, the ‘negation of a great 
perfection among created things’.118 The Catholic view is in sharp distinction to the 
Reformed view, which argues not only for the loss of Adam’s faculty of reason, but 
also of the image of God himself. Luther maintains that ‘It is clear that the natural 
endowments did not remain perfect, as the scholastics rave’,119 and that, where the 
image of God is concerned, it is ‘through sin [that] this image was so obscured and 
corrupted that we cannot even grasp it with our intellect’.120 Calvin states that ‘the 
sophists in the papacy feign that some part of the reason remains sound and entire 
[whereas] the whole soul is vitiated, from reason even to the affections’,121 and that, 
though the image of God was not ‘totally annihilated’, it was nevertheless ‘so 
corrupted that whatever remains is frightful deformity’.122 Both Luther and Calvin’s 
statements represent the majority of the Reformed view of the ‘negative 
epistemological consequences’ of the Fall of Man account.123 Further, beyond their
16 Roger A new  argues in an essay that Descartes would have been familiar with Aquinas’ thought on 
the epistemological consequences o f  the Fall from his education by the Jesuits at La Fleche. ‘Descartes 
and Scholasticism: The Intellectual Background to Descartes’ Thought’, in The Cam bridge C om panion  
to  Descartes, ed. by John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 58-90 .17 Descartes, M editations 3.5, CSM n, 35; O bjections and  Replies, 5.372, CSM n, 256; P rinciples o f  
Philosophy, §11, CSM I, 199.18 Descartes, Principles, 1, §31, CSM, 203-204 , 207; O bjections and  Replies, CSM n, 258, cf. n, 218.19 Luther, L uther's Work, I, p. 167, 142. Cf. Aquinas, Sum m a contra gentiles I. 7.120 Ibid., p. 65.121 Calvin, Com m entaries on Ezekiel, I, p. 375.12 Calvin, Institutes  l.xv .4  (I, 189). Later Calvinists even more strongly worded the implications o f  the 
Fall. Robert Burton writes o f  the ‘the sin our o f  our first parent Adam ’ as constituting the entire cause 
o f  the ‘destruction o f  God’s im age’. A natom y o f  M elanchony, 2 vols (London: Printed for J. Cuthell, 
1892), I, p. 122.123 Harrison, ‘Original Sin’, p. 249. The view  that Luther and Calvin’s analyses on the epistem ological 
implications o f  the Fall represent the majority opinion o f  Protestant orthodoxy, see Reynolds, Treatise
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reaction to Catholic epistemology, the Reformers rejected any speculative or extra- 
biblical interpretation of Adam. Gnostic and Hermetic notions that the prelapsarian 
Adam was an androgynous being found itself met with particularly scathing 
comments, and the very fact that such a view was postulated was used as further 
evidence of the degeneration of the faculty of reason post Fall. Luther spits that, 
‘These pagan ideas prove that reason is not able to establish anything with certainty 
concerning God and his works but only invents reasons against reasons and teaches 
nothing perfectly or soundly’.124
In their exploration of the psychology of Adam, the primarily theme which 
comes to the fore, for Hegel and Böhme, is the dichotomy between a series of 
dualising ‘oppositions’ (in Böhme’s language) or contradictions (in Hegel’s). As 
Hegel notes, in considering the Genesis story, one must first observe the ‘great 
contradictions’ contained therein.123 Hegel argues that this is due to the representative 
character of the narrative, that ‘images and mere representations cannot portray a deep 
speculative content in its true and proper form, and therefore essentially without 
contradiction’.126 These contradictions are listed variously as: the supernatural and the 
natural, immortality and mortality; the eternal world and the material world; lightness
o f  the Passions, p. 5, 44, 483; William Perkins, ‘An Exposition of the Creed’, in Workes (London: [n. 
pub.], 1605), pp. 181-182. See also Gisbert Voetius, ‘De errore & heresie’, I.iv, Il.i, in Selectarum  
disputationum  theologicarum, 4 vols (Ultrajecti: [n. pub.], 1648), m, p. 701, 714, 702.124 Luthers Werke, XLTT, p. 53. However, if the figure of Christ is interpreted as the ‘Second Adam’, 
Bohme’s portrayal of Adam himself as an androgynous being has distinct Pauline undertones. Cf. 
Galatians 3. 28; Colossians 3.11.125 LPR, m, p. 153.
126 Ibid., p. 154.
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and darkness; knowledge and ignorance; androgyny and sexuality; and submission 
and desire. Some of these oppositions presented in the psychology of Adam are 
particular to Hegel, some particular to Böhme, and some are shared by both. The 
meeting point between both, however, is in the overarching theme of such 
oppositions: in universality and versus particularity. Hegel and Böhme treat Adam as 
a being who, before the Fall, shared in the universality of God, and who, post Fall, 
lost this universality in favour of particularity. The discussion of Adam’s psychology 
will begin with the specific oppositions identified by both men, and work towards this 
common, shared centre.
§ 2. 1. Böhme ’s Reading: Man as a Mixture
Böhme writes, in a 1621 tract against one of his contemporaries, that ‘God created 
Adam to [enjoy] eternal life in paradise, in a state of paradisiacal perfection’.127 As 
the perfect image of God, Adam was created in a state of bodily immortality:
Before his fall, man could rule over the sun and the stars. Everything was in his power. 
Fire, air, water, and earth could not tame him; no fire burned him, no water drowned, 
no air suffocated him; all that lived stood in awe o f him.128
No heat, no cold, no sickness, no accident, nor any fear could touch or terrify him. His 
body could pass through earth and rocks without breaking anything in them; for a man
127 Stiefel 1. 36.128 T hreefo ld  11.23.
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who could be overpowered by the terrestrial nature, or who could be broken to pieces, 
would not be eternal.129
The similarity to the orthodox interpretation, however, ends here. Böhme eschews any 
further method of literal exegesis: the character of Adam in the Genesis narrative is 
treated, by Böhme, not as an historical figure, but as an archetypal one. Böhme 
subscribes to the Hermetic and cabbalistic notion that the Adam of the Fall account 
refers to Adam Kadmon (D1K limp), the ‘heavenly Adam’, primordial man, or the 
Urständ in his own terminology. Böhme also refers to Adam as the Füncklein and the 
glimmende Docht, the spark which is ignited briefly before it is snuffed out.130 Adam 
Khadmon is the ‘Aristotelian final cause [...] logically prior to the rest of creation, 
and simultaneously the end towards which creation is moving’, and not Adam Ha- 
Rishon, the historical Adam taken as a real earthly figure.131 This ‘heavenly Adam’ is 
treated by Böhme as a cosmic figure, a being superior to that of traditionally orthodox 
depictions. He is the master of all he surveys, he holds the keys to both heaven and 
earth, he is an innocent, with no knowledge of evil nor any evil vice.132
When God had created Adam thus, he was then in paradise [...] and this clarified man
129 Incarnation, I, 2. 13.
130 Busse, passim. Compare with Hegel’s comment that whatever appears must eventually disappear: it
is eine verschwindende Erscheinung (‘a disappearing appearance’). LPR, m, 88-89.
131 Magee, p. 230.
132 Incarnation, I, 4. 7; Myst. Mag., 16. 2; Dreyfach, 11. 23. Bohme’s characterisation, thus far, is 
scripturally based: Genesis portrays Adam as having the power to subdue (kabas/D2W) the earth and 
rule (raddn~!7] ) its creatures. Kabas is suggestive o f ‘rape’ (Esther 7. 8), ‘pillage’, or ‘subjugate’ in the 
sense of hostile action done to one’s enemies (Numbers 32. 22), while rada connotes a rule over the 
reluctant (Leviticus 26. 17; Ezekiel 34. 4). See McKeown, p. 27.
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was wholly beautiful and full of all knowledge;133 and there God brought all the beasts 
to him, that he should look upon them, and give every one its name, according to its 
essence [...] And Adam knew what every creature was, and he gave to every one its 
name, according to the quality of his spirit [...] And Adam [went about] wholly naked, 
as he then went; his clothing was the clarity of virtue; no heat nor cold touched him; 
he saw day and night with open eyes; in him there was no sleep, and in his mind there 
was no night, for the divine virtue was in his eyes; and he was altogether perfect.134
Böhme includes some supernatural elements to his characterisation of Adam’s 
constitution (such as his supposed ability to reproduce by imagination alone, to pass 
through matter, to endure without earthly sustenance, and warp reality through the use 
of magic words),135 but any further discussion of such will be neglected, as Hegel does 
the same. Where Böhme’s reading will be seen to be identical to Hegel’s is in its 
treatment of Adam as the divine in microcosm, both as the p.íKpoKÓopo<; and 
(iiKpoGéoq, the literal imago Dei. Adam is the true ‘the similitude of God’:136 
incorruptible, androgynous, and ‘[partaking] in the paradisiacal substantiality of the 
divine.’137 This psychological reading of Adam is partly Platonic, partly Gnostic, and 
partly Judaeo-Christian: an idea revivified by Paracelsus in the sixteenth century, and
133 A problematic viewpoint as, before the loss of primordial unity, it is posited that no evil existed.134 Princ., 10. 17-18.
135 Magee, p. 44. See Seel. Frag., 4. 7; D reyfach  11. 23; Incarnation, I, 2, 13; Sig. Rer. 12. 2. Though 
peculiar, these powers have some philosophical and theological justification. Adam’s use of magic 
words (or Ursprache Böhme ’s terminology) corresponds to Plato’s theory of language in the Cratylus, 
in  that the carpenter imposes the icepidq (or even the idUor| of the Republic, x) on the piece of wood 
on which he works. See Raphael Demos, The P hilosophy o f  P lato  (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1930), p. 263; Alfred E. Taylor, Plato, the M an and  H is W ork (New York: Dial Press, 1936). Of 
course, for Plato language describes the mere copies which sensible objects are said to be, while, for 
Böhme, the Adamic language was descriptive of the inner essence of things. In this way, Böhme is 
perhaps closer to the Pseudo-Dionysius than to Plato. Also, Böhme’s view conforms precisely to the 
orthodox Christian view point Adam did not reproduce for he was both an individual and species 
together (Stoudt, p. 266).136 Princ., 17. 11.
137 O’Regan, G nostic Apocalypse, pp. 44-45.
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appropriated by Böhme, then Hegel, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.138 
As Böhme puts it:
The image in Adam was not transitory, or corruptible. Also if we will say, that Adam 
(before his Fall) lived in the source [or property] of the four elements, then we can no 
way maintain, that Adam was not a corruptible image. For at the end, the four elements 
must pass away, and go into the eternal element.139
As the imago Dei, Adam was made in the likeness of God:140 when the ‘[the spirit of 
God] became inbreathed into the image of man, then was heaven in man; for God 
willed to reveal himself in man, as in an image created after his own likeness, and to 
manifest the great wonders of his eternal wisdom’.141
As the image of God, the structures and processes of Adam’s mind acted in 
accordance with one another: his thoughts and his will were as one, focused 
completely upon God.142 The mind of Adam ‘was innocent like that of a child, 
playing with the wonders of its father. There was in him no self-knowledge of evil 
will, no avarice, pride, envy, anger, but a pure enjoyment of love’.143 The state of 
Adam’s mind was, to a great extent, the product of his androgyny —  sexual 
differentiation being long associated (from Plato to de Lyra), not only with bodily 
mortality, but also with the disintegration of the mind. So too, Adam’s sexual 
undifferentiation is an idea which Böhme and Hegel find attractive.
Owing to Böhme’s own acceptance of this theory, the extent of Adam’s
138 See Myst. Mag., 2. 5.139 Princ., 17.3.
140 Genesis 1.27.
141 Stiefel, 1. 36.
142 Hartmann, Boehme, p. 151.
143 Threefold, 11.23.
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knowledge was that only of the universal: ‘the language of God and the angels, and 
the language of nature’.144 That is to say, Adam, as a divine androgyne, was capable 
of knowing only those things for which it was possible for him to know. The material 
world of particularity and differentiation was outside his provenance. To reiterate, 
Adam’s knowledge of these divine languages was in virtue of his being of the one 
substance with God: the soul of Adam, the angels, and God were, qua Adam as the 
imago Dei, identical. Böhme also includes the power of Adam to name the creatures 
of the earth, based upon, no doubt, a literal reading of the Genesis narrative. The 
Adam of the Genesis narrative is portrayed as the lord of nature who has ‘dominion 
over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over the 
wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth’.145 
Böhme concurs with the content of this depiction, agreeing that ‘everything was 
subject to Adam’, in virtue of the ‘divine power [being] manifested in him’.146 As 
such, this ability of Adam’s is explained by Böhme that, as Adam was the blueprint of 
creation, his essence was inside every creature, and so the Adamic power of giving 
each creature ‘its appropriate name’ was a simple recognition of this shared
147essence.
For Böhme, the most important details of Adam’s psychology lie in his
144 Jakob Böhme, ‘Answers to Forty Questions Concerning the Soul’ [hereafter Forty Questions], in 
Forty Questions and the Supersensual Life, trans. John Sparrow (London: n. pub., 1647. Reprint, 
Kessinger Publishing, 2005), 4. 7.
145 Genesis 1. 26.
146 Myst. Mag., 16. 2.
147 Princ., 10. 17. Note the relationship between Adam as the blueprint of creation, and Lucifer as the 
creator of the blueprint of creation.
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mirroring the principles (or ‘moments’ in Hegel’s revised terminology) of the Trinity. 
Where the first principle represented by the Father, whose nature is self-involution 
and is represented by the qualities of wrath, ‘fierceness’ or ‘wrathfulness’ 
(Grimmigkeit), and ‘sternness’ (Schwerigkeit) in Luther’s terminology. The second 
principle, which proceeds from the first principle, is the divine drive towards 
manifestation. It is the creative will of God, to reveal himself to beings other than 
himself. In the language of Luther, it is synonymous with ‘mercy’ (Barmhertzigkeit), 
and ‘love’ (Liebe). The third principle then, is the unity of the first and second 
principles. For Bohme, the third principle is synonymous with the terrestrial world. 
Adam, stands in the midst of these three principles; each one wanting to manifest 
itself fully through him.
Everything attracted Adam and wanted to take possession of him. The heart o f God 
wanted to have him in paradise and to reside in him, for it said, ‘He is my image and 
likeness’. The kingdom of wrath wanted him, for it said, ‘He is mine; for he has issued 
out o f my fountain, out of the eternal mind of the darkness. I will be in him, and he 
shall live in my power; I will manifest through him strong and great power’. Finally, 
the kingdom of the world likewise said, ‘He is mine for he bears my image; he lives in 
me and I in him; for he must be obedient to me, for I have all my members [organs] in 
him and he has his members in me, and I am greater than he. He shall be my steward, 
and manifest my power and wonders’.148
Böhme, speculating upon the Genesis narrative, argues that Adam, in his original 
created state, is the ‘embodiment’ {Leiblichkeit) of the first principle, the will to 
remain in a state of complete unity and identity with God. In the events leading to the
148 Ibid., 11. 33. The term ‘the heart of God’ is not to be mistaken for the ‘Son of God’. The former is 
the divine locus of reality, but it is not its Redeemer. See Aurora, 3. 36-39; Stoudt, p. 123, n. 24.
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Fall, however, Adam turns towards the second principle, the desire, in Hegelian 
terms, to move from universality to particularity, to differentiate himself from his 
creator.149 Ultimately, Adam becomes the embodiment of the third principle (the 
unity of the divine drives for self-involution and manifestation) displayed in a 
particular being.
While such a reading of Adam’s psychology may seem, on the face of it, 
entirely speculative, if not somewhat wild, Böhme’s commentary does bear some 
resemblance to orthodoxy. The frame of reference is, as one commentator puts it, 
dialectical, lying in ‘the simultaneous existence of radical opposites’.150 Luther’s 
treatment of man is as a being standing between the twin poles of redemption and 
sinfulness, justus et peccator, his life being one ‘in the midst of death’.151 Böhme’s 
treatment of man is as a being stood in an antagonistic relationship in the midst of the 
three principles; microcosm stood against macrocosm.152 Luther also makes time for 
this macrocosm-microcosm theory, noting that, where Adam is concerned, there ‘is 
such wisdom, justice, and knowledge of all things that he is rightly called
149 Adam is, in trinitarian terms, the first attempt at a creation of an economic second moment; a ground 
for the Groundless. There is some scriptural warrant for this notion, highlighted in the Genesis 
wordplay between the name ‘Adam’ (ädäm/Hl□) and the word for ground (ádámd/xmn). Although 
there is no etymological relationship between the two words, they are related to each other by 
assonance. Gordon J. Wenham, Word Biblical Commentary: Genesis 1—5, 59 volumes (Waco: Word, 
1987), I, p. 59. That is not to say, however, that their relationship is a speculative one, rather the 
assonance of words is an often used rhetorical device in the Old Testament to call attention to certain 
points of significance (e.g. Amos 8. 2; Jeremiah 1. 11-12). See McKeown, p. 31, n. 5.
150 Miller, ‘Luther and Boehme’, p. 270.
151 Luthers Werke, XLn, p. 147.
152 This idea of analogy was found in Babylon and India. Cf. Hermann Olderberg, Die Weltanschauung 
der Brahmantexte (Göttingen: [n. pub.], 1919); also, George Perrigo Conger, Theories o f  Microcosmos 
and Macrocosmos in the History o f  Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1923); Ernst 
Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (Berlin: Bruno 
Cassirer, 1911), pp. 200-244.
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(iiKpoKoaiioq, world in miniature. For he understands the heaven, earth, and the 
entire creation’.153 As will become clear, Hegel is also sympathetic to this idea: for 
him, Adam stands between the divine will to remain universal, and the divine push to 
exteriorise.
Although immortal, Adam is not ‘at home’ in the ‘elementary kingdom of the 
this world’, as it is composed of an entirely different substantial material than Adam 
himself. While Adam was fashioned from the ‘eternal element’, the divine substance, 
the world was crafted from the alchemical ‘four elements’.154 Böhme quotes various 
New Testament accounts to support this claim, such as: ‘My [Christ’s] kingdom is not 
of this world’; ‘[to his Apostles] I have called you out of this world’, and; ‘Flesh and 
blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God’.155 Böhme accounts for his idea again, with 
further references to scripture:
If he [Adam] had been merely of earth [i.e. creation], and of the four elements, then he 
might have been burnt in the fire, or drowned in the water, and be stifled in the air; 
also wood and stone could have bruised him and destroyed him, and yet it is written, 
that he [the Adamical Man] at the Day of Restitution shall pass through the fire, and 
be approved, and the fire shall not hurt him.156
The ‘eternal element’, from which Adam was created, was fashioned by God into a 
body composed of three shells or worlds: the outer shell, a ‘crystalline body made up 
by the stars and the four elements’; a middle layer, a ‘devilish and dark world’; and an
153Luthers Werke, XLn, p. 51.
154 Princ., 17. 5. The product, as stated, of Lucifer’s fall.
155 John 18. 36, 15. 19; I Corinthians 15. 50. Cf. Princ., 17. 2.
156 Princ., 17.4.
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inner layer, a ‘divine, regulating principle’.157 Where the ‘dark world’, representative 
of the first principle, pushed Adam towards prideful self-will, the divine ‘regulating 
principle’ (representative of the second principle, and personified by Böhme as a 
female entity, named alternatively ‘Sophia’, the ‘Venus matrix’, the ‘heavenly virgin’, 
and ‘Eve’) pushed Adam away from it.158 There was also a struggle for dominance 
within the soul of Adam between the divine eternal element and the worldly four 
elements, representative of the third principle.159 For Böhme, Adam was indeed ‘a 
mixed individuality [...] destined to be an image according to the inner, and also 
according to the outer world’.160 Here, Böhme is close, not only to the Gnostics who 
also describe man as a ‘mixture’ (cu|iJi:A,eKco) of the higher and lower, but also to the 
Neo-Platonists, who describe man too as a ‘mixture’ (pepiypevov) of the forms of 
matter and reason.161
157 Miller, p. 272. Cf. Myst. Mag., 10. 46, 16 5. See also Myst. Mag. 15. 18ff, where Bohme states that 
‘the soul [...] consists in three kingdoms: the first is [...] the dark and fire-world [...] The second is the 
holy light world [... ] The third [... ] is the outward astral and elemental kingdom’. Further, ‘Man should 
be the image and similitude of God, wherein God should dwell. Now God is a spirit, and all the three 
principles are in him; and he would make such an image, as should have all the three principles in him, 
and that is rightly a similitude of God’ (Princ., 10. 9). Nevertheless, Adam has only one soul, however 
many divisions it may have: ‘and if this were not, then it could not be said, that the soul went to heaven 
or to hell, if it were not in it [...] We are in no wise to think that the soul is God himself [...] But the 
soul is the f...] formed Word; it is the spirit and the lift of the three principles of divine manifestation’ 
(Myst. Mag., 15. 25).
158 Ibid Miller. Cf. Myst. Mag., 18. 2, 10; 19. 8.
159 Psychologically, therefore, man is the microcosm of the Trinity. ‘All things in this world are 
according to the similitude of this Trinity [...] Thus you fmd in man three fountains. First, the power in 
your whole mind, which signifies God the Father. Then secondly, the light in your whole mind, 
enlightening the whole mind, which signifies the Son. Then thirdly, there goes forth out of all your 
powers, and out of your light also, a Spirit which has understanding’. Aurora, 3. 82-90.
160 Incarnation, I, 3. 13.
161 See The Gospel o f  Thomas, ed. and trans. by A. Guillaumont, H. Ch. Puech, G. Quispel and others, 
(Leiden: Brill, 1959), logion 87; Plontinus, The Enneads,m, 2. 2.
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For the first man was a mixed formation and a mixed creation. And he was a 
formation o f those to the left, o f  those to the right, and o f  a pneumatic Logos, whose 
understanding was divided over each o f the two beings, from which the man in 
formation was taken. Therefore one says, that a paradise was planted for him, so that 
he should eat o f the food of the three types o f trees. He was a power o f order, which 
was united with the three types. It is he who gives enjoyment, i.e. the noble nature o f  
the chosen being, which is in him. It became more exalted. It created. And it was not 
accustomed to inflict wounds upon them. Therefore did they issue an order, while they 
made threats and brought him in great danger, which is an appeal to evil alone. He 
allowed him to eat thereof the other tree, which had a double, did not they allow [him] 
to eat, especially o f the Tree o f Life [...] abandoned them to that power, which is 
called the serpent [...] He misled man through the command o f those o f the thought 
and through the lusts. It (i.e. the lust) induced him to break the commandments, so that 
he should die. He was ejected from all the enjoyment that was there [...] It was the 
work o f providence (jtpovom), so that they should discover that there was but a short 
time, in which is the place o f rest. This he established when the Spirit first considered 
that man should receive this name, the greatest evil, which is death and ignorance [...] 
and should received the greatest good, which is everlasting life and which is true 
knowledge o f the All [...] Because o f the transgression o f the first man, has death 
become lord and entered into association with all men [Romans 5. 12].
In his state before his Fall, the relationship between the inner, eternal element and the 
outer, four elements within Adam’s soul was harmonious, ‘the pure element 
penetrated through the four elements and kept the Limus of earth —  that is to say, the 
external sulphuric [i.e. terrestrial] body within itself as in a state of absorption’.163 
The rationale for Adam’s need to maintain this harmony was that it, for want of a 
better word, ‘attuned’ the soul of Adam to that of God. In his prelapsarian state, 
Adam was psychologically identical with God, and, as Bohme writes, ‘when [Adam] 
remains in the harmonious order [...] he is then the likeness of God’.164
162 4th Treatise, 106. 18-108.163 Myst. M ag., 16. 6.
164 Theos. Punkt, 6. 12.
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§ 2. 2. Hegel ’s Treatment: Internal Differentiation
For Hegel, next to the concept of God, the ‘second element of importance is the Adam 
Kadmon, the first man, Kether [D m ], the first that arose, the highest crown, the 
microcosm, the macrocosm, with which the world that emanated stands in connection 
as the efflux of light’.165 Hegel’s thoughts on the heavenly Adam are based both on 
his reading of Bohme, and on August Neander’s work, Genetische Entwicklung der 
vornehmsten gnostichen System.I66 Adam Kadmon, for Hegel, is the primordial 
human being, but only in the ontological sense. For Hegel, the heavenly Adam is not 
a determinate being, rather he is ‘the idea of humanity’, mankind’s ‘universal 
essentiality’, and ‘the archetype of humanity’.167 He is the blueprint of what finite 
spirits will come to be:
The making or creation o f the world is God’s self-manifesting, self-revealing. In a 
further and later definition we will have this manifestation in the higher form that 
what God creates God himself is, that in general it does not have the determinateness 
o f an other, that God is manifestation o f  his own self, that God is for himself —  the 
other (which has the empty semblance o f [being] an other but is immediately 
reconciled), the Son o f God or human being according to the divine image, A dam  
K adm on ,168
To Bohme’s description of Adam as the piKpoKoapoq, Hegel adds that the term
165 LH P, n, p. 396.16 See August Neander, Genestische Entw icklung der vornehm sten gnostichen System  (Berlin: [n. 
pub.], 1818), esp. pp. 88ff., 102.161LPR , p. 129, 220, 430.168 Ib id , pp. 1 2 9 - 130.
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‘“the first man” signifies “man as man” —  not any particular, contingent individual, 
not one among many, but the absolutely first man, man according to his concept’.169 
For Hegel, Adam is not only the microcosm, but the macrocosm itself. Adam is oft 
called ‘the Son of God’, a religious title shared, of course, with Christ.
The rationale for Hegel’s description of Adam as the ‘universal man’ is that it 
acts as an explanation for how the changes Adam will undergo as a result of the Fall 
are passed down to succeeding generations. If Adam is taken, in Hegelian terms, as 
man as a totality, what is common to the whole is then common to the parts —  Adam 
is ‘as one of us’.170 In this way, Hegel escapes the Augustinian-Lutheran notion of the 
biological nature of sin, a ‘deficiency residing in the fact that man as such is 
perceived figuratively as a first man is corrected’.171
Adam, for Hegel too, is a mixed consciousness. He is ‘an internally 
unresolved contradiction’ between what he is, pre-lapsus, and what he will become 
(or, in fact, ought to be) post-lapsus: ‘Natural humanity does not exist in the form that 
it ought to’.172 In terms of the ordering of consciousness, Adam betrays only the 
capacity for sensuous experience, and not self-consciousness. Adam wills, and 
desires, but he does not think.173 ‘Thus the natural human being is not liberated within 
itself vis-à-vis itself and external nature. It is the human being of desire, of savagery
169 Ibid., p. 159.170 Ibid., p. 155.171 Ibid., p. 159.172 Ibid., 92 -5 .173 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 148.
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and self-seeking, of dependence and fear’.174 At this stage there is no distinction in 
thought between good and evil, and therefore, Hegel argues, it is at this stage that 
Adam is not ‘actually human’.175
To expand upon this aspect of Hegel’s Adam’s psychology, Adam is 
considered to be a mixed consciousness in respect of the following: in the ‘ordering 
of consciousness’ (Gestalt des Bewusstseins), Adam has only ‘sensuous 
consciousness’ (die sinnliche Bewusstheit). Adam is in a state of Sichselbstgleichheit, 
‘harmonious unity’ or a state of being ‘at one with him self.176 Adam is called an 
innocent, for he is ‘not yet spirit for itself; he does not show forth his inner necessity, 
and as he is not yet as spirit, he may be ‘called innocent’, but he is ‘not strictly 
good’.177 Adam may be happy, but he is not good, for goodness requires the condition 
of selfhood.178 But the state of ‘harmonious unity’ is not what it first appears, for 
Adam is although explicitly innocent, good, and unthinking, he carries self- 
consciousness, evil, and thought implicitly. ‘For spirit ought not to be implicitly spirit 
— it is spirit because it is so explicitly’.179 Evil and self-consciousness are inexorably 
linked, for ‘it pertains to evil to be able to decide, to will, to possess insight into the 
nature of actions’.
174 LPR, ffl, 92 -95 .175 Hodgson, H egel and  Christian Theology, p. 148. See LPR, III, 102—103176 PhM , 771; PhS, 468. Miller has the superior translation from the German o f  this state.17 PhM , 770. Within the Genesis narrative there is a contrast between Adam’s innocence and the 
serpent’s ‘prudence’. The Hebrew words for ‘nakedness’ and ‘prudence’ are similar in pronunciation, 
and, as such, this wordplay in the text highlights the dialectical relationship between the two. 
McKeown, p. 25. See also Gordon J. Wenham, G enesis 1 -15. WBC (Waco: Word, 1987), p. 72.178 Crites, D ialectic and  Gospel, p. 501.179 LPR, ffl, 202-205 , 295-300 .
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Hegel’s Adam then is caught between the twin poles of universality and 
particularity: the decision as to whether to remain in a unified, universal state with 
God, or descend in to the material world, the world of particularity. Adam inevitably 
chooses the latter, but the means by which he does this will be discussed in the next 
chapter. For the moment it is worthwhile stating that, for both Bohme and Hegel, 
Adam’s soul, like Lucifer’s, carried within it the possibility of a fall from grace, if 
ever the harmony between the ‘principles’ or ‘moments’ should be disturbed.
S e c t i o n  T h r e e  
S p e c u l a t i v e  R e a d i n g s  o f  t h e  F a l l  o f  M a n  A c c o u n t
For Christian orthodoxy, much has been made historically of the Fall of Man account 
of Genesis 3. Paul Tillich refers to this Genesis narrative of the as ‘a decisive part of 
the Christian tradition’,180 while Henri Blocher declares that, ‘It is obvious that the 
Eden story is no peripheral anecdote or marginal addition; it belongs decisively to the 
structure of Genesis and to that of the Torah. It has a major etiological intention’.181 
In the early church, the disobedience of Adam and Eve was considered one of mere 
‘deviation’ or ‘transgression’ from God’s ordained plan, and it was not until the time 
of Augustine that ‘the so-called classic view’ of the Fall and its consequences
180 Paul Tillich, System atic Theology, 3 vols (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1951-1963), n, p. 
29.181 Henri Blocher, O riginal Sin: Illum inating the R iddle  (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), p.
32.
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received wide-scale theological appeal.182
What can be said to the strongest return to the Augustinian spirit as the result 
of the Reformation was through the re-emergence of this doctrine of original sin and 
its pervasive and severe natural and epistemological effects.183 The Reformers view of 
the degeneration of man and the corruption of the natural world, they argued, is 
attested to scripturally, both in the Old Testament and the New.184 The author of 
Genesis, for instance, describes God’s curse upon the world in which man inhabits:
And to the man he said, ‘Because you have listened to the voice of your wife and have 
eaten of the tree about which I commanded you, “You shall not eat of it,” cursed is the 
ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and 
thistles it shall bring forth for you; and you shall eat the plants of the field.185
Similarly, Paul writes that ‘the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will
182 M. D. Gow, ‘Fall’, D O TP, 285-291  (pp. 285, 291). This was also H egel’s view, that the notion o f  
original sin was, for example, never part o f  the Jewish world-view or in its consciousness as a religion. 
LPR, ID, p. 155.183 Harrison, ‘Original Sin’, p. 243. See also Luthers Work, I, p. 166; John Calvin, Com m entary on 
Jonah, 1. 5., trans. by John Owen (Grand Rapids, M. I.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1950), pp. 37, 38; 
Com m entaries on E zekiel, trans. by Thomas Myers, 2 vols (Grand Rapids, M. I..: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 
1948), II, pp. 5-44; Institu tes o f  the Christian Religion, II. ii. 2. ed. by John M cNeill, 2 vols 
(Philadelphia: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1960), I, pp. 270-271 . The return is to Augustinian, and not, 
necessarily, to Augustine himself, for Augustine comments that, ‘Nothing is so easy to denounce, 
nothing is so difficult to understand’. Quoted in Blocher, O riginal Sin, p. 15. Nevertheless, Augustine’s 
viewpoint is essentially that o f  Paul’s in his letter to the Romans, and, as such, he does argue that sin 
and death are propagated (propagatio ) by Adam to succeeding generations. See Mark Reasoner, 
Rom ans in F ull Circle: A H istory o f  Interpretation  (Westminster: John Knox, 2005), pp. 46—47.184 The argument from the Reformers is based on readings speculative readings o f  passages in Hosea, 
Ezekiel, Psalms, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and, in particular, Isaiah. Blocher comments that, ‘when 
we turn to Isaiah, with its thematic context o f  creation and its “Paradise regained” atmosphere (cf. 11. 
5ff), the promise that the serpent shall eat dust (65. 25) distinctly recalls the verdict o f  Genesis 3. 14. 
Implicitly, all the evils that shall at last be forgotten in the newly created Jerusalem (65. 16ff) are traced 
back to the original serpent’s manoeuvre, for which he was sentenced to dust’. Blocher, O riginal S in , 
p. 44. It must be said, however, that references to the Genesis account o f  the Fall in the succeeding 
books o f  the Old Testament are mere allusions, if  even that, and not direct references.185 Genesis 3. 17-18.
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but by the will of the one who subjected it [...] creation [is in] bondage to decay [...] 
[and] groaning.’186
This returning spirit of moral and epistemological catastrophe was not 
restricted to the Reformation, however, but was also strongly felt among primarily 
French, Catholic counter-reformation theologians of the period, particularly due to 
Montaigne’s sceptical essays and the emerging prominence of Jansenism.187 
Additionally, due to the new appreciation for humanism and biblicism that the 
Renaissance and Reformation brought about, the Fall was not read as an allegory, but 
an historical truth.188 In this way, the Fall and the consequences it entailed was not 
seen as the domain only of theological speculation, but also for metaphysics, 
epistemology, moral philosophy and psychology.189
The epistemological consequences of the Fall remain for modem man, argued 
the Reformers, even if  he be saved. Luther’s maxim of simul iustus ac pecator 
(simultaneously justified and a sinner) expresses this idea.190 Against the Catholic 
Aristotelianism, the Fall for the Reformers led to both sensory and intellectual 
distortion. Sixteenth century French philosopher Pierre Charron writes in De La 
Sagesse (1601) that the mind ‘corrupted and seized on by the force of the passions (or
186 Romans 8. 20 -22187 See Michel de Montaigne, The Com plete Essays, ed. and trans. by M. A. Screech (London: Penguin
Classics, 1993); Jean Pierre Chantin, Le Jansénism e  (Paris: Cerf, 1996).18 Harrison, ‘Original Sin’, p. 243. See Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism , and  the R ise o f  
N atural Science  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 121-129 , 205-211 .189 Harrison, ‘Original Sin’, p. 243. See Marguerite Shuster’s comment to this effect, that ‘the 
contemporary predilection for many [ ...]  to give short shrift to the Fall’. The F a ll and  Sin: W hat We 
H ave Becom e as Sinners (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2004), p. 4.190 Ib id , p. 257.
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rather by the fall of our first father Adam) does likewise perhaps corrupt the 
understanding, and so from hence come the great part of our erroneous 
judgements’.191 Bacon declared that ‘the human intellect left to its own course is not 
to be trusted’.192 Similarly, the Baconian Thomas Browne declares in the 
Pseudodoxia Epidemica (1646) that ‘the first and father cause of common error is the 
common infirmity of human nature’.193 This crypto-Platonic notion that the Fall, and 
its consequence of original sin, should be considered solely as a darkening of the 
senses has no truck with Protestant orthodoxy. Luther declares that,
When the sophists speak of original sin, they are speaking only of wretched and 
abominable lust or concupiscence. But original sin is truly a total fall of human nature; 
because the intellect is darkened, we do not acknowledge God and his will and do not 
perceive his works. In addition, because the will is extraordinarily depraved, we do not 
trust in the mercy of God and do not fear him but unconcerned and disregarding the 
Word and will of God, we follow the desire and impulses of the flesh; similarly, our 
conscience is no longer quiet but thinks of God’s judgement, despairs, and adopts 
illicit defences and remedies.194
Against rationalism and empiricism, conflicting notions of personal piety and ardent 
study were frequently posited as solutions in overcoming the epistemological 
consequences of the Fall.195 These proposed solutions were not argued as conflicting
191 Pierre Charron, O f Wisdom, in Three Books, trans. by S. Lennard (London: 1606), pp. 63 -64 .192 Francis Bacon, The Works o f  Francis B acon , ed. by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and 
Douglas Denon Heath, 14 vols (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1857-1874), rv, p. 17.193 Thomas Browne, Pseudodoxia  Epidemica, I.i, ed. by Robin Robbins, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1981), I, p. 5. See Bacon’s comment that it is the responsibility o f  scientific enquiry to 
‘discharge [knowledge] o f  that venom which the serpent infused into it [which] makes the mind o f  man 
to sw ell’ so that we will be led to the cultivation o f  ‘truth and charity’ and ‘the true end and termination 
o f  error’. Works, IV, pp. 20, 21.194 W A 42: 8 6 (1 8 -2 5 )195 Harrison, ‘Original Sin’, p. 251. See Lauren K assell’s comment that ‘Study, along with prayer, were
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epistemologies, rather were representative of ‘different moral or spiritual 
prescriptions for a universal mental malady’.196 Glanvill wrote against 
Aristotelianism, declaring it as being ‘built upon the unexamined prejudices of 
sense’,197 and pronouncing it as of the ‘shallow, unimproved intellects that are the 
confident pretenders to certainty’, who were the ‘voluminous schoolmen, and 
peripatetical dictators’.198 Descartes argued, where the recovery of the imago Dei is 
concerned, that ‘man cannot achieve knowledge of natural things so long as he does 
not know God’.199 Malebranche argued that, ‘The mind becomes purer, more 
luminous, stronger, and of greater scope as its union with God increases, because this 
union constitutes its entire perfection’.200 Agrippa was of the opinion that the 
acquisition once again of true knowledge required,
not much labour [...] but faith and prayer: not the study of long time [sic], but 
humbleness of spirit and cleanness of heart: not the sumptuous furniture of many 
books, but a pure understanding [...] It is better therefore and more profitable to be 
idiots, and know nothing [than] being lofty and proud through the subtleties of science 
to fall into the possession of the serpent.201
In a similar vein, Paracelsian Robert Bostocke declared,
essential activities for anyone who wished to conduct alchemical experiments’. ‘Reading for the 
Philosopher’s Stone’, in B ooks and  the Sciences in H istory, ed. by Marina Frasca-Spada and N ick  
Jardine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), pp. 132-150  (p. 133).196 Harrison, ‘Original Sin’, p. 252.197 Glanvill, Vanity o f  D ogm atizing, p. 73.198 Ibid., pp. 14-15.19 Descartes, R eply to O bjections, v i, CSM II, 290. Descartes mystical assertion here is even more 
strongly argued for by later Cartesians, such as Pierre Poiret. See Thomas M. Lennon, ‘The Cartesian 
Dialectic o f  Creation’, in The C am bridge H istory o f  Seventeenth-C entury Philosophy, ed. by Daniel 
Garber and Michael Ayers, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), I, pp. 331-362 .20 Malebranche, Search A fter Truth, xxxvn.201 Agrippa, Vanitie and  Vncertainty, Sig. 187v, 182v.
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The ethnics or heathen have of their own brains de-used [sic] [their capacity for 
reason] is not founded upon the rule of God’s Word, but upon the authorities of men 
reprobate of God, and such as were idolaters and ignorant of the truth [...] These 
heathen philistines must needs err and stray, not receiving the key of wisdom, which is 
the science of God himself, who gives wisdom to the wise.202
Augustinian Jean-Framjois Senault argued for a complete disengagement with nature: 
‘Thus all the verses teach us that all the creatures are corrupted, that it is better to pass 
by them, than to make use of them, that it is safer to condemn them, then to employ 
them, and that if philosophy teaches us to use of them, religion counsels us their 
privation’.203
In Böhme’s reading, the Fall of Man account is seen as two-fold: the first 
stage taking place in the break-up of androgyny heralded by Adam’s dream, and the 
second stage in the actual eating of the fruit of the ‘Tree of the Knowledge of Good 
and Evil’. Where the angel Lucifer’s expulsion from heaven by God served as the 
anticipation of Adam’s fall in idea, the break-down into sexual differentiation serves 
as a pre-history or portent of the Fall in actuality. While the Fall of Man is anticipated 
by Lucifer’s angelic fall, it is, nevertheless, not a perfect mimesis of such. Lucifer’s 
fall was the result his of attraction to the first principle, the eternal godhead itself, and 
his wish to usurp the place of God. Adam’s fall was constituted, as will be shown, by
202 Robert Bostocke, A uncien t Phisicke, Sigs. B l v—B 2r.203 Jean-Fran^ois Senault, M an Becom  Guilty, Or the Corruption o f  N ature by Sinne, according to  St. 
A u g u stin e’s Sense  (London: [n. pub.] 1650), pp. 365—366.
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his desire ‘to taste good and evil as the vanity of the earth’,204 an attraction to the third 
principle. In Hegelian terms, Adam’s fall was anticipated by his desire to move away 
from the universal and towards the world of the particular.
§ 3. 1. Böhme ’s Reading: The Implicit and Explicit Fall
If Adam was created from an incorruptible, divine substance, the question arises what 
exactly are the conditions of possibility for his descent into mundane existence, into 
mortality. The answer given by Böhme is that the eternal element from which Adam 
was created is ‘without understanding’,205 that it has no end or purpose within itself, 
but is malleable, capable of being oriented towards the moral poles of good and evil 
(towards the first or the second principle). While God contains his telos within 
himself, Adam does not per se: the imago Dei ‘is not the heart of God, but it reaches 
into the heart of God’.206 As such, the Fall of Adam is seen by Böhme primarily as an 
act caused by the imagination. The imagination (or ‘lust’ according to one of his 
English translators) is rendered by Böhme as a means by which man orients his 
consciousness towards the poles of either the first or second principle, the divine will 
towards self-contraction and self-expansion respectively.207 Imagination is a force
204 Myst. M ag., 18 .31 .205 Princ., 17. 7.206 Ibid., 17. 13.207 Aurora, p. 23.
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which is ‘able to create actual images (from the divine substance) and to give [...] a 
consciousness to those forms.’208 Imagination not only impresses itself as the form of 
a substance, but also is the substance itself.209 In Adam’s case, it is oriented towards 
the prideful self-will of the first principle, forsaking the will to exteriorise, and to 
become solely in-himself {an sich). The motivating factor for the orientation of 
Adam’s imagination towards the first principle is what Böhme terms the ‘spirit of the 
world’, the personification of the third principle, the created world of the four 
elements.210
But when the wisdom of God saw that man, from the spirit of the world, came to [this 
orientation of the imagination], to mingle himself with the four elements, then came 
the commandment and said; Thou shalt not eat o f the Knowledge of Good and Evil.211
Adam’s imagination or lust, equivalent to the Gnostic conception of the same (called 
emG'Dpia, ev0'6|j.r|oi<;, or 7td0oq) enjoined by the spirit of the world, lead him to 
desire to gain the knowledge of the ‘spirits of nature’. Adam broke the happy 
‘equilibrium’ between imagination and desire, causing lust to become the veritable
208 ‘Great Theosophists’, Theosophy , 5, 26 (1938), 197-204. The ‘divine substance’ here is actually 
aether, which has its parallels with H egel’s early, albeit discarded, work. Cf. Magee. The particular 
usage o f  ‘imagination’ is recollected by Böhme from Paracelsus. This imagination is a ‘imaginatio  
activa’ rather than the faculty o f  abstraction and the power over the unreal, the ‘maîtresse d ’erreur et 
de fa u sse té ’. In the Paracelsian and Böhmean sense it gives one access to, and the power o f  impression 
upon, the gera^b, the péaoK oapoç, or the im undus im aginalis’. Cf. Faivre, Western Esotericism , p. 
76, n. 44. Hegel, also, speaks o f  the imagination: as P hantasie  (fantasy or fanciful imagination) and as 
E inbildung  (imagination), a term closer to Böhm e’s notion.209 There are parallels between this idea and that o f  Hebrews 11. 1: ‘N ow  faith is the substance o f  
things hoped for, the evidence o f  things not seen’.210 Princ., 17. 10-15.21 Ibid., 17. 16.
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Hegelian Begierde, ‘an infinite, negative, insatiable striving’.212 This destruction of 
Adam’s psychological harmony signifies the destruction of the pre-existing unity with 
God, and the shame felt in his new loss of innocence.213 The destruction of this 
harmony is read by Böhme in an additional pre-history which prefigures and portends 
Adam’s fall: the dream of the loss of a rib and the subsequent appearance of Eve.214 
The soul of Adam ‘fell in love with the creation of the formed world in its 
differentiation, and not being conscious of the power of distinguishing, she [the soul] 
entered into lust, into differentiation’.215 This desire to experience differentiation led 
to a clouding of the divine image Adam previously enjoyed. Adam, therefore, was 
drawn down into the world of differentiation, the terrestrial world of the four 
elements, and into sleep. Before this pulling down in to the terrestrial world, Adam 
had no need to sleep, as Böhme explains,
Now to an understanding man it is very easy to be found and known, that there neither 
was, nor should be any sleep in Adam, when he was in the image of God. For Adam 
was such an image as we shall be at the Resurrection of the dead, where we shall have 
no need of the elements, nor of the sun, nor stars, also [of] no sleep, but our eyes shall 
be always open eternally, beholding the glory of God.216
212 Magee, p. 45. Desire itself is somewhat o f  an ambiguous term. Hyppolite suggests that desire is the 
psychological end o f  self-consciousness, ‘the end point o f  desire is not, as one might think 
superficially, the sensuous object —  that is only a means—  but the unity o f  the I with it s e lf.212 Crito 
argues that the telos has already been achieved with the immediate satiation o f  desire. Further, self- 
consciousness is already present in desire. Jean Hyppolite, G enesis and  Structure o f  H e g e l’s 
P henom enology o f  Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1974), p. 160.213 Genesis 3. 7.214 Ibid., 2 .2 1 -2 2 .215 Grace, 6. 33.216 Princ., 12. 17.
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Adam’s falling asleep signifies ‘death’ and ‘surrender’ for Böhme, and is identified 
with various biblical instances of a similar variety, such as the temptation of Israel at 
Mount Sinai by Moses, Christ’s forty days in the desert, and his rest in the tomb, as 
each instance involves a transition from one state to another.217 For Israel, their giving 
in to the temptation of pagan gods caused them to enter a period of dormancy as a 
nation, a forty year trek in the wilderness. Where the figure of Christ is concerned, his 
‘sleep’ and subsequent resurrection from the dead is read as the transition from an 
earthly to a transfigured body. For Adam, his sleep is the loss of his previous 
‘angelical form’ and emergence as a mere elemental ‘lump of earth’.218 In Böhme’s 
terminology, it is the severance of the matrix from the limbus119, the severance of the 
source of Adam’s being from the positive pole of the imagination which it had 
previously pointed towards. This idea is identical to the Gnostic notion of 
‘forgetfulness’ (X,f|9r|, which Till translates as 'Erkenntnisunfähigkeif ), the ‘inability 
of knowledge’ the demiurge ‘inflicted [...] on Adam’. In one Gnostic narrative, the 
archons ‘discussed with each other and said “Come and let us bring forgetfulness over 
Adam!” And he fell, asleep. But forgetfulness is the ignorance, which they brought 
upon Adam and he fell asleep’.220 This transformation is engendered, Böhme states, 
by the ‘spirit of the world’ which God permitted to coerce him into sleep so the
217 Ib id , 17. 26, 29. However, Adam’s falling asleep is interpreted in orthodox spheres as an assurance 
that Adam is not directly responsible for Eve’s existence, i.e. that Eve was not created from Adam by 
his own power, rather that her appearance was due to God’s intervention. See McKeown, p. 34.218 Ibid., 17 .31.219 Ibid., 17. 58.20 ‘Das W esen der Archonten’, Theol. Literaturzeitung, 83 (1958), columns 661-670 , 137. 3 (Zandee 
trans., p. 36).
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operation could take place. The result of which was that, when Adam awoke ‘he had 
flesh and blood; and he was (in his flesh) a lump of earth, and he saw from a three­
fold spirit. With his eyes he apprehended the light of the sun, and knew the first 
image no more’.221 In short, Adam ‘fell asleep in the angelic world, and awoke 
relatively to the terrestrial world’.222
The result of Adam’s dream is, naturally, the break-up of his androgyny and 
the resulting appearance of Eve. For Böhme, while Adam was crafted from God’s 
eternal essence, Eve was constructed as a mere facsimile of Adam. What is worse, she 
is a copy of Adam in his sleeping state, when he is first cast down in to the corruptible 
elemental world —  as such, she is ‘infected with the four elements’.223
None can say, that Eve was a pure and chaste virgin before the contact of Adam; for as 
soon as Adam awakened from sleep, he saw her standing by him, and presently set his 
imagination upon her, and took her to him and said, ‘this is flesh of my flesh, and bone 
of my bone; she shall be called “woman”, because she is taken from man’. And she 
(Eve) instantly set her imagination upon Adam, and so both were mutually kindled 
with the desire of each other. Where is now the pure chastity and modesty? Is it not 
bestial? Is not the outward image become a beast?224
On account of this, Eve becomes an easy target for further corruption, as evidenced in 
the Genesis narrative that she was the instigator of Adam’s final fall from grace. 
Böhme comments:
[Eve] suffered herself very easily to be persuaded, when the lying spirit said, that the
21 Princ., 17 .31 .22 Myst. M ag., 19 .4 .23 Princ., 17. 32.24 Forty Questions, 36. 8 -10 .
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fruit would make her wise, and that her eyes should be opened, and she be as God, 
knowing good and evil; yet he told her not, that (if she eat thereof) she must die; but 
[he said] she should be wise and fair; which disease [desire or lust] sticks still in the 
brains of the woman, that she would fain be the fairest beast.225
Adam’s fall from the beatific vision was not complete until after Eve’s appearance — 
he still yet had ‘pure eyes, for the fierceness (of Grimmigkeit) did not yet stick in 
them’, corruption had not ‘pressed him wholly’.226 The consequence of Adam’s 
dream and the appearance of Eve as a result allowed for the possibility of the final 
fall. When Eve, pressed upon by her imagination, ate of the Tree of Knowledge, 
thinking ‘it would be a good thing to be a goddess’, and did not die, Adam did the 
same.227 It was at that moment, Böhme declares, that the ‘spirit of the world’ ‘took 
them captive with the four elements’ and made them mortal.228 The transition from 
‘Jerusalem to Jericho’ as it were, from paradise into iniquity, was complete. Adam 
was no longer able to partake in his former ‘paradisiacal substantiality’ as the 
embodiment of the third principle: he has lost the beatific vision.
The earth is not eternal, and for the sake of the fragility [or corruptibility,] therefore 
man’s body must break [or perish] because he has attracted the corruptibility to him. Thus
25 Princ., 17 .32 .26 Princ., 17. 56.27 Myst. M ag., 20. 25. For Gnosticism, the Tree o f  life is the ‘opposite o f  the Holy Spirit’ (av-uipigov 
Jtveupa), which attracts man to evil action. ‘Apocryphon o f  John’, in D ie drei Versionen des 
Apokryphon des Johannes im K optischen M useum  zu  Alt-Kairo, ed. by M. Krause and Pahor Labib 
(Wiesbaden: Deutschen Archäologischen Institutes, 1960), 56. 14. ‘Its branches are the shadows o f  
death’. Apocryphon o f  John, 56. 19.28 Princ., 17. 58. For Gnosticism, the consequences o f  sin for humanity is that ‘they came to the visible 
elements’ {4th Treatise, 109. 21), ‘they encountered those powers which had their origin in self-conceit 
and empty thoughts’ (ibid., 109. 26) , and ‘they were in contact with error’ (ibid,. 110. 1). ‘For that 
reason there was no one who was in agreement with his neighbour over anything, philosophy, 
medicine, rhetoric, music, [and] ‘technology’ (ibid., 110. 11).
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also the paradiscial knowledge, delight, and joy is departed from him, and he is fallen into 
the kindled anger, of the kindled four elements.229
Böhme’s reading of the appearance of Eve, however, is not an entirely misogynistic 
one. Firstly, Eve’s creation is not dispensed with as due to being made from Adam’s 
slough, his rib. Against the reasoning that Eve ‘should be far inferior to Adam’, 
Böhme writes that God, ‘took from Adam of all essences and properties of every 
virtue [...] therefore Eve was for certain created out of all Adam’s essences’.230 
Further, that she was fashioned from Adam’s rib did not make her in any way 
deformed, but ‘altogether lovely’.231 Eve is also read as a necessary and redeeming 
figure in Adam’s tragedy, for although she was the one who ‘set the sin on work, and 
did eat of the false, evil, or corrupt fruit’, if Eve had not, and Adam was the first to 
transgress God’s command, ‘it would have been far worse than it is’.232 
Consequently, another striking similarity with Hegel’s treatment is present: Böhme 
reads the Fall account as a necessary event. The paradisiacal harmony man has 
previously enjoyed with God is an ‘unthinking, unreflective, and thus inferior unity’, 
as such the break-up of this unity is necessary, allowing for a return (Rückkehr) to ‘a 
higher state of unity, in fu ll consciousness of his nature and the nature of God’.233
For Böhme, the idea that there was an intention behind the Fall, that it was not 
just simply the felix culpa of traditional orthodoxy, lies in his reading of the Garden
29 Ibid., 17 .23 .230 Ibid., 13. 18-19.231 Ibid., 13. 36.232 Aurora, 17. 26.23 Magee, p. 45.
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of Eden itself. Böhme points out that the events leading up to the Fall take place in a 
specific location in creation: the Garden of Eden, planted ‘in the East’, with a river 
flowing in to and out of it, then separating in to four named branches.234 Böhme goes 
on to explain that,
The whole world would have been all paradise if it had not been corrupted by Lucifer. 
But as God knew that Adam was going to fall, it bloomed out in only one place, 
wherein man might find a suitable dwelling-place, and be fortified therein.235
God saw and knew that man was going to fall, and therefore the Paradise did not 
bloom and bear fruits in the whole of the world by means of the earth, although it was 
manifest everywhere, but only in the Garden of Eden, wherein Adam was tempted, did 
it become revealed in its full magnificence.236
For Bohme then, the creation of the Garden, set apart from the rest of the world, 
constitutes God’s intention for the events leading up to the Fall, the ‘great battle 
taking place in man’ to unfold.237 Adam could not enjoy being the similitude of God, 
the imago Dei, because he did not in fact realise he was. Adam, in Hegelian terms, 
lacked self-consciousness, the power of reflection. For Hegel, Adam’s transgression 
of the divine command entailed an ascent of his consciousness, transcending his own 
supposed limitations.238 This knowledge of his own freedom, caused ostensibly by the
234 Genesis 2. 8 -14.235 Myst. M ag., 17. 7.236 Epistles, 39. 28.237 / / Apol. Tilke., 1 .381 .238 Compare this notion with the following passages from a Gnostic text: ‘The Logos brought forth the 
form o f  man in a state o f  deficiency. He [i.e. man] was sick, and he [i.e. the Logos] had made it (i.e. the 
form o f  man) unable to know and in a state o f  ignorance’ (4‘ Treatise, 105. 11-13); ‘The Logos had 
produced the first form [o f man] through the demiurge in ignorance [i.e. the lifeless body], so that he
(man) should receive knowledge that there is an exalted one’ {4th Treatise, 105. 17-18).
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serpent, will ultimately be annulled as man ought not to remain in a state of 
estrangement from God.239 This bruising ‘of the head of the serpent’ is said, both by 
Christian orthodoxy and by Hegel, to be a messianic prophecy, realised historically 
during the Crucifixion. Nevertheless, both Bohme and Hegel warn against reading the 
Fall in a fatalistic way. Bohme explains that ‘it was within [Adam’s] power to decide’ 
whether or not to transgress God’s command, to remain in a state of absolute unity 
with God, or to descend in to the world of differentiation.240
The will of the soul is free, and she can either sink into nothing within herself and 
conceive of herself as the nothing, when she will sprout like a branch out of the tree of 
divine life, and eat of the love of God; or she may in her own self-will rise up in the 
fire, and desire to become a separate tree.241
Further,
The constellation [or power] of the macrocosm should not be pennitted to rule over 
man; but he has his own constellation within himself, which is capable for becoming 
attuned to the harmony of the rise and evolution of the divine world within.242
If Adam had not disobeyed God’s command, then he would have remained in the 
paradiscial state of unity with God, and ignorance of the world of differentiation; the 
soul of Adam ‘could have ruled powerfully over the external principle if  she had 
entered again with her will into the heart of God, into the word of the Lord’.243 
However, to remain in such a state would have been anything but blissful for Adam,
239 LPR, ra, p. 157.240 Hartmann, Boehm e, p. 157.241 Forty Q uestions, 2. 2.242 Epistles, 1. 8.243 F orty Q uestions, 4. 2.
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as he, as previously stated, still would not realise being in such a state of unity with 
God. Böhme has great difficulty in reconciling both the freedom of Adam to fall, and 
yet the necessity of such a fall, as he freely admits:
But now if Adam had continued in paradise, he should have been able to manifest the 
wonders [wonderful things o f God] much better, for they should have been much 
nearer to the form of angels [as Adam was], and such great sins and abominations had 
not been brought to effect with many, as is usually done now. But the spirit o f  
grimness [the spirit o f the world] in the eternal source would also be manifested, and 
open its wonders [to Adam]; o f which much may not be written, for it is a Mysterium 
that belongs not to us to open.244
Just as he cannot reconcile the relationship between the freedom of the Fall and the 
necessity of the Fall, nor can Böhme appreciate the relationship between the universal 
‘wonders of God’ and their particular incarnations. The consequence of this is a kind 
of dialectical misery, man cannot reconcile one opposite with another; they cannot be 
sublated.
Into this great misery man is fallen; and he is fallen quite home to the kingdom of the 
stars and elements, as to his body [i.e. the terrestrial world has taken possession o f  
man’s corporeal constitution]; what these do with him, that he is, and that stands in the 
substance; they make one great, another small, one straight, another stooping and 
crooked; they send one fortune and riches, and another poverty; o f  one they make a 
crafty subtle man according to the council and the kingdom o f this world, and of  
another they make an idiot; they make one a king, and break and pull down another; 
one they kill, another they bring into the world; and they continually drive the mind of  
man, yet into nothing else but into vain troubles, discontent, and vexation.245
Man’s will and imagination have become perverted from their original state. Man has
Princ., 20. 11-12.245 Princ., 17. 68.
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surrounded himself by a world o f will and imagination o f his own. He has therefore 
lost sight o f God, and can only regain his former state and become wise if  he brings 
the activity o f his soul and mind again in harmony with the divine Spirit.246
As to how to overcome the consequences of the Fall, in the fashion of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century commentators, Böhme argues that those who are ‘learned in 
arts and sciences’ rely solely on their faulty capacity for reason, from which ‘nothing 
comes of it but pride of themselves’.247 In a later work Böhme expands upon this 
point, arguing that as knowledge does not come from ‘academic, or university, or 
scholastic learning’, it must come from ‘earnest repentance, fasting, watching, [and] 
praying’.248
So long as Lucifer has his regiment in man, the creature insists on being his own God 
[...] the natural Adam in the kingdom o f corrupted nature does not and cannot find 
repentance in his own nature, for there is no possibility for good therein, but the 
indwelling grace in him awakens the same when the will turns itself to grace.249
But whosoever wills and runs by himself, he separates himself from the entire will of  
God and leads himself into selfhood in which there is no rest, for he must live in his 
own will and running and it is a vain unrest.250
Should now the free will with the desire go toward God, he must first leave his false 
creation [Etwas] and as he does this, he is bare and impotent, for he is again in the first 
nothing [nichts]; then when he wants to go to or with God, he must kill or leave 
behind false selfhood 251
246 Noted in Hartmann, p. 6.
241 Way, p. 1.248 Jakob Böhme The Second  Booke, trans. by John Sparrow (London: Printed by M. Simmons, 1648), 
Preface.249 M yst. M ag., 6 1 :5 0 , 54.250 Ibid., 66. 65.251 Ibid., 27. 5.
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§ 3. 2. Hegel ’s Reading: The Fall into Finitude
The Fall account has been interpreted as ‘the supreme negative m oment in H egel’s 
myth o f  s e l f .252 The Adamic myth and account o f  the Fall is im agistically presented, 
H egel argues, by the Genesis author as a string o f  inconsistencies and oppositions. 
The acquisition o f  knowledge from the ‘Tree o f  the K nowledge o f  Good and E vil’, is 
expressly prohibited by God, and the Fall is accounted for as the failure to obey this 
command.253 H egel finds fault w ith this account in G enesis, as according to the 
biblical narrative, the existence o f  the Tree itself, which does not appear to belong to 
any group or category o f  trees, rather being a single, specific tree, expresses the event 
leading to the Fall not as some ontological concept, but as a contingent, material 
cause.254 H egel argues that this literal explanation cannot be correct due to its 
implications, and wryly quotes Goethe: ‘Bum blebees and wasps? Gods! i f  apple- 
eating makes them ’.255 H egel’s rejection o f  such an explanation, which is historically 
Platonic-Augustinian, is shared by Luther and Bohme, both o f  whom  affirm the 
notion o f  sin as curvatus in se (as a ‘turning in upon its e lf ) . Luther agrees with Hegel 
in that the act o f  ‘apple-eating’ itse lf could not result in a loss o f  G od’s good graces, 
rather the Fall is a result o f  transgressing the divine command. Adam ’s sin is a
252 Crites, D ialectic a n d  Gospel, p. 504.253 Genesis 2. 16-24. Sama (p. 19) argues that ‘knowledge o f  good and ev il’ is yet another merism, and 
refers to a knowledge o f  everything, not only what is good and evil.254 LPR, m, p. 153.25 ‘H um m eln und  Wespen —  G ötter —  w enn das Äpfelfressen G ötter tä t m achen!’. Hegel does not 
give a source for this citation, and Georg Lasson, H egel’s m odem  editor, could not him self trace it. H. 
S. Harris argues that Hegel is in fact quoting Goethe. Cf. LPR, m, p. 167, n. 49.
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turning in upon himself, it is, in the language o f  Böhm e, to fo llow  his own prideful 
self-w ill and not the w ill o f  God. Luther declares that,
When the sophists speak o f original sin, they are speaking only o f wretched and 
abominable lust on concupiscence. But original sin is truly a total fall o f  human 
nature; because the intellect is darkened, we do not acknowledge God and his will and 
do not perceive his works. In addition, because the will is extraordinarily depraved, we 
do not trust in the mercy o f God and do not fear him but unconcerned and disregarding 
the Word and will o f God, we follow the desire and impulses o f the flesh; similarly, 
our conscience is no longer quiet but thinks o f God’s judgement, despairs, and adopts 
illicit defences and remedies.256
H egel’s affirmation o f  such a revisionist and speculative reading o f  Genesis 3 and 
subsequent interpretation o f  the material into an account o f  theodicy has its roots in 
Bohme. Contrast H egel’s remark that i f  the physical act o f  apple-eating results in 
godhood, then anything that does so w ill becom e a god, with B ohm e’s comm ent that,
If the gate o f the deep was not opened to me in my mind so that I can see [or know] 
the strife that is against the Kingdom of God then I should also suppose, that the 
matter [of the Fall] was merely a disobedience about the biting o f an apple, as the text 
in Moses barely passes it over.257
Bohm e would not agree with H egel’s rejection o f  the portrayal o f  the Tree as o f  a 
particular, contingent variety, but states that:
The Tree o f  Temptation was earthly, as now all the Trees are; all the other [sic] were 
paradisical, from which Adam could eat paradisical virtue in his mouth, and had no 
need o f  stomach and guts; for they [the Trees] were like his body, and [like] the
256 Luthers Werke, XLII, p. 86.
257 Princ., 17. 1.
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Element, and the Tree o f  Tem ptation  was like  the fo u r elements.258
Böhm e’s conceptualisation o f  the Tree o f  Knowledge in this way is due to depiction 
o f  Adam as created from the eternal element, for, if,
God created man o f a lump o f  earth [...] [and] If Adam [before the Fall] had been of  
the earth earthly, then God would not have forbid him the earthly fruit [...] Reason 
must not imagine, that God ever made any beast out o f a lump o f earth, as a potter 
makes a pot. But he said, Let there come forth all sorts o f  beasts, every one after its 
kind; that is, out o f all essences, every one after the property o f its essence [...] How 
then should the image o f God be made out of the fragile [or corruptible] essences? But 
it [must be and] was made in the paradise out o f the eternal [essence].259
A  striking similarity between Böhm e and H egel’s depiction here becom es clear. For 
both, the Tree o f  K nowledge is portrayed as an entity distinct in form and substance 
from the established nature o f  Adam. For Hegel, the tree is a ‘heavenly’ universal in 
contrast to Adam as a particular being. For Böhme, the tree is a contingent, earthly 
thing in contrast to Adam as a being who is the similitude o f  the eternal element. Both  
accounts, then, are fundamentally about the transgressive, and w hile o f  course the Fall 
account, read in any way, is the epitom e o f  transgressive behaviour, what is being 
highlighted in both o f  these accounts is not the traditional injunction against 
disobeying the positive authority o f  God, rather the proclamation o f  the innate 
disjunction between the worlds o f  the creator and the created. Böhm e further declares 
that, ‘when Adam ’s hunger was set after the ‘earthliness’ (.Irdigkeit), it did, by its
258 Ibid., 17. 19.259 Ibid., 17. 20-22 .
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magnetic power, impress into his fair image the vanity o f  ev il and good; whereupon 
the heavenly image o f  the angelical world’s essence disappeared’.260 Adam ’s sin  was 
the lust after earthliness, the material world o f  the four elem ents, in disobedience o f  
the divine command. Adam ’s sin, therefore, echoes Lucifer’s: both wished to rise 
above their station, to know more than was the original intention in their design, and 
to usurp the place o f  God. Both are distinguished, however, in that w hile Lucifer 
sought mastery over the first principle, Adam w illed to enter the third. Therefore, and 
to return to Hegel, the Fall o f  Man account must not be read as issuing from ‘an 
entirely finite, comm onplace result’, but must be read as ideal, as speculative261 
Adam ’s sin is the contravention o f  G od’s command to remain in the embrace o f  the 
universal, and not to descend in to the world o f  the particular.
For Hegel, as with Böhme, a strong element o f  necessity in to the Fall account 
is argued. For both, the fall o f  Adam is a necessary event, an incident which brings 
about a reconstitution o f  man, closer to his creator’s original intention in design.262 
The Fall account is, therefore, ‘the eternal myth o f  m an’s becom ing m an’.263 For 
H egel, the Fall leads to the acquisition o f  knowledge, to know  the difference between  
good and evil, and, without that faculty, man would have simply remained ‘a 
beast’.264 W hile it was forbidden to eat the fruit o f  the Tree, the knowledge it
260 M yst. M ag., 19 .3 .261LPR, m, p. 153.262 The Christian Religion, Peter C. Hodgson commentary, III. 3.263 'D er Sünderfall ist der ew ige M ythos des M enschen w odurch er eben M ensch w ir d  —  Glöckner, n, 
p. 43.264 LPR, m, p. 153. See Tillich’s comment that ‘Creaturely freedom is the point at which creation and
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bestowed upon Adam is precisely what it constitutes to be a human being.265 Adam  
does not fall from the divine image, for even in the biblical narrative God comments: 
‘See, the man has becom e like one o f  us, knowing good and ev il’.266 The knowledge  
o f  the particular, the knowledge o f  the difference between good and evil, precisely  
constitutes ‘the divine in humanity’.267 There is no m ention o f  Adam ’s dream and 
subsequent appearance o f  Eve in H egel’s exegesis o f  the Fall narrative. It has be 
argued that the reason for this is that the break-up into differentiation occurs too early 
in the biblical narrative for H egel’s exegesis to fit the myth.268
In his prelapsarian state, Adam is an innocent spirit. But, according to the 
trinitarian scheme o f  which Adam is a microcosm , his self-consciousness is im plicit 
in his existence.269 H ow  this self-consciousness is made explicit is in the follow ing  
way. The Fall leads to a ‘separation’ (Trennung) in thought between Adam as a 
concept and Adam as a particular spirit, or between humanity as an idea, and the 
individual in particular. This separation brings about a ‘cleavage’ within humanity as 
a concept. At the same time, however, cleavage is essential to spirit, for the nature o f  
spirit is to other itse lf from itse lf in order to com e to self-consciousness. This 
separation and cleavage brings about ‘estrangement’ (Entfremdung), which is argued
the fall coincide’. System atic Theology, I, p. 256.265 LPR, m, p. 153.*26 Genesis 3. 22.267 LPR, in, p. 154.268 Crites, D ialectic and  G ospel, p. 502.269 Ibid., p. 501.
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to be the ‘condition o f  possibility’ for evil.270 Evil is then actualised or manifested  
from this possibility in two ways: firstly, when the cleavage is thought to be 
irreconcilable and becom es ‘alienation’ (Entfremdung), and secondly, when humanity 
tries to escape cleavage by trying to revert to the lost state o f  nature, postlapsus. 
Hodgson argues that H egel is thinking o f  Paul’s dualism between ‘those who live  
according to the flesh’ ( K a r a  a a p K o t)  and ‘those who live according to the spirit’ 
(K ara rcveupa).271 Existence according to the flesh is often condemned by Paul: it is 
denounced as being the morality o f  the slave who abases h im self before an earthly, 
and not heavenly, master; it is used as an incitement o f  the rich and worldly, o f  whom  
‘not many [are] w ise x a x a  o d p x a ’, and, i f  one continues to live according to the 
flesh ‘you w ill [surely] die: but i f  by the Spirit you put to death the deeds o f  the body, 
you w ill live’.272 The relationship between living according to the flesh and according 
to the spirit is, in H egelian terms, a distinction between immediate and self-conscious 
existence. One variety o f  evil occurs when immediate sensuous is posited above self- 
consciousness, which is superannuated: it is an immediate and, therefore, ‘inferior 
and inadequate’ perspective.273
Through the introspection and introversion (Insichgehen) which alienation
270 Hodgson, H egel and  C hristian Theology, p. 149.271 Ibid., See Romans 8. 5.272 Colossians 3. 22-24; I Corinthians 1. 26; Romans 8. 13. Paul’s usage o f  the term, coming from the 
Hebrew basar, has a variety o f  meanings, from the relationships between fellow  humans beings, 
personal weakness and desire, and corruption by evil. Moravcsik, p. 66. See also Robinson, M an  pp. 
111—122; Walter David Stacey, The Pauline View o f  M an, (London: Macmillan & Co., 1956) pp. 154 -  
173. Paul’s view would be reiterated in the Reformation, by Luther’s reproval of, so-called, fleshly  
conduct ( tertius usus legis).273 Edith A. Moravcsik, A n  Introduction to Syntactic Theory (N ew  York: Continuum International,
2006), p. 66.
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(Entfremdung) brings about, a sense of otherness is engendered. This otherness exists 
in thought: it is ‘thought which contains otherness, and is, thus, the self-imposed 
opposed thought of good and evil’.274
Man is pictorially represented by the religious mind in this way: it happened once as 
an event, with no necessity about it, that he lost the form o f harmonious unity with 
himself by plucking the fruits o f the tree o f the knowledge o f good and evil, and was 
driven from the state o f innocence, from paradise, from the Garden with all its 
creatures, and from nature offering its bounties without man’s toil.275
Adam now experiences the poles of good and evil within his own consciousness, as 
an inner dialectic.
Evil appears as the first actual expression of the self-concentrated consciousness. And 
because the thoughts o f good and evil are utterly opposed, and this opposition is not 
yet broken down, this consciousness is essentially and merely evil. At the same time, 
however, owing to just this very opposition, there is present also the good 
consciousness opposing that one that is evil, and again their relation to each other.276
Hegel’s viewpoint with regard to evil and knowledge is identical to Böhme’s in the 
respect of being necessary in order to overcome the ignorance of the paradiscial state 
by first breaking up the divine unity, then returning at the end of history to a harmony 
closer to perfection. Both philosophers go against the prevailing attitude of religious 
orthodoxy in this respect, as the acquisition of knowledge for the purposes of what we 
might call self-improvement is treated by Luther and Protestant Scholasticism as
274 PhM, 770.
275 Ibid., 770-771.
276 Ibid., 771.
239
Satanic.277 Similarly, for Hegel, where the necessity of the Fall is concerned, and as 
O’Regan notes, a fall into ‘pain’ (Schmerz) and ‘evil’ (das Böse) is ‘a phase of the 
self-determination of the divine, which self-determination provides the adequate 
definition of freedom’.278 Adam’s fall and the institution of evil in the world is, 
therefore, read by Hegel according to a ‘teleological-eschatological perspective’.279 
Ideologically, man’s goal of knowledge is heralded by the undesired break-up of the 
divine unity. Eschatologically, however, man is essentially good, as he wills the 
reinstitution and reconciliation of the lost harmony with the divine. Further, according 
to Hegel’s analysis, bodily mortality does not become the punishment for Adam’s 
transgression, rather it is part of his eternal nature from his creation. That Adam was 
prevented from eating from the ‘Tree of Life’ (which would have made him 
immortal) is irrelevant —  immortality would negate his role in the dialectic as the 
vehicle for the actualisation of the idea (i.e. God). If knowledge allows for the 
possibility of evil, then it is thinking which may actualise it. ‘Human beings become 
evil by cognizing,’ Hegel writes in the Lectures in the Philosophy o f Religion, and 
‘cognition is the source of all evil’.280 The existence of evil is, however, necessary as 
it is absolutely intrinsic to finite spirit. Hegel writes that ‘God [is] the absolutely 
positive; therefore what differs from him [is] the negative. Evil must exist, otherwise
27 O ’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, p. 163.278 Ibid., p. 154.279 Ibid., p. 159.280 LPR, E 205-206; G 137-138.
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there would be no capacity for human progress.281 This negative appears on the side 
of worldly essence, of human being. This negative of God is evil, or wickedness in 
general’.282 Hegel argues that the contradiction lies in that, while the expulsion from 
the garden is the means to ensure man’s mortality, mortality is yet ‘the necessary 
consequence of finitude’.283
The entire process may be summed up dialectically in this way: man betrays 
the divine command, an evil act but allowing the possibility for knowledge, an event 
‘upon which the rise of consciousness is posited’, and yet knowledge is necessary for 
what it is to be a human being, it is ‘the principle of spirituality’. Thesis reflects 
against antithesis, creating a contradiction. This possibility of reflection is instituted 
and realised in God’s parting words to the serpent, that he ‘will put enmity between 
you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed; he shall bruise your head, 
and you shall bruise his heel’.284 Once again, a concept, being the consequence of 
knowledge (sin), is not taken as an ontological general force or law, but as a 
contingent, autonomous event (as was the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil in 
the Fall scenario).285 Hegel makes the distinction, however, between two forms of 
knowledge: the first, seen in the above biblical passage as a consequence of sin, is 
external to Adam, and the second, reflection in the form of ‘concrete cognition’, 
which dwells within him. It is this latter form of knowledge, Hegel wryly remarks,
281 Zandee, p. 23.282 LPR, E 205-206; G 137-138.283 LPR, III, p. 155.284 Genesis 3. 15.285 LPR, m, p. 156.
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which will ‘bruise the head of the serpent.’286 As Hegel comments in the 
Encyclopaedia:
The spiritual is distinguished from the natural, and more especially from the animal, 
life, in the circumstance that it does not continue a mere stream of tendency, but 
sunders itself to self-realization. But this position o f severed life has in its turn to be 
suppressed, and the spirit has by its own act to win its way to concord again. The final 
concord then is spiritual; that is, the principle o f restoration is found in thought, and 
thought only. The hand that inflicts the wound is also the hand which heals it.287
The synthesis of this contradiction, therefore, is as Hegel states: knowledge reconciles 
the rift caused by the Fall, healing ‘the injury of separation’.288 Knowledge then, for 
Hegel, is surely that which ‘heals the wound that it itself is’.289
This is a deep truth, that evil lies in consciousness: for the brutes are neither evil nor 
good; the merely natural man quite as little. Consciousness occasions the separation o f  
the ego, in its boundless freedom as arbitrary choice, from the pure essence o f the will 
—  i.e. from the good. Knowledge, as the disannulling o f the unity o f mere nature, is 
the ‘Fall’, which is no casual conception, but the eternal history o f spirit. For the state 
of innocence, the paradisiacal condition, is that o f the brute. Paradise is a park, where 
only brutes, not men, can remain. For the brute is one with God only implicitly [not 
consciously]. Only man’s spirit (that is) has a self-cognizant existence. This existence 
for self, this consciousness, is at the same time separation from the universal and 
divine spirit. If I hold to my abstract freedom, in contraposition to the Good, 1 adopt 
the standpoint o f evil. The Fall is therefore the eternal mythus o f  man —  in fact, the 
very transition by which he becomes man. Persistence in this standpoint is, however, 
evil, and the feeling o f pain at such a condition, and of longing to transcend it, we find 
in David, when say says: ‘Lord, create for me a pure heart, a new steadfast Spirit’.290
This argument follows Hegel’s ontological scheme of spirit coming to self­
286 LPR, m, p. 156.287 Miller, p. 43.28 LPR, ffl,p. 155-157.289 Ib id , p. 155.290 LPH, p. 3 2 If.
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consciousness, that God is a finite entity before creation, but through the intercession 
of man the process of God becoming an infinite being is initiated. Mortality, and so 
the possibility of evil, seen in terms of the separation of knowledge from the infinite, 
is necessarily connected with the essence of man, and his role in the process of the 
idea coming to know itself as a whole.291 Böhme and Hegel are thus much closer to 
Christian Neo-Platonism in espousing their kind of epistemology.292 The criticism 
may be made that in order to accept Hegel’s Böhme-based speculative interpretation 
of the Fall, one must first accept man’s role as the vehicle of the actualisation of the 
spirit. However, this concept is not legitimised at the beginning of the Hegel’s system, 
rather it emerges as an ‘absolute truth’ at the end of the dialectic.293
Hegel’s speculative treatment of the Fall of Man account in Genesis can be 
read as a reaction against the general attitude of German Enlightenment writers 
concerning of human goodness. This attitude constituted a ‘naive [...] view’ of 
human action being primarily motivated by an ‘aboriginal goodness’,294 a rejection of 
the viewpoint of Protestant scholasticism. Hegel agrees with Protestant scholasticism, 
disagreeing with the Aufklärer, that the Adamic fall constitutes a true and faithful 
relation of the truth of mankind’s origins, and portrays man’s nature as an essentially 
‘evil’ one. It is evil in so far that it is erotic rather than agapaic: man’s nature is not an 
overflowing, unselfish love for God, but a heartfelt feeling of lack, a desire to
291 O ’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, p. 163,292 Ibid.293 Bowie, p. 85.294 O’Regan, The H eterodox H egel, p. 158.
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rekindle the relationship between himself and God which was lost as a result of the 
Fall. Nevertheless, Hegel in the same breath agrees with the Aufklärer, disagreeing 
with Protestant Scholasticism, in his rejection of the Augustinian and Reformation 
doctrine of original sin, passed down to succeeding generations biologically or 
otherwise, in promulgating the idea that the possibility of committing evil action is 
part of man’s nature from the beginning. Böhme, in the same way, also disagrees with 
this normative doctrine of original sin, as he believes the regeneration of the 
uncorrupted imago Dei is still possible. For both philosophers, Adam’s loss of 
innocence is really a loss of ignorance, as the possibility of evil is as a necessary 
prerequisite for knowledge. This move beyond aboriginal ignorance does entail a loss 
of the beatific vision (Blick)-, post lapsus, Adam may only attain a momentary 
‘glimpse’ (Augenblick) of what has been lost during certain ‘hours of grace’ 
(Gnadenstunden).295 This loss, the knowledge of this loss, and all subsequent attempts 
to regain what has been lost, constitutes the ‘agon of history’, a concept whose 
influence is seen as abundantly clear in Hegel’s work.296 A criticism of this theme 
might be informed by Hegel’s general ontological scheme, the return of spirit to itself 
once it becomes to self-consciousness through the process of history. It might be 
objected that if mankind does indeed return to that paradisiacal state at the end of 
history, would that not entail a return to aboriginal ignorance? This criticism can be 
argued to be a misreading of Hegel’s own eschatological scheme. And, as previously
295 This use o f  the term G nadenstuden  originates with Pietist biblical scholar F.C. Oetinger. Cf. 
O’Regan, G nostic Apocalypse, p. 45.296 Ibid.
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argued, Hegel’s eschatological vision does not merely signify a wholesale return to 
the earliest, fundamental stage, but also that something new is added. It is not ‘a 
return into the same; it is a return into the more’.297
The similarities between Hegel and Böhme’s treatment of the Fall of Man 
account in the Genesis narrative cannot be underestimated. Both subscribe to the view 
that paradise is not a state which mankind can long endure. For Hegel, knowledge 
(the acquisition of which is evil as a result) is intrinsic for the definition of man as 
man; the destruction of the divine unity is the inevitably result. In the same vein, 
Böhme also warns that the state of innocence is also one of ignorance. 
Eschatologically, the Fall account serves for both as a necessary point of departure for 
a return to a superior mode of being with the divine. Man, removed from paradise, 
estranged from his prior state of universality with God, now is forced to descend in to 
nature, in to the world of mere particularity.
297 Ib id , p. 169.
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis has been to engage in a comparative examination of the 
content of Böhme and Hegel’s speculative thought, as it emerges both through 
their intellectual development, in their understanding of the concept of God, and 
in the traditionally Christian accounts of the creation of the world and the Fall.
As it appeared throughout the course of Böhme and Hegel’s intellectual 
development, both philosophers were motivated to find a way of expressing truths 
which they considered to be perennial, but which could not, they thought, be truly 
expressed by the religion which claimed them under its authority. The desire to 
articulate this eternal content took each through various modes of expression: 
from the reactionary spirit of humanism and Enlightenment criticism, to the 
writings of Hermetics and the German mystics. Both found, however, that each 
mode of representation bore some deficiency inherent within it, and returned 
whence they came, namely to the original spirit of the Reformation. For Hegel, 
however, this return entailed more than Böhme’s, for Hegel believed in the 
capacity of philosophy, and philosophy alone, to liberate the perennial content of 
religion from the trappings of mysticism, analogy, metaphor, and simile.
The first instance of this power of philosophical language was examined in 
relation to the Christian concept of God. Böhme’s yearning to reveal the core of 
the hidden deity spurred on Hegel’s desire to move away from the infantile 
notions of Christian orthodoxy on the nature of the divine, and of the Trinity as a 
mere mystery yet one which is composed of real persons, and towards a rational,
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more cohesive understanding of the eternal unity of God.
The examination ended with an appraisal of their readings of the creation 
the world and its fall, which, too, were shown to mirror one-another. Both argue 
against the orthodox separation between creation ex Deo and ex nihilo accounts, 
and seek to reconcile them as mere abstractions expressing the manifestation of 
God in both idea and in appearance. Both also argue strongly for the necessity of a 
fall from original unity, the speculative reading of which seeks to describe ‘the 
eternal myth of man becoming man’; the movement away from the 
epistemological innocence intrinsic to paradise and towards the differentiation in 
thought necessary for the birth of self-consciousness.
To say in conclusion of this comparative study of Böhme and Hegel’s 
thought, it becomes apparent that, while Hegel finds the content of Böhme’s 
theosophical system to be a source of inspiration for his own work, the 
representational mode of expression in which that content is rendered is utterly 
inferior to the language of philosophy. Fortunately, as, according to Hegel, both 
philosophy and theology share an identical common subject-matter, that content 
can be rescued by stripping away religious analogy, metaphor, and parable, so that 
the kernel of truth that remains can be expressed in the clear and rational language 
of thought. To repeat the findings of another commentator, we are led to conclude 
that ‘such qualifications aside, when Hegel comes to the content of Böhme’s 
speculation he is clearly a believer’.1
How, then, does the content of Böhme and Hegel’s thought find itself
1 David Walsh, ‘The Historical Dialectic of Spirit’, p. 18.
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evaluated amongst succeeding generations of commentators on religion? The 
content of Böhme’s philosophy has had, to say the least, a tremendously varied 
reception among theologians and philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Theologically, Böhme’s body of work was said to have ‘as many 
blasphemies as there are lines’ by his latter day pastor, Gregorius Richter, while 
Böhme personally was considered ‘the antichrist’, a ‘villain of a shoemaker’ who 
had been ‘daubed over with dirt by the devil’.2 Johann Trick refers to Böhme’s 
work as ‘the vilest excrement of the devil’, having ‘the father of lies for its origin, 
[...] [who] grunted out of [Böhme’s] mouth’.3 In short, the so-called ‘ladder of 
dreams’, which Böhme’s philosophy was considered, was thought to be a 
temptation of God and, if studied, would lead the faithful ‘down to perdition’.4 
Some theologians were more sympathetic: Johann Gichtel, for instance, describes 
Böhme’s work as ‘a gift from God’, claiming that anyone whom ‘in our time wish 
to bring forth anything fundamental [...] must borrow it from Böhme’.5 Many 
other theologians of the period echoed this kind of sentiment, among them John
2 Richard Jecht, Jakob Böhme: Gedenkgabe der Stadt Görlitz zu seinem 300 jährigen Todestage 
(Görlitz: Selbstverlag des Magistrats der Stadt Görlitz, 1924), p. 43; 70-71; Franz Hartmann, Life 
and Doctrines o f  Jacob Boehme (Vienna: Theosophist, 1891; repr. Kessinger Publishing Co., 
1992), p. 23.
3 Quoted in Hartmann, p. 23.
4 Attributed to Friedrich Delitsch. Noted in Hartmann, p. 23. Much of the poor reputation earned 
by Böhme’s philosophical system is found in Abraham Carlov, Anti-Böhmius, in quo Docetur quid 
Habendum de Secta Jacobi Böhmen Satoris Görlicensis (Wittenberg: Schrödterm 1684); and 
Abraham Hinckelmann, 40 Wichtige Fragen betreffende die Lehre so in Jacob Böhmens Schriften 
enthalten (Hamburg: Schulissischen Buchladen, 1693). The honour of the most voluminous 
refutations of Böhme’s philosophy belongs to Johann Frick and Johann Christoph Holthausen. See 
Johann Frick, Gründliche Undersuchung Jacob Boehmens vornehmster Irrthümer: So auss dessen 
eigen Schriften gezeiget und auss H. Schrift widerlegt werden: Vorrede Dr. Elias Veiels (Ulm: zu 
finden bey Wolffgang Kraer Buchbindern druckts Ferdinand Manch, 1697); and Johann Christoph 
Holthausen, Teutscher Anti-Barclajus, das ist, Aussführliche Untersuchung der gantzen Quackerey 
und Apologia Roberti Barclay ([n.p]: in Verlegung Johann David Zunners; Druckts Johann 
Dieterich Friedgen, 1691).
5 Cf. Johann Gichtel, Theoscopia Practica  (Amsterdam: [n. pub.], 1722).
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Winkler, John Mathaei, Frederick Brenkling, Philipp Jakob Spener, Friedrich 
Christoph Oetinger, Johann Oberlin, and le philosophe inconnu, Louis Claude de 
Saint Martin, who learned German specifically for the purpose of reading Böhme.6 
Saint Martin, recalling John the Baptist’s proclamation in Matthew 3. 11., declares 
that he is himself,
not worthy to unloose the shoestrings of this wonderful man, whom I regard as the 
greatest light that has ever appeared upon the earth, second only to Him who was 
the Light itself [...] I advise you by all means to throw yourself in this abyss of 
knowledge of the profoundest of all truths [...] I find in his works such a 
profundity and exaltation of thought, and such a simple and delicious nutriment, 
that I would consider it a waste of time to seek for such things in any other place.7
Philosophically, it has been said Böhme’s work did not receive much appreciation 
from the rationalists, especially because of his reputation as a alchemist. Böhme 
did receive a great deal of appreciation from the romantics, however, best known 
among them Novalis, Heinrich Stilling, Jacobi, Friedrich Schlegel, Goethe, Franz 
von Baader, and Schelling.
Hegel’s theological and philosophical reception has been of a similar 
nature. After an initial period of good opinion and general approbation in the 
1820s and 1830s, Hegel’s ontological system slid into its rapid descent in the 
middle of the nineteenth century —  the time of the trenchant criticism of 
Feuerbach, Stimer, Marx, and Kierkegaard. Unlike the philosophical schemes of 
mainstream Enlightenment writers, such as Helvetius, Holbach, Bentham, and
6 See Louis Claude de Saint Martin, Theosophic Correspondence between Louis Claude de Saint 
Martin and Kirchberger, Baron de Liebistorf (Pasadena, T.X.: Theosophical University Press, 
1991).
7 Saint Martin, 97. 32, 199. 30.
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Burke, Hegel’s central thesis, of spirit which descends into the material world to 
redeem itself, is a position which finds no modem adherents. Little has to be said 
of Hegel’s reception in the twentieth century from those who followed in the 
tradition of the continentals, of which Schopenhauer, Jung, and Popper come most 
strongly to mind. While Hegel’s concept of spirit finds sympathy among some 
modem theologians, such as Eberhard Jüngel, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Jürgen 
Moltmann, among the majority, Hegel’s God serves as an antitype against which 
the orthodox define themselves.8 The most commanding of modem Christian 
theologians, Karl Barth, Bultmann, Karl Rahner, and Tillich, are ‘profoundly 
ahistorical theologians [...] engaged in a deep negation of Hegelian thinking, and 
each of whom [affirm] a purely non-Hegelian God’.9
It is true that Böhme and Hegel’s ontological scheme is quite dead. The 
cause of this demise lies in the fact that, at heart, both schemes are entirely 
reactionary. Without the struggle against the values which defined them — 
between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the Reformation and the Enlightenment, and 
rationalism and romanticism — the raison d ’être of both philosophies no longer 
applies. Both Böhme and Hegel’s philosophical position are productive of a keen 
sense of Weltschmerz, the feeling that the modem world is ideologically dead, cut
8 The Hegelian conception of God is rejected not only by Christian theologians across the Catholic 
and Protestant divide, but also amongst Jewish theologians, such as Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas, 
and Derrida. In this way the rejection of the Böhmean-Hegelian conception of God can be said to 
be truly transconfessional.
9 Altizer, p. 82. See Wolfhart Pannenberg, ‘The Significance of Christianity in the Philosophy of 
Hegel’, in The Idea o f  God and Human Freedom  (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), pp. 
144-177; Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross o f  Christ as the Foundation and 
Criticism o f  Christian Theology (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); and Eberhard Jüngel, G od as 
the Mystery o f  the World: On the Foundation o f  the Theology o f  the Crucified One in the Dispute 
between Theism and Atheism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1983).
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off from any real sense of meaning, and must, somehow, be redeemed with 
reference to the past. The desire, for both, is as Nietzsche has it, to ‘redeem what 
is past, and to transform every “It was” into “Thus I would have it!” —  that only 
do I call redemption!’.10 In this way, Bohme and Hegel’s central thesis, like those 
of Rousseau, de Tocqueville, Marx, or Arendt, is dispensed with, for, after the 
proclamation of ‘end of ideology’, they are now strangers in the world of the 
modern-day mainstream.11
But this, as Hegel would argue, is the very nature of spirit. To appear is to 
eventually disappear, and again to return. There is much, still, to be said for the 
application of Bohme and Hegel’s speculation on modem day theological and 
philosophical difficulties: o f historicism, of the nature of the Church, of personal 
and civic morality, and of the end of history.
The life of spirit is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of destruction; it 
endures death and in death maintains its being. It only wins to its truth when it 
finds itself utterly tom asunder.1
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans, by Thomas Common (Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1993) p. 131.
11 David Easton, A Systems Analysis o f  Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965). See 
Taylor, pp. 538—542.
12 PhM, 93.
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